How is teacher evaluation policy enacted?-The workings of performativity and micro-politics in Japanese schools by Katsuno, Masaaki
 
 
 
http://researchcommons.waikato.ac.nz/ 
 
 
Research Commons at the University of Waikato 
 
Copyright Statement: 
The digital copy of this thesis is protected by the Copyright Act 1994 (New Zealand). 
The thesis may be consulted by you, provided you comply with the provisions of the 
Act and the following conditions of use:  
 Any use you make of these documents or images must be for research or private 
study purposes only, and you may not make them available to any other person.  
 Authors control the copyright of their thesis. You will recognise the author’s right 
to be identified as the author of the thesis, and due acknowledgement will be 
made to the author where appropriate.  
 You will obtain the author’s permission before publishing any material from the 
thesis.  
 
  
 
How is teacher evaluation policy enacted?  
—  The w or ki ng s  of  per fo r mat iv i ty  and mic ro - pol i t i c s  in  J a panes e  sc hool s  —  
 
 
 
A thesis  submitted in fulfi lment   
of the requirements for the degree  of  
 
Doctor  of Philosophy  
in 
Education  
at  
The University of  Waikato  
by  
Masaaki Katsuno  
 
 
 
2013 
 
 I 
Statement of Intellectual Ownership 
 
This thesis is my own original work. The thesis does not exceed 100,000 
words. 
 
Publication deriving from the Thesis 
 
Part of the thesis has been published in the form of: 
Katsuno, M. (2010). Teacher evaluation in Japanese schools: An 
examination from a micro-political or relational viewpoint. Journal of 
Education Policy, 25(3), 293-307. 
 II 
Abstract 
 
This thesis is concerned with the extent to which new teacher evaluation 
policies and practices in Japan are about controlling teachers or represent 
opportunities for authentic professional development. It seeks to examine how the 
new teacher evaluation policies are embedded within the wider policy formation, 
what perspectives teachers have on the new policies and what their experiences 
are, and how the new teacher evaluation policies are actually being enacted in 
schools.  
The thesis uses a range of methods to explore these concerns. For the purpose 
of macro analysis of the new teacher evaluation policies, it examines both primary 
and secondary documentation around policy development. For studying the 
impact of the policy in schools, it draws on data from a national survey and in-
depth interviews with a sample of teachers and head teachers. In this way, it 
employs a mixed methods approach in which quantitative data is used to provide a 
general picture of how teachers experience and perceive the new teacher 
evaluation policies and practices and qualitative data is used to provide the depth 
of analysis required to look at the nature of performativity in schools.  
The concept of performativity has been central to the overall investigation. 
The study argues for a particular reading of performativity — a work through, as 
opposed to work upon, perspective. This analytical lens illustrates how the new 
teacher evaluation policies have played a role in producing or reinforcing the 
mutually policing relations that lead to destabilisation of teacher‘s identities.  
This thesis concludes that the enactment of new teacher evaluation policies 
has had significant indirect impacts on teachers and teachers‘ work by affecting 
modes of school management and teachers‘ relationships. By illustrating the 
usefulness of the work through perspective of performativity, it has enabled 
theorizing of performativity to advance. It also illuminates both congruence and 
 III 
variance between teacher evaluation policies as enacted in Japan and other 
countries. Japan‘s teacher evaluation is no less effective as a measure of political 
control than its counterparts in other countries, but it can work in a more subtle 
way: teacher evaluation affects, repositions, and reconstructs teachers‘ work and 
identities through affected relationships as mentioned above. This implies that 
teachers as well as policymakers should develop a more broad, macro-political 
and critical perspective on teacher evaluation. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
In recent years almost all of the local boards of education (Kyoiku Iinkai) 
across Japan have begun putting in place redesigned schemes for teacher 
evaluation (Monbukagakusho, 2010a). Previous schemes that involved only 
unilateral efficiency rating of teachers by head teachers were widely considered to 
be ineffective for the development of teachers. Furthermore, teacher unions had 
denounced these older schemes as a control measure over teachers (Aspinall, 
2001; Duke, 1973; Schoppa, 1991). On the other hand, the new schemes feature 
apparently development-orientated and collaborative elements, such as goal-
setting and assessment meetings with head teachers, lesson observations and 
feedback, and self-reviews of performance and competence (Kariya & Kaneko, 
2010). This means that Japanese teachers have to account for their performance 
and competence in new ways. The nature and impact of these new 
accountabilities are the main concerns of this thesis. 
Teacher evaluation has been a continuing issue in Japanese schools. In the late 
1950s, a heated confrontation arose between the government and the Japan 
Teachers Union (Nihon Kyoshokuin Kumiai: Nikkyoso), the then-powerful 
teachers union, over the ―efficiency rating plan of teachers (Kyoin Kinmu Hyotei)‖ 
(Aspinall, 2001, p. 42). Originally, the government planned to directly link an 
efficiency rating to the teachers‘ pay. This led to fierce resistance from the union, 
including teachers going on mass leave
1
. This undermined the schemes that had 
been introduced across the nation and the link between rating and pay was 
abandoned. Around the turn of the millennium, the government‘s interest in 
                                                        
1
 Under the Local Public Service Law, strikes by government employees (including 
teachers working for public schools) were banned and are still illegal today. To circumvent 
the prohibition, the teachers union directed its members to all go on leave at the same time. 
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teacher evaluation resurfaced (Monbukagakusho, 2001). This coincided with the 
―Structural Reform of Compulsory Education (Gimukyoiku no kozokaikaku).‖2 
The policy looked to new ways of controlling teachers as well as new forms of 
school organisation (Fujita, 2010). The same policy put particular emphasis on the 
enhancement of teachers‘ abilities and competence, leading to school 
improvement, by means of a ―professional developmental model‖ of teacher 
evaluation (Kariya & Kaneko, 2010; Kyoin no Jinjikoka ni kansuru Kenkyukai, 
1999; Yaosaka, 2005). 
Nevertheless, there is evidence that the redesigned model of teacher evaluation 
has failed to gain teachers‘ confidence. It has been the subject of member surveys 
conducted by the Tokyo High School Teachers Union (Tokyo-to Kotogakko 
Kyoshokuin Kumiai, 2002, 2004, 2006) as well as investigations by local boards 
of education and educational researchers (Osaka-fu Kyoiku Iinkai Jimukyoku, 
2004; Urano, 2002). Overall, the results have shown that in spite of the 
remodelling, teachers have perceived the policies and practices rather negatively. 
Some teachers have doubted the proclaimed effectiveness of the new schemes, 
while others have suggested that the earlier, highly contested policies were 
                                                        
2
 In its public document of the same title, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports and 
Technology declared that the compulsory education system was in need of structural reform 
to assure its quality through the following cycling steps: the central government is to 
assume the responsibility for setting national goals and assuring the infrastructure to achieve 
these goals, more power and responsibilities are to be delegated to municipal governments 
and schools, and then the central government is to check up on the achievement 
(Monbukagakusho, 2005a). In summary, the ―Structural Reform of Compulsory Education‖ 
has given the state more strategic and stronger power, with local education boards, schools, 
and teachers being given some autonomy in how they should work while dealing with 
severely constraints on the scope of their work. See Chapter 2 for more details. 
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strategies for the government to control teachers and that the redesigned model of 
teacher evaluation is more of the same. 
The broad concern guiding this thesis then has been the extent to which the 
new teacher evaluation policies and practices in Japan are about controlling 
teachers or represent opportunities for authentic professional development. It 
centres on the following three research questions: 
 
(1) How are the new teacher evaluation policies embedded within the wider policy 
formation, namely the ―Structural Reform of Compulsory Education‖? 
(2) What are teachers‘ perspectives on and experiences of the new teacher 
evaluation policies?  
(3) How are the new teacher evaluation policies actually being enacted in schools?  
 
Whilst the first question is concerned with macro analysis, the others look at what 
is happening within the social interactions between teachers.  
Additionally, here, I use the term ―enact‖ with reference to Ball‘s work on 
policy sociology (Ball, 1990, 1994). Ball wrote about the rationale of adopting the 
term of policy ―enactment‖ rather than ―implementation‖ as follows: ―policies do 
not normally tell you what to do, they create circumstances in which the range of 
options available in deciding what to do are narrowed or changed, or particular 
goals or outcomes are set‖ (Ball 1994, p. 19, cited in Braun, Maguire, & Ball, 
2010, p. 549). This approach to exploration into policy processes gives attention 
to the ways teachers make sense of their circumstances, including the policies 
concerned. In other words, it gives attention to their agency (cf. Weick, 1995). 
Drawing on the findings from the case studies in four secondary schools in 
England, Ball, Maguire, Braun, and Hoskins argue that ―actors in schools are 
positioned differently and take up different positions in relation to policy‖ (Ball, 
Maguire, Braun, & Hoskins, 2011a, p. 625). At the same time, however, the 
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authors distinguish between ―coercive‖ and ―emancipatory‖ policies, and later in a 
similar vein ―imperative/disciplinary‖ and ―exhortative/developmental‖ policies 
(Ball, Maguire, Braun, & Hoskins, 2011b, pp. 612-615). The former type of 
policy greatly constrains teacher‘s agency, setting them in passive, delivery roles. 
On the other hand, the latter type of policy allows teachers to make judgments and 
thus have a sense of professional efficacy. My assumption is that teacher 
evaluation policy closes down rather than opens up possibilities of reflexive 
responses and exemplifies an ―imperative/disciplinary‖ policy. It is heavily 
implicated in performativity. 
The concept of performativity is highly relevant and will be central to the 
overall investigation. Performativity is defined by Ball (2003) as: 
 
a technology, a culture and a mode of regulation that employs judgments, 
comparisons and displays as means of incentive, control, attrition and 
change — based on rewards and sanctions (both material and symbolic). 
The performances (of individual subjects or organisations) serve as 
measures of productivity or output, or displays of ―quality‖ or ―moments‖ 
of promotion and inspection. As such they stand for, encapsulate or 
represent the worth, quality or value of an individual or organisation 
within a field of judgement. (p. 216) 
 
Thus, performativity ―plays up the importance of measurable performance goals‖ 
(Chua, 2009, p. 159) and therefore ―influences the identities of both individuals 
and organisations that become committed to improvement in outputs measured 
against competing peers and institutions‖ (Jeffrey & Troman, 2011, p. 485).  
While performativity as an analytic concept has been seldom used in analysing 
education policies and practices in Japan (Katsuno (2008b) and Katsuno (2009b) 
are some exceptions), it clearly applies to teacher evaluation. It also provides a 
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theoretical framework that can allow us to bridge macro analysis of policy 
formation and micro analysis of what is happening within the social interactions 
between teachers. For Ball (1998), performativity is one of the interrelated 
technologies of reform, alongside the introduction of market mechanism and 
managerialism. These technologies have led to the education services being 
privatised and commoditised. As stated above, the renewed interest in teacher 
evaluation in Japan coincided with the development of the ―Structural Reform of 
Compulsory Education‖ and it can be assumed that teacher evaluation in Japan is 
also an integral part of the new form of regulation of schooling. When using 
performativity as an analytical concept, it will be possible to understand how the 
new teacher evaluation policies are embedded in the wider policy formation and 
its enactment in schools. 
A theory of performativity also enables us to investigate how, if at all, 
professional and personal identities of teachers are shifting in the process of 
teacher evaluation. This is made possible because performativity is defined not 
just as a technology of regulation but of production. Ball (2003) has stated this as 
follows: 
 
Within each of the new policy technologies of reform there are embedded 
and required new identities, new forms of interaction and new values. 
What it means to teach and what it means to be a teacher (a researcher, an 
academic) are subtly but decisively changed in the processes of reform [...] 
New roles and subjectivities are produced as teachers are re-worked as 
producers/providers, educational entrepreneurs and managers and are 
subject to regular appraisal and review and performance comparison. (p. 
218) 
 
Thus, performativity engenders new roles and subjectivities of teachers. Ball has 
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called this ―the struggle over the teachers‘ soul‖ (Ball, 2003, p. 217). As implied 
in the quote above, teacher evaluation could present a good illustration of how 
performativity works in this way. 
For all of the above reasons, a theoretical concept of performativity is highly 
relevant to the present study. Yet because it has not been used very often in the 
Japanese national context, I will draw on related educational literature from 
England (Hall & Noyes, 2009; Jeffrey, 2002; Jeffrey & Troman, 2011; Moore, 
Edwards, Halpin, & George, 2002; Perryman, 2006, 2007, 2009; Troman, 2008; 
Troman, Jeffrey, & Raggl, 2007; Woods & Jeffrey, 2002) and other countries such 
as Scotland (Doherty & McMahon, 2007), the US (Lipman, 2004; Wills & 
Sandholtz, 2009), Hong Kong (Choi, 2005), Australia (Burnard & White, 2008; 
Day & Sachs, 2004; Keddie, Mills, & Pendergast, 2011; Sachs, 2001; Lingard, 
2009) and New Zealand (Duhn, 2010).  
I also argue for a particular reading of performativity being most relevant to 
how teacher evaluation policies are being enacted in Japanese schools. A feature 
of the literature on performativity and ―identity work,‖ defined as ―the range of 
activities individuals engage in to create, and sustain personal identities that are 
congruent with and supportive of the self-concept‖ (Snow & Anderson, 1987, pp. 
1348, cited in Woods & Jeffrey, 2002, p.98), is that it tends to focus on the impact 
of performativity policies or discourse as outside forces on teachers (Moore, et al., 
2002; Perryman, 2006; Woods & Jeffrey, 2002). This shared feature may stem 
from the fact that these authors conducted research in schools where teachers‘ 
relations were relatively consistent in terms of values and aspirations. 
Consequently, it was possible that there was less possibility for micro-politics 
(Ball, 1987; Blasé & Anderson, 1995) to emerge. However, as Blasé and 
Anderson (1995) point out, this cannot always be assumed.  
 
Although there are, perhaps, some general professional cultural norms that 
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most teachers would subscribe to, there are so many differences among 
teachers with regard to teaching philosophies, personal goals and values 
and political interests. This creates in most schools a complex set of micro 
political interactions among teachers. (p. 64) 
 
I have argued previously that school organisation is becoming increasingly 
hierarchical in Japan (Katsuno, 2008a). Furthermore, there is evidence that while 
teachers in Japan used to share a sense of vocation, their values and aspirations 
have become more fragmented in recent years (Inagaki & Kudomi, 1994; Kudomi, 
2008). These features of Japanese schooling make it necessary to locate the 
identity work of teachers in the micro-politics of the school. In this study, I 
assume that while performativity policies initiate performativity in schools, 
performativity becomes enacted through the interactions of teachers. In short, 
performativity is not always forced upon teachers: teachers themselves produce 
performativity in some ways. 
In examining what is happening in the process of teacher evaluation, I shall 
introduce the work through perspective of performativity. Whereas a work upon 
perspective of performativity sees the culture of a certain school as being rather 
monolithic and the impact of performativity policies or discourse coming from the 
outside, the work through perspective pays attention to the way performativity 
capitalises on the value divisions already present (or being produced) and different 
positions within the school organisation. Accordingly, it locates the identity work 
of teachers in the micro-politics of the school.  
The work through perspective of performativity is required due to different 
assumptions about the nature of school organisation. As has been suggested above 
and discussed further later, school organisation is likely to be more hierarchical 
and involve (both explicitly and tacitly) more use of power in Japan than in 
England and other countries where the concept of performativity has been 
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discussed. This leads me to concentrate on the details of the meetings between the 
evaluating head teacher and the evaluated teachers. These meetings are likely to 
be the point in the process of teacher evaluation, where ―identity securing 
strategies in the production of power relations‖ (Knights & Willmott, 1985, p. 22) 
will become most tangible. A theoretical framework, which views performativity 
from a relational or micro-political standpoint, would allow us to make a more 
thorough analysis. 
In recent years, a variety of performativity policies has been introduced into 
schools in Japan (Katsuno, 2007a; Katsuno & Takei, 2008). Many schools set 
targets on students‘ performance under the growing pressure of testing and 
assessment. In some areas, local boards of education also publish the test results 
of the pupils by school. The test results can be linked to teacher evaluation in 
some ways or others. Firstly, head teachers as school managers, and then teachers 
are required to advocate such performativity, putting more emphasis on the 
measurable aspects of teaching and learning. However, some of them may feel 
alienated from such policies and practices because of pedagogical reasons. There 
is some reason to expect that the evaluation process provides those who are 
already advocates of performativity (presumably in more senior positions) with 
opportunities to win others over to their side. 
In summary, the existing literature tends to assume that the performativity 
policies, such as target-setting, school evaluations, and school league tables 
constructed from pupil test scores, have a direct impact on teachers‘ work and 
identities. However, the work through perspective of performativity, which pays 
more attention to micro-politics and micro power relations, will allow us to draw 
not only a more subtle picture of the way teacher evaluation policies are enacted 
in schools against a background of performativity but also of how performativity 
itself is enacted in schools. 
However, it is worth noting that the work upon and the work through 
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perspectives of performativity are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they are 
complementary to each other. When I began to conceive the idea of conducting 
research into new teacher evaluation, I only had it in mind to address research 
questions (1) regarding policy formation and (2) regarding teachers‘ and head 
teachers‘ reactions to policy. Arguably, the work upon perspective could do this 
work well. However, I gradually came to realise that more in-depth exploration is 
needed into the way teachers interact with each other to understand their different 
positions on the new teacher evaluation policies. Consequently, I decided that the 
research question (3) regarding the ―enactment‖ of the policies in schools should 
be also addressed from the work through perspective. 
Thus, this study uses a range of methods to address the research questions. For 
the purpose of macro analysis of the new teacher evaluation policies, I examine 
both the primary and secondary documents regarding the policy development. For 
the study of schools and teachers, I employ a mixed methods approach (Creswell, 
2009; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011) in which quantitative data has been used to 
provide a general picture of how teachers experience and perceive the new teacher 
evaluation policies and practices and qualitative data has been used to provide the 
depth of analysis required to examine the nature of performativity in schools. 
More specifically, I draw on the data from a national survey and in-depth 
interviews with a sample of teachers and head teachers. 
The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 deals with the policy development 
of new teacher evaluation in Japan. In this chapter, I discuss the way the new 
teacher evaluation policies are embedded within the wider policy formation — the 
―Structural Reform of Compulsory Education.‖ Some critics have focused on the 
government‘s intention to control teachers. This chapter more fully explores the 
thesis of new teacher evaluation as a means of government control. 
Chapter 3 examines some surveys that have investigated how teachers and 
head teachers have experienced and perceived the policies and practices of the 
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new teacher evaluation in Japan. The findings from these surveys are early and 
local in nature, but despite these limitations, provide us with significant insights 
into the views of teachers and head teachers. Additionally, I review survey 
research on teachers‘ and head teachers‘ perspectives on performance 
management in the UK. I pay particular attention to the work of Marsden and 
Belfield (2005, 2006) which suggested that performance management of teachers 
could cause better articulation of goals between individual teachers and the school 
as an organisation, and thus lead to improvement of teaching and learning in the 
end. This is a proposition to be examined in the Japanese context. 
Chapter 4 provides details about the theoretical framework. I review the 
literature of the policies and practices of teacher evaluation, with particular 
focuses on economic theory applied to teacher evaluation and the professional 
development model of teacher evaluation developed in the UK and Japan. I also 
review the literature on performativity and its impact on teacher identities as 
debated in the UK and elsewhere. This literature review leads me to discuss in 
more detail how the work through perspective on performativity is likely to be 
most relevant to teacher evaluation policies as enacted in Japan.  
Chapter 5 describes research design and methodology employed by the 
present study. In light of the discussion regarding the theoretical framework in the 
previous chapters, I explain the rationales of using both quantitative and 
qualitative methodologies to address different research questions regarding the 
new teacher evaluation in Japan. 
Chapter 6 introduces the results of my national survey of teachers‘ experiences 
and perceptions of the new teacher evaluation. I examine the differences in their 
views according to their types of school, gender and age. I also discuss how the 
findings from the national, more recent survey correspond with those from the 
earlier and local surveys discussed in Chapter 3. However, my main aim here is to 
provide a national context for the more in-depth research which follows. 
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Chapter 7 considers qualitative data from interviews that I conducted in three 
senior high schools and one special school. Apart from some local variations, a 
number of common themes from the stories of the four schools are identified. 
These themes are concerned with the impacts of teacher evaluation on the social 
interactions of teachers in schools. In particular, I explore the way micro-politics 
or performativity is fostered by the new teacher evaluation. I also illustrate social 
justice concerns raised by the process of teacher evaluation. 
Chapter 8 focuses on the impacts of teacher evaluation on teachers‘ work and 
selves. Again using the interview data from the teachers and head teachers, in this 
chapter I examine how the promises of professional development model for 
teacher evaluation have, or have not been fulfilled, and also how the teachers 
negotiate their professional identities under the pressure of performativity. In 
particular, I point out that the success of the teachers‘ negotiating strategies 
depends on a variety of micro-political factors. 
The final chapter (Chapter 9) further discusses significant themes arising from 
the micro-political analysis of the new teacher evaluation policies as enacted in 
schools. In doing so, I consider the range of findings and present conclusion. In 
particular, I conclude that the enactment of new teacher evaluation policies has 
had significant impacts on teachers and teachers‘ work indirectly by affecting 
modes of school management and teachers‘ relationships. I also discuss the 
limitations of the present study and some directions for future research. 
Overall the thesis illuminates the impact of the new teacher evaluation in 
Japan and makes three related contributions. The first is concerned with the 
theoretical advancement of research on performativity. My introduction of the 
work through perspective on performativity enables the research in this area to 
take a step forward. The present research also advances the comparative analysis 
of education reform. Elsewhere I have described the characteristics of the 
Japanese version of the Evaluative State (Katsuno & Takei, 2008). As Whitty, 
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Power, and Halpin (1998) noted, we have to consider variance as well as 
congruence in the cross-national examination of education reform. The present 
work illuminates what is distinctive about teacher evaluation in Japan and what it 
shares with other countries. The thesis makes a third contribution in the area of 
policy and practice alternatives. My approach to the research problem and 
methodology is led by a social justice and transformative orientation (Mertens, 
2007). We need to understand how teacher evaluation policies are enacted to be 
able to develop more progressive approaches in order to have any chance of 
serving the needs of those who have been excluded from positions of power. 
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Chapter Two: Japan’s New Teacher Evaluation Policy 
 
In this chapter, I present a brief description of the development of Japan‘s new 
teacher evaluation policy and then discuss how the new teacher evaluation 
policies are embedded within wider policy formation. 
The Tokyo Metropolitan Board of Education (Tokyo-to Kyoiku Iinkai) 
introduced a new teacher evaluation scheme in April 2000. Other prefecture 
boards of education followed suit and today almost all teachers nationwide go 
through an annual cycle of evaluation: setting annual goals, meeting with head 
teachers to discuss the appropriateness and attainment of the goals, conducting 
self-review on competence and performance, and being evaluated by head 
teachers (Monbukagakusho, 2010a). The government has promoted this as a 
―professional development model‖ of teacher evaluation and local boards of 
education and some educationalists endorsed this (Osaka-fu Kyoiku Iinkai 
Jimukyoku, 2004; Yaosaka, 2005). Nevertheless, I argue that this justification is 
not plausible. By discussing the degree to which the evaluation policies are 
integral to wider policies, I suggest instead that this new teacher evaluation model 
is likely to be a form of political control. 
 
2.1 How the New Teacher Evaluation Policies Developed 
 
In July 1998, the Chief Education Officer of the Tokyo Metropolitan Board of 
Education convened the Study Group on Personnel Evaluation of Teachers (Kyoin 
no Jinjikoka ni kansuru Kenkyukai). The Study Group was composed of nine 
members: educationalists, business managers, and mass media players. Professor 
Otohiko Hasumi of Wayo Women‘s University and former president of Tokyo 
University of Education (Tokyo Gakugei Daigaku) was the designated chairperson 
of the group. At that time, he was also the chairperson of the National Council for 
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the Education of Teaching Personnel (Kyoiku Shokuin Yosei Shingikai), which was 
integrated into the Central Council on Education (Chuo Kyoiku Shingikai) later in 
2001. 
The mission for the Study Group was to examine and report on the issues of 
teacher personnel evaluation as an integral part of personnel management and 
human resource development (Kyoin no Jinjikoka ni kansuru Kenkyukai, 1999, p. 
1). Underpinning the mission was the idea that the old teacher personnel 
evaluation, ―efficiency rating plan of teachers‖ (Aspinall, 2001, p. 42), was 
ineffective in enhancing morale and performance of teachers, not the least because 
the result was not communicated to the teacher evaluated, nor linked to pay and 
other personnel treatments (Kyoin no Jinjikoka ni kansuru Kenkyukai, 1999, p. 7). 
Another rationale stated was the increased need for professional development of 
teachers who work in the era of education reform, facing up to many problems 
such as bullying, school non-attendance, drop out and gakkyu hokai (which means 
literally a collapsed classroom, the classroom where a teacher cannot have control 
over the students, and thus teaching and learning are seriously paralysed). 
The Study Group delivered an interim report in December 1998, and in March 
1999, after consultations with relevant organisations (see the next section for 
dispute, involving an international organisation, over this point), submitted their 
final report entitled ―Future directions for personnel evaluation and human 
resource development of teachers: A conversion to teacher evaluation for 
professional development‖ (Kyoin no Jinjikoka ni kansuru Kenkyukai, 1999). 
The Study Group‘s report explicated the idea and methodology of the 
professional developmental model or bilateral model of teacher evaluation (Kyoin 
no Jinjikoka ni kansuru Kenkyukai, 1999, Chapter 3; Tokyo-to Kyoiku Iinkai, 
1999). The bilateral model specifically meant the introduction of goal-setting and 
assessment meetings with head teachers, and self-review of the process and results 
of working towards the set goals. It recommended that teachers be assessed by the 
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deputy head in the first instance and the head teacher for the final evaluation. The 
teachers were supposed to be assessed annually and ranked in terms of three 
aspects: competence (noryoku), dispositions (joi, iyoku and taido), and 
performance (gyoseki). For fairness and objectivity, the report stated, evaluation 
items and criteria should be clearly defined, and such measures as lesson 
observation and asking teachers‘ colleagues for comments should be adopted. It 
also recommended the introduction of training for the evaluator and disclosure of 
assessment results. The report also made specific statements on ―the ways of 
utilising teacher evaluation‖ and ―future directions for the human resource 
development of teachers‖ (Kyoin no Jinjikoka ni kansuru Kenkyukai, 1999, 
Chapters 4 & 5). As such, it emphasised a professional development model, not a 
summative or judgmental model, but it did not abandon the principle of 
―appropriate personnel treatment based on evaluation results‖ (p. 21). The Board 
had been applying parallel evaluation schemes with particular aims, such as 
promotion to managerial posts (head teacher or deputy head teacher) and special 
pay increases for outstanding performers. The report argued that selection, 
placement, promotion, and reward should all reflect more rigorously evaluation 
results. Thus, it recommended a combined system of professional development 
and judgmental models, with the latter being based on the former. 
In April 2000, the Board adopted the new system recommended by the report. 
Although the recommendations were only intended for teachers working in Tokyo, 
the concept soon spread beyond the board‘s jurisdiction. In 2001, new teacher 
evaluation systems were introduced in Mie and Kagawa prefectures, then 
followed by Osaka in 2002, and Kanagawa and Hiroshima prefectures in 2003. 
The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology 
(Monbukagakusho) committed studies of the new teacher evaluation to all 
prefecture boards of education from 2003 to 2006. It is a prefecture and 
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designated city
3
 board of education that has the legal authority to enact evaluation 
schemes for teachers who work in its jurisdiction (Local Public Service Law, 
Article 40; Local Educational Administration Law, Article 46). Thus, the Ministry 
could not order the adoption of new systems, but it endorsed them. Meanwhile, 
the Central Council on Education, an advisory body accountable to the Minister, 
recommended the introduction of new teacher evaluation systems by prefecture 
boards of education on many occasions. For example, in its report mainly dealing 
with teacher licensure, the council stated: 
 
The success of schooling depends, first and foremost, on teachers. For 
teachers to professionally develop and bring their ability into full play, 
their competence and performance needs to be properly assessed and 
linked to placement, promotion, remuneration and other conditions, and 
training needs. Hence, we recommend that every prefecture board of 
education consider the introduction of new teacher evaluation systems, 
with reference to the present reform of the public service working force. 
(Chuo Kyoiku Shingikai, 2002, ii4(3))  
 
As this quote implies, the policy developments of new teacher evaluation were 
affected by wider reform of the public service. In December 2001, the Cabinet 
(Naikaku) approved and published a document entitled ―Fundamental principles 
of the reform concerning public employees (Komuin Seido Kaikaku Taiko).‖ This 
document advocated ―the renewal of the public employees‘ values and attitudes in 
order to establish ‗the truly people-centred,‘ as well as more efficient and effective, 
public service‖ (Naikaku, 2001, p. 1). Through the various measures 
                                                        
3
 Japan's Local Autonomy Law grants 19 larger cities designated by the ordinance with 
more legal authorities, including those concerned with educational provision and service. 
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recommended, the Cabinet was determined to establish new public employees' 
remuneration systems that were more closely than ever before linked to job 
competency, responsibility, and performance, instead of the current incremental 
systems. They understood that such remuneration systems needed new evaluation 
methods of competence and performance (pp. 10-13). 
Similar recommendations appeared frequently in subsequent reports by the 
Central Council on Education (Chuo Kyoiku Shingikai, 2003, 2004). In particular, 
the Central Council on Education (2004) discussed the issue of teacher evaluation, 
regarding it as an essential part of school organisation and management. The 
report confirmed the need to reform teacher evaluation systems for the purposes 
of maintaining public trust in schooling and enhancing teachers‘ morale through 
linking the results to pay and other conditions. It then continued and stated that 
there should be two basic viewpoints — development of human resource (jinzai 
ikusei) and improvement of school work (gyomu kaizen). 
 
In schools, for the most part, staff work collectively. Thus, it is needed to 
evaluate how they perform as a team. Furthermore, because the 
performance of a school and its teachers are closely interrelated, 
evaluations of a school and its teachers should go hand in hand. This, if 
properly done, will lead to better articulation of endeavour by a school and 
its teachers, development of both organisational strengths and individual 
teachers' abilities. (Chuo Kyoiku Shingikai, 2004, (3)) 
 
This statement signalled that the professional development of teachers was 
increasingly becoming viewed within the parameters of a school‘s organisational 
development. There was a focus on better articulation between the efforts of 
individual teachers and the school‘s work. 
In 2010, ten years after the introduction of the new teacher evaluation system 
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in Tokyo, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology 
conducted a nation-wide survey to take stock of the policy developments for this 
period. The Ministry asked all prefectural and designated city boards of education 
to report how they were conducting teacher evaluation systems as of April 2010. 
The main findings of this study were as follows (Monbukagakusho, 2010a): 
 
 Almost all 66 prefectural and designated city boards of education across the 
country introduced teacher evaluation systems, involving all teachers in all 
schools. Only one board had introduced a system that involved only a part of 
its teaching force. 
 While 56 boards assessed teachers' competence (noryoku) and 60 boards 
assessed performance (gyoseki), most of the boards assessed both. Twenty 
boards assessed teacher's dispositions (joi, iyoku and taido), in addition to 
competence and performance. 
 Most boards arranged for deputy head teachers to evaluate in the first instance, 
with head teachers undertaking the final evaluation. Only about 10 boards 
designated only the head teacher as evaluator. 
 While 48 boards normally communicated evaluation results to the relevant 
teacher, 16 did so only on request. Furthermore, eight boards made it a rule 
not to disclose such information.  
  Fifty-nine boards published their evaluation criteria but six did not (although 
one of these was planning to publish). 
 Thirty-eight boards had established some system of complaint or appeal. Four 
were considering introducing a system but 15 replied that they had no plan to 
introduce such a system. 
 Boards used the evaluation results of competence and performance for a range 
of purposes, including training, promotion, placement and remuneration.  
 Twenty-four boards, including those from the largest three prefectures of 
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Tokyo, Kanagawa and Osaka, decided on annual rises in teacher salaries based 
on the results. Meanwhile, 10 boards reported that they did not use the 
evaluation results for any particular purposes. 
 
Overall, local boards of education had some discretion over the detailed 
design of the schemes. One of the main differences occurred in the area of linking 
performance to pay
4
. However, in spite of the decentralised nature of education 
system in Japan (the Ministry is not able to order the adoption by individual 
boards of education), it was apparent from the survey that during the preceding 
decade the new model of teacher evaluation had extended across the nation. 
Two main assumptions underpinned the new policy on teacher evaluation. One 
was that teachers could attain required competence and performance (however 
poorly defined) by means of the professional development model of teacher 
evaluation, which involves elements such as goal setting, feedback meetings with 
head teachers, and self review of competence and performance, in addition to 
being formally evaluated by the head teacher. The other is that a new teacher 
evaluation system was needed to create a more efficient and effective, 
performance-based personnel system and that this in turn would cause favourable 
changes in the values and attitudes of public employees. It was on the latter 
assumption that performance-related pay was forcefully advocated by some of 
those promoting the new teacher evaluation. 
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 As will be explained later in Chapter 5, those local boards of education that oversee the 
sample schools operate performance pay system, and arguably, for this reason, they strongly 
demand that teachers set numerical goals. 
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2.2 A Historical Perspective on Teacher Evaluation in Japan 
 
Teacher evaluation is a resurgent policy issue. Japan had a serious national 
confrontation in the late 1950s between the government and Japan Teachers Union 
(Nihon Kyoshokuin Kumiai: Nikkyoso), the then-powerful teachers union, over the 
―efficiency rating plan of teachers‖ (Aspinall, 2001; Duke, 1973; Schoppa, 1991). 
Originally, the government planned to directly link efficiency ratings to teachers‘ 
pay. However, the conflict that followed rendered the schemes ineffective, even as 
they were introduced across the nation. The link between rating and pay was 
abandoned. 
The teachers union regarded the teachers‘ efficiency rating plan as being 
another form of control over teachers. They denounced the plan as ―the next stage 
in the government‘s plan to extend its power and control into the schools 
themselves, while making a direct attack on the union‖ (Aspinall, 2001, p. 43). In 
the preceding years, the government had successfully established national 
curriculum standards and an official textbook approval (censorship) system, 
which had whipped up strong dissent. Increasing state control over education was 
criticised for undermining academic freedom, teachers‘ professional autonomy, 
and the democratic control of education. The government‘s moves were called a 
―reverse course‖ — a proclaimed intention to offset the ―excess‖ of democracy 
and egalitarianism of post-war education reform under the Occupation authority 
(Horio, 1994; Schoppa, 1991, pp. 38-39). 
The most recent efficiency rating plans (new teacher evaluation schemes) have 
been achieved more smoothly than those in the 1950s. One reason for this is that 
Japanese teacher unionism dramatically declined during the last half of the 
previous century. Indeed, the rate of teacher union membership declined for 34 
straight years: from 86.3% in 1958 to 27.1% in 2009 (Monbukagakusho, 2010b). 
Thrupp (2002) observes that in various countries, teacher evaluation or 
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performance management has been used to erode teachers‘ collective strength. 
Teachers in Japan had already noticed this 50 years ago. However, when 
responding to the government‘s latest attempt to introduce new teacher evaluation 
systems, teacher unions could no longer resort to direct action as they did in the 
late 1950s. 
Second, the performance-based personnel system (seikashugi) has become 
more widely accepted in Japanese society and, therefore, with teachers as well. In 
a survey that will be discussed in Chapter 6, a majority of the teachers agreed to 
the principle of performance-related pay. It has often been said that government 
employees, including teachers, should not be exceptions to the performance-based 
compensation of employees that the private sector practices. Indeed, many private 
sector firms now have a performance-based personnel system in place 
(Koseirodosho, 2008; Nakamura, 2006)
5
. These changes in Japanese employment 
approaches have helped the new schemes of teacher evaluation to be introduced. 
Third, the new schemes of teacher evaluation that prefectural boards of 
education planned to install were not the same as the old rating plans. As stated 
earlier, the new rationale for evaluation underscored the professional development 
of the teacher. This shift in orientation contributed to the acceptance of the policy, 
as educationalists do not object to all types of teacher evaluation. Even during the 
era of confrontation over the efficiency rating, ―A General Opinion on the Issue of 
Teachers‘ Efficiency Rating (Kinmu Hyotei ni kansuru Zenpanteki Kenkai)‖ 
                                                        
5
 Drawing on the statistics collected by the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, 
Keisuke Nakamura, a labour relations expert of the University of Tokyo, estimated that 
nearly a third of private firms had introduced performance-based personnel systems by 2004 
(Nakamura, 2006). However, the proportion varied as to the size of the firms. Thus, 72.4% 
of the firms with over 1,000 employees and 61.0% of those with 300 to 1,000 employees 
had such personnel systems in operation. 
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provided by the Japan Educational Research Association (Nihon Kyoiku Gakkai) 
affirmed the significance of teacher evaluation when conducted to identify the 
needs of professional development. They argued that what should be negated was 
an efficiency rating that is intended to control teachers and education; teacher 
evaluation of a ―completely different nature‖ was possible but had yet to be 
studied (Nihon Kyoiku Gakkai, 1958). 
Some boards of education were more conscious of the difficulty of putting the 
two objectives — performance-related pay and professional development — into 
a single teacher evaluation scheme. Since they understood that to insist on 
performance-related pay would invite fierce objection from the teachers (albeit 
much less than in the 1950s), these boards behaved strategically. They refrained 
from making clear pronouncements on the possible (or intended) link of 
evaluation results to pay, saying instead that it would depend on the future 
development of general pay reform, a move that is categorically different from the 
introduction of the new teacher evaluation schemes. 
Although the introduction of new systems of teacher evaluation did not cause 
as large a confrontation as in the 1950s, the teachers unions were able to draw 
international attention to their concerns. In 2002, the All Japan Teachers and Staff 
Union (Zennihon Kyoshokuin Kumiai), the second largest national teachers union, 
made an allegation to ILO/UNESCO Committee of Experts on the Application of 
the Recommendations concerning Teaching Personnel (CEART)
6
. The union 
                                                        
6
 The ILO/UNESCO Recommendation concerning the Status of Teachers was adopted 
on 5 October 1966. CEART was set up with the mission of examining reports on the 
application of the Recommendation by member-state governments, and national and 
international relevant organisations. In addition, CEART receives and examines allegations 
from national and international teachers' organisations on the non-observance of the 
Recommendations‘ provisions. See for more details CEART's website 
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asserted that Tokyo Metropolitan Board of Education had refused to undertake 
proper consultation with relevant teachers unions concerning the development of 
new teacher personnel evaluation scheme on the grounds that it related to a 
management matter that required no consultation. In addition to this, the 
allegation raised the following criticisms. 
 
 It [the new system of teacher personnel evaluation] involves an ―absolute‖ (i.e., 
criterion referenced) assessment by deputy principals and principals, coupled 
with a ―relative‖ (i.e., norm referenced) assessment by a superintendent, who 
may have the overview of as many as 15,000 teachers. There is, accordingly, a 
substantial subjective component involved by reason of the latter assessment. 
 The process begins with mandatory ―self-assessment‖ by the teacher, which 
the principal or deputy can require to be ―re-done.‖ 
 The competitive nature of assessment is such that, in practice, it tends to be 
antithetical to the existence of collaborative collegiality among teachers and 
may well operate to pervert individual professionalism in order to secure a 
grading based on student results. 
 [The system] is not truly transparent because the disclosure of assessment 
results is discretionary and has recently been suspended. A system of appeals 
against assessments has yet to be established. 
 [The system] does not attract the confidence of teachers generally. It has, in 
practice, had a deleterious effect on morale and motivation. It has given rise to 
an undesirable breakdown in trust between principal and teachers. (Joint 
ILO/UNESCO Committee of Experts on the Application of the 
Recommendations concerning Teaching Personnel, 2003, pp. 43-44): 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/sector/techmeet/ceart/. 
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The Tokyo Metropolitan Board of Education and the Ministry of Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology refuted the union‘s allegations and sent 
their counter arguments to the Committee. Based on the parties‘ submissions, the 
Joint Committee concluded that the new system of teacher evaluation had been 
developed in a manner inconsistent with the Recommendation in that: 
 
 There has been no adequate process of consultation with teachers‘ 
organisations, as contemplated by the Recommendation. 
 It plainly involves the making of significant subjective evaluations. 
 Teachers are not entitled to access the precise evaluation made and its basis. 
 There is certainly a lack of openness and transparency in the process and a 
total absence of specific rights of review or appeal in relation to the evaluation 
itself. (Joint ILO/UNESCO Committee of Experts on the Application of the 
Recommendations concerning Teaching Personnel, 2003, p. 45) 
 
Although ILO/UNESCO‘s recommendations were not legally binding, 
CEART‘s findings certainly exerted some pressure on boards of education to 
reconsider their systems in regard to the points raised. Thus, as stated above, 38 
boards of education (including Tokyo) have now established some systems of 
complaint or appeal, and a majority of boards disclosed the results of evaluation to 
the relevant teacher. In other words, the allegation helped boards of education to 
be more conscious of issues of transparency and objectivity in evaluation, and 
procedures that would safeguard teachers against arbitrary assessments and 
personnel decisions that could follow, albeit not yet adequate. However, the main 
assumptions underlying the policy development of new teacher evaluation 
remained intact. 
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2.3 The New Teacher Evaluation within Wider Policy Formation 
 
Structural Reform of Education 
Since the introduction of a new teacher evaluation scheme by Tokyo 
Metropolitan Board of Education in 2000, some local teachers‘ unions have 
conducted surveys to probe their members‘ attitudes and opinions toward the new 
system (see Chapter 3 for more details). These surveys found that the teachers 
have perceived the policy and practices rather negatively, in spite of the 
remodelling, possibly fuelled by the memory of the fierce confrontation over the 
efficiency rating plan of teachers in the late 1950s (Aspinall, 2001; Duke, 1973; 
Schoppa, 1991) and the more recent debates on the substitution of new teacher 
evaluation schemes for the old plans (Joint ILO/UNESCO Committee of Experts 
on the Application of the Recommendations concerning Teaching Personnel, 
2003; Katsuno, 2002a). The new schemes — as well as their predecessors — have 
been blamed for the divisiveness in the collaborative relationships and activities 
of teachers. It seems that promotion of a ―professional development‖ model of 
teacher evaluation has failed to win the confidence of the teachers. Some teachers 
doubt the proclaimed effectiveness of the new schemes, while others suspect them 
to be a control strategy of the government, as was the case with the old plans. I 
argue that this suspicion may be underpinned by recognition of a post-industrial 
and ―post-welfarist‖ (Gewirtz, 2002, pp. 2-6) type of economic and education 
reform in Japan — ―Structural Reform of Education (Gimukyoiku-no 
kozokaikaku).‖ 
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (in office from April 2001 to September 
2006) pursued a comprehensive societal restructuring agenda called ―Structural 
Reform‖ to revitalise the country‘s economy and industry in the aftermath of the 
collapsed ―bubble economy.‖ Similar to reforms grounded in neo-liberalism 
ideology in Anglo-American and some European countries (Clarke & Newman, 
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1997; Pollitt, 1990), the Japanese Structural Reform targeted the expanding public 
sector expenditures and challenged the bureaucratic system. The public education 
sector, alongside healthcare, insurance, and pension, has been deregulated, 
economised, and decentralised. Thus, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science and Technology, the self-styled guardian of public education, was forced 
to undertake survival measures. According to Professor Tetsuhiko Nakajima of the 
University of Nagoya, a specialist on education policy and administration, the 
Ministry was desperate to include compulsory schooling in the national strategy to 
make Japan a frontrunner, leading the world in industry, and exploiting 
globalisation to realise economic growth (Keizai Zaisei Shimonkaigi, 2006; 
Nakajima, 2006). 
The Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (Keizai Zaisei Shimonkaigi), the 
most country‘s powerful policy maker, was led by the Prime Minister and 
comprised relevant members of the Cabinet, the Governor of the Bank of Japan, 
and business leaders. To achieve the above-mentioned goal, the Council 
emphasised the importance of concentrating domestic resources on areas in which 
Japan has an advantage and utilising overseas resources to compensate for any 
insufficiencies in other aspects. There was some concern that Japan was unable to 
cope with the realities of globalisation and would find itself overwhelmed by 
nations that enjoyed rapid growth, such as BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and 
China). Thus, it declared the need to strengthen international competitiveness in 
human resources. 
 
Human resources who are well qualified to engage in international 
activities and who are also going to be the main players in the future 
labour market must be secured in terms of both quality and quantity. For 
this purpose, we will aim to achieve world top-level performance in 
international academic ability tests by 2010. (Keizai Zaisei Shimonkaigi, 
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2006, p. 4) 
 
To restructure education so that excellent human resources can be efficiently 
introduced in the economy would necessitate a new form of organisation and 
control of schooling. The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology, reacting to the report of the Central Council on Education (Chuo 
Kyoiku Shingikai, 2005), began to refer to its own reform agenda as the 
―Structural Reform of Compulsory Education [Gimukyoiku no kozokaikaku].‖ In a 
leaflet bearing the same title, the Ministry declared that the compulsory schooling 
system needed structural reform to assure its quality — by establishing a new 
relationship between the state and the education system. The central government‘s 
role would be to set objectives, secure input (national course of study, fully 
prepared teachers, and adequate funding), and audit outcome through a regime of 
national testing of academic achievement and school evaluation. The 
responsibility for the process would fall on the shoulders of local governments 
and schools (Monbukagakusho, 2005a, p. 1). 
 
Centralised micro-management of education 
The imperative of the Structural Reform was undergirded by the introduction 
of market forces into all aspects of public education. In January 2005 the Japan 
Business Federation (Nippon Keidanren), a powerful representative of the 
business world, published the recommendations on the future direction of 
education (Nippon Keidanren, 2005). It began by stating, ―Education is the 
foundation for national prosperity. Particularly for us, as a nation with scarce 
national resources and energy, the top priority should be placed squarely on 
developing the human resources which will and can perform well in various fields 
not only home but abroad‖ (p. 1). It continued by declaring that this project would 
be realised by means of more competition among teachers as well as schools. 
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Particular recommendations were made on the principles of diversity, competition, 
and evaluation, one of which was the introduction of an educational voucher 
system. Here lay the basic assumption that public sector services, in contrast to 
those of the private sector, are bureaucratic, self-serving, and inefficient. In 
response, quasi-market reforms based on private business systems were 
introduced to enable the centralised micro-management of education. This 
involved sharply focused interventions, in which accountability, developments, 
and outcomes would be subjected to management scrutiny at both the macro and 
micro educational levels (Gleeson & Gunter, 2001). 
At the macro-educational level, the state would prescribe the operating 
environments for schools. As mentioned earlier, the ―Structural Reform of 
Compulsory Education‖ sought to reallocate the responsibility and authority in 
finance and public education among the stakeholders, with the state setting 
nationwide objectives for education and introducing national testing to ensure that 
these objectives were achieved. 
At the micro-educational level, the government has exhibited growing interest 
in efficiency, effectiveness, and development — within the national objectives 
(Nakajima, 2006). The new teacher evaluation systems in Japan employ 
procedures that are almost identical to those of the performance management for 
English and Welsh teachers that were developed during the 1990s (Department for 
Education and Employment, 1998, 2000). According to Gleeson and Husbands 
(2001), the performance management of teachers in the UK acts as a policy device 
that binds the micro and macro forms of intervention; the measured levels of 
teacher, pupil, and school performance are connected to external inspection, 
funding, pay, staffing, and resources. In the process of simultaneous devolution 
and control, teachers are being micro-managed to the point that their productivity 
can be measured locally against national standards in terms of the test results and 
the examination performances of their students.  
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The idea and procedures of management by objectives (MBO), which came to 
constitute an integral part of the evaluation of teachers and schools in Japan, are 
supposed to work in a similar way. For example, the School Evaluation 
Guidelines published by the Chiba Prefecture Board of Education required 
teachers to firmly base their individual goals on organizational objectives. MBO 
was regarded as a management method through which an individual staff member 
could attain goals and bring her/his autonomy and self-control into full play 
(Chibaken Kyoiku Iinkai, 2003). The board also claimed that MBO is different 
from the practice wherein a superior forces work quotas on the subordinate. 
However, following Lyotard, we can call it a device that ―makes individuals 
‗want‘ what the system needs in order to perform well‖ (Lyotard, 1984, p. 62, 
cited in Ball, 2008, p. 46). Thus, MBO could more effectively make the staff 
realise required goals. 
In the context of the management cycle, MBO strongly demands linkages 
between the school‘s mission, the head teacher‘s management policy, and the 
goals of middle-level groups such as subject groups, year tutor groups, 
administrative committees on the one hand, and those of individual staff on the 
other. Indeed, in recent years, head teachers have been strongly exhorted to 
formulate their own management policies or the ―mission‖ of their schools so that 
teachers can follow the lead (Kioka, 2003). This process could be viewed as the 
workings of an ―internal market, where the management ‗sells‘ and the teacher 
‗buys into‘ the vision and mission‖ (Gleeson & Gunter, 2001, p. 150). However, 
there is no guarantee that the negotiations and trading are carried out on a level 
playing field. A subordinate teacher who refuses to accept the head teacher‘s 
management policy may be meted a negative evaluation rating, the label of 
incompetent teacher, and disadvantages in remuneration or redeployment 
(Katsuno, 2002b). In the labour process literature there are also critics who 
describe MBO — and Total Quality Management in general — as a device to 
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accomplish the traditional Taylorist principle of separation between conception 
and execution, disguised by so-called benign theories and practices of human 
resource management (Boje & Winsor, 1993; Knights & McCabe, 1998). 
After the announcement of the ―Structural Reform of Compulsory Education,‖ 
the following policies were developed. In 2006, the Ministry of Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology launched a new initiative called ―Quality 
Assurance of Compulsory Education‖ (Gimukyoiku no Shitsutekihosyo) 
(Monbukagakusho, 2005a). The policy package included the promotion of self-
evaluation of the school, once again in line with the ―Guidelines for School 
Evaluation at the Compulsory Education Stage‖ published by the Ministry, and 
the commencement of pilot studies on school evaluation carried out by a third 
party, using as a model the Office for Standards in Education (OFSTED) of 
England (Katsuno & Takei, 2008; Monbukagakusho, 2006). In December of the 
same year, the Fundamental Law of Education (Kyoiku Kihon Ho) was revised. 
Under the new legal framework, economic demands can be more easily translated 
into national objectives of education (Katsuno, 2007a). The revised Fundamental 
Law of Education demands that local boards of education set their targets for 
education and outcome measures in the form of the Basic Plan for Educational 
Promotion, in accordance with the national objectives. Research shows that a 
large proportion of the local plans include targets for student achievement as 
measured by both national and local examinations (Arai, 2010; Taniguchi, 2009). 
In 2007, National Testing began for 6th grade elementary school students and 
3rd grade junior high school students although in 2010 the newly elected 
Democratic government scaled down its sampling to 30% for the tests, Many 
schools now set targets for students‘ performance under the growing pressure of 
testing and assessment. More pressure is placed on the schools that have to attract 
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students in the areas in which school choice policies are in place
7
. Such schools 
publish school development plans that elaborate on how they are attaining the 
targets. In these schools, teachers are required to make lesson development plans, 
which typically include more frequent use of drills and materials specially 
prepared for the tests, to ensure the attainment of the targets. The teachers appear 
to share the same goals, but their relationships are characterised by indifference to 
each other‘s practices per se apart from attainment of the goals. This has also 
intensified teachers‘ workloads and left them with less professional autonomy 
concerning their teaching content and pedagogy. I discussed elsewhere the 
apparently concerted efforts of teachers, in terms of ―contrived collegiality‖ 
(Hargreaves, 1995; Katsuno, 2009a). Hargreaves (1995) considered that the 
characteristics of this type of collaborative relationship are ―administratively 
regulated,‖ ―compulsory,‖ ―implenmentation-oriented,‖ ―fixed in time and space,‖ 
and ―predictable‖ (p. 195). In the circumstances of contrived collegiality, 
―teachers are required to or ‗persuaded‘ to work together to implement the 
mandates of others‖ (p. 195).  
In 2008, new managerial posts such as vice-head teacher (fuku kocho) and 
chief teacher (shukan kyoyu) were introduced with the responsibility of serving 
the head teacher. Prior to the creation of these posts, in 2000, the role of staff 
meetings was also legally defined for the first time as that of a sounding board for 
the head teacher rather than a decision-making body (School Education Laws, 
                                                        
7
 According to the Ministry of Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology, by 2008, 14.2% of local boards of education had school choice systems for 
elementary schools, while 13.9% had them for junior high schools (Monbukagakusho, 
2008b). The rates vary across the nation, depending on the local boards‘ policies, the stage 
of schooling, and the degree of urbanisation. Out of 23 wards in Tokyo, 19 allow parents of 
students to choose among junior high schools and 13 allow choice of elementary schools. 
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Enforcement Regulations, Article 23-3). The government explained that this 
legislation was needed because teachers‘ views could contradict those of the head 
teacher and, thus, staff meetings could hinder a head teacher from managing the 
school (Chuo Kyoiku Shingikai, 1998). Meanwhile, in April 2004, the Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology began to develop training 
materials on organisational management for schools. Furthermore, the ministry 
then distributed a model curriculum to local education boards across the nation. 
This model curriculum distinguishes between goals of schools and those of 
private firms. Nevertheless, it seeks to introduce various generic private sector 
management skills into schools with the express purpose of strengthening head 
teachers‘ leadership (Monbukagakusho, 2005b). Consequently, local boards of 
education have been conducting training courses for school leaders using the 
model curriculum. Thus, head teachers‘ leadership and the hierarchical structure 
of management have been strengthened within schools (Sako, 2005). 
Thus, with the legitimisation of the state‘s power to develop comprehensive 
educational objectives and programs, the establishment of an audit regime of 
national testing and evaluations, and the enhancement of managerial power at the 
institutional level, all within the parameters of market-orientated reform, the 
―quality cycle‖ (Gleeson & Gunter, 2001, p. 148) will be completed by controlling 
individual teachers‘ performance and competencies. The new teacher evaluation 
and performance-related pay will likely work not merely as an integral mechanism 
in the micro-management of education, but also as a bridge between the macro 
and micro-level interventions of the government. The proposition of new teacher 
evaluation as a device of government control — centralised micro-management of 
education — is plausible, although it still needs to be explored empirically. 
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2.4 Summary 
 
In this chapter, I have sketched the policy developments of new teacher 
evaluation in Japan, to illustrate the two main assumptions that underpinned the 
policy developments. One was concerned with the claimed advantages of the 
professional development model of teacher evaluation. The other was that a new 
teacher evaluation, and a link of the results to salary, would cause favourable 
changes in the values and attitudes of teachers — micro-economic theory applied 
to teacher evaluation. (In Chapter 4, I will examine these assumptions in turn, 
critiquing the lack of perspectives on power and micro-politics on the part of the 
professional development model, and the improper treatment of the nature of 
teachers‘ work on the part of the micro-economic theory.) I also introduced a 
historical perspective on teacher evaluation in Japan, suggesting reasons for why 
the new teacher evaluation schemes have been achieved more smoothly than with 
their teacher counterparts in the 1950s. 
I also situated the teacher evaluation policy developments within a wider 
policy context by raising the prospect of new teacher evaluation as a device of 
government control — centralised micro-management of education. The recent 
policy formations led to a variety of performativity measures introduced into 
schools in Japan. These measures have caused changes in behaviour on the part of 
local boards of education and schools. In some areas, local education boards also 
publish the test results of the pupils by school and many schools now set targets 
for students‘ performance. Moreover, some teachers may feel alienated from such 
policies and practices because of pedagogical reasons. How the new teacher 
evaluation policies are being enacted in these contexts is the main question that I 
address in the chapters that follow. 
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Chapter Three: Views on Teacher Evaluation 
 
In this chapter, I revisit earlier surveys that sought to investigate how teachers 
and head teachers experienced and perceived the policies and practices of new 
teacher evaluation in Japan. These surveys addressed union member teachers in 
Tokyo (Tokyo-to Kotogakko Kyoshokuin Kumiai, 2002, 2004, 2006), teachers 
and head teachers in Tokyo (Urano, 2002), and teachers and head teachers in 
Osaka (Osaka-fu Kyoiku Iinkai Jimukyoku, 2004). As stated in Chapter 2, Tokyo 
initiated the development of the new teacher evaluation processes and Osaka 
followed shortly after. As also noted, they are early and local findings, but they 
still provide us with some initial insights into the views of teachers and head 
teachers in Japan regarding the new teacher evaluation policies and practices. 
This chapter also reviews survey research from England on the way teachers 
and head teachers there responded to the idea of linking pay to evaluation results, 
and the introduction of performance management. The concept and procedures of 
the new teacher evaluation in Japan have much common with the professional 
development model that was developed in England and the performance 
management for English and Welsh teachers (Department for Education and 
Employment, 1998, 2000; Richardson, 1999). Yet reference to the English 
literature is unusual in the Japanese context despite the comparative insights it 
provides. I focus particularly on the work of Marsden and Belfield, labour 
relations specialists at the London School of Economics and Political Sciences. 
Their research suggests that performance management of teachers could cause 
better articulation of goals between individual teachers and the school as an 
organisation and thus lead to improvement of teaching and learning (Marsden & 
Belfield, 2005, 2006). In chapters 6, 7 and 8, I examine this proposition within the 
Japanese context, using data from both my national survey and interviews with 
teachers and head teachers. 
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3.1 Views of Teachers and Head Teachers in Tokyo 
 
In April 2000, new regulations (Tokyo-toritsu Gakko Kyoshokuin no Jinjikoka 
nikansuru Kisoku) came into effect, which stipulated that teachers in Tokyo must 
go through ―authentic personnel assessment‖ for the purposes of ―developing their 
abilities and competence, and also reinvigorating school organisations‖ 
(Regulations [Kisoku], Sec. 1). The assessment processes have been divided into 
two parts: self-report (jiko shinkoku) and performance review (gyoseki hyoka). For 
the self-report, teachers are required to set goals ―in accordance with school 
management policies formulated by the head teacher‖ (Sec. 2), and then, at the 
end of the year, self-review the degree to which they have attained these goals. 
The goals are supposed to be set in terms of teaching and learning (gakushu shido), 
personal and career guidance (seito shido and shinro shido), contribution to school 
management (gakko unei), and other activities (tokubetsu katsudo and others). For 
the performance review, a ―criterion-referenced‖ evaluation of a teacher‘s 
competence and performance is conducted by the deputy head teacher in the first 
instance and then by the head teacher (Sec. 10). In addition to these steps, under 
the new arrangement, a teacher's performance is assessed in a comparative way 
(i.e., a norm-referenced assessment is conducted) at the Board of Education level 
and the results may affect her/his pay advancement and promotion (Sec. 11). 
The Tokyo Metropolitan High School Teachers and Staff Union (Tokyo-to 
Kotogakko Kyoshokuin Kumiai) has intermittently conducted questionnaire 
surveys to investigate member teachers‘ views on the new teacher evaluation 
(Tokyo-to Kotogakko Kyoshokuin Kumiai, 2002, 2004, 2006). Although we 
should note that respondents are almost exclusively union members, the reliability 
of the results is high given the sample size (as shown below, between 1,960 and 
3,532 teachers participated in the surveys). 
Asked about the impact of the new teacher evaluation scheme on their work 
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and school management, union members have, in successive surveys, given 
clearly negative responses. In July 2001, 75.5% of the 3,532 respondents felt that 
the new schemes had ―unfavourable impacts.‖ The percentage increased to 83.0% 
in April 2003 (n = 2743) and further to 86.5% in December 2005 (n = 1960). 
Union members were also asked to indicate what the impact has been in more 
concrete terms. As Table 3.1 shows, the unfavourable impacts noted most 
frequently included ―less relaxed and animated atmosphere at the school,‖ ―lower 
morale among the staff,‖ ―worse relationships between the manager and teachers,‖ 
and ―worse teamwork among the staff.‖ More specifically, in response to the 
question, ―Did the performance review carried out by the head teacher and its link 
to remuneration help in enhancing your own morale?‖ only 0.3% answered 
positively while 56.1% answered negatively. Roughly a quarter of those 
responding felt that the performance review and performance-related pay had no 
particular impact on their motivation or morale (Tokyo-to Kotogakko Kyoshokuin 
Kumiai, 2006, pp. 10-11). 
 
Table 3.1 Views held by union member teachers in Tokyo regarding 
―unfavourable‖ impacts of the new teacher evaluation 
 2001 
n = 3,532 
2003 
n = 2,743 
2005 
n = 1,960 
Worse teamwork among the staff. 53.1% 48.7% 57.4% 
Worse relationships between the 
manager and teachers. 
69.5% 66.3% 62.2% 
Lower morale among the staff. 64.6% 72.5% 74.1% 
Unfavourable impact on pedagogy due 
to teachers‘ awareness of being 
evaluated. 
48.2% 29.9% 35.1% 
Less relaxed and animated atmosphere 
at school. 
66.4% 69.1% 74.5% 
Source: Tokyo-to Kotogakko Kyoshokuin Kumiai (2002, 2004, 2006) 
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Given these results, the intended effects of improving morale and motivation 
were far from confirmed. On the contrary, it seems the experiences of being 
evaluated and receiving performance-related pay demoralised many teachers. 
Furthermore, there was concern about the divisive nature of the teacher evaluation. 
Thus, on the whole, it seems the new teacher evaluation scheme has failed to 
secure the confidence of teachers‘ union members in Tokyo. 
It goes without saying that head teachers play an important role in the new 
teacher evaluation processes and that it is necessary to seek their views, especially 
since their school management policies are supposed to establish parameters 
within which teachers set their goals and self-review their performance. In Tokyo, 
head teachers themselves had also been evaluated by the Chief Education Officer 
of the Tokyo Metropolitan Board of Education for five years before the new 
scheme for teacher evaluation was put in place in April 2000 (Katsuno, 1995). 
Thus, they had experienced being both the evaluator and the evaluated. 
In early 2001, Toyokazu Urano, a professor at the University of Tokyo, carried 
out a survey to investigate how head teachers, as well as regular teachers, in 
Tokyo perceived the rapidly changing national and local education policies, 
including the new teacher evaluation system that had just commenced. For this 
survey, Urano randomly selected one teacher from each school and one out of 
every two head teachers from elementary, junior high, and special schools. For 
senior high schools, all the head teachers were included. In total, 3,527 
questionnaires were sent to potential respondents. In the end, questionnaires were 
collected from 793 head teachers and 1,325 teachers — a total of 2,118, with a 
response rate of 60.1%. For a mailed survey, this response rate is very high. 
The results clearly showed some differences between the views of teachers 
and head teachers in regard to the effectiveness of the new teacher evaluation 
(Urano, 2002). As Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show, most teachers‘ views were in line with 
the teacher union survey already discussed. Teachers felt that they had not 
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observed any of the favourable projected impacts of the new processes; they did 
not perceive higher morale, better professional development, or improved school 
management. In contrast, the head teachers were more likely to view the processes 
favourably and to recognise some of these projected impacts although many of 
them still answered ambiguously. In response to another question, 45.2% of the 
head teachers indicated that they did not feel that being evaluated had heightened 
their morale. 
 
Table 3.2 Views held by teachers in Tokyo regarding claimed advantages of 
the new teacher evaluation 
 Positive Negative Ambiguous 
Higher morale. 8.9% 74.8% 15.7% 
Better professional development. 9.4% 73.5% 16.3% 
Improved school management. 12.5% 69.6% 16.1% 
Source: Urano (2002) 
 
Table 3.3 Views held by head teachers in Tokyo regarding claimed advantages 
of the new teacher evaluation 
 Positive Negative Ambiguous 
Higher morale. 32.2% 24.5% 42.2% 
Better professional development. 38.1% 20.7% 40.5% 
Improved school management. 62.3% 9.2% 27.9% 
Source: Urano (2002) 
 
More specifically, in assessing the claimed advantages of the new teacher 
evaluation, head teachers were more likely to confirm the improvement of school 
management than higher morale or better professional development. This suggests 
that many head teachers are willing to make use of the new teacher evaluation as a 
management tool. From this finding, it is not possible to infer the ways in which 
they are actually using the tool. However, given the policy development 
Chapter Three 
39 
elucidated in Chapter 2, the management tool likely provides head teachers with 
the power to win over non-committal or even critical teachers. 
 
3.2 Views of Teachers and Head Teachers in Osaka 
 
Another key survey was conducted in Osaka. In 2003, the Osaka-fu Board of 
Education developed a large-scale trial of the new teacher evaluation scheme, 
called ―Evaluation and Development System for Teachers and School Staff 
(Kyoshokuin no Hyoka/Ikusei System).‖ The Board claimed that the new system 
placed greater emphasis on the development of individual teachers and school 
organisation than its counterpart in Tokyo did (Osaka-fu Kyoshokuin no Shishitsu 
Kojo ni kansuru Kento Iinkai, 2002). Indeed, at that time, the system did not link 
evaluation results to the treatment of personnel, although this changed soon after. 
The head teacher was designated as an evaluator/trainer (hyoka/ikusei sha) (i.e., a 
person who does not simply evaluate but also develops teachers‘ abilities and 
competence levels) and the deputy head teacher as supporter (shien sha) (i.e., a 
person who helps teachers develop their abilities and competence levels). In 
addition, the system advocated the active involvement of teachers in the process 
of school development. Teachers could express their views in regard to school 
management by means of opinion sheets (teigen sheet). Despite all of this, 
however, the system underscored ―management by objectives,‖ just as the systems 
in Tokyo and other prefectures had. According to the Inquiry Committee into the 
Development of Teachers and School Staff, which reported to the Chief Education 
Officer of the Osaka Board of Education: 
 
If teachers and other school staff voluntarily and actively set their own 
objectives, in line with those applied to the school as a whole or groups 
within the school, and seriously consider their roles and obligations, they 
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ought to be motivated and helped to attain their targets with the aid of the 
managerial staff. (Osaka-fu Kyoshokuin no Shishitsu Kojo ni kansuru 
Kento Iinkai, 2002, p. 8) 
 
The committee regarded this as a ―strategy for reinvigoration of schools.‖ All 
through the final report prepared by the committee, it was assumed that individual 
teachers‘ goals accorded with organisational objectives. Head teachers were 
expected to clearly present their vision or goals for school development so that the 
teachers could fully understand them. In turn, the teachers were expected to 
present and explain their goals to the head teacher so that the head teacher could 
―finalise‖ these goals (Osaka-fu Kyoshokuin no Shishitsu Kojo ni kansuru Kento 
Iinkai, 2002, p. 10). The problem here is that the committee did not take into 
account power dynamics and possible conflicts over pedagogical goals that affect 
relationships between individual teachers and an organisation, teachers and 
managers, and even individual teachers and their peers. 
In February 2004, for the purpose of collecting views about the trial, the 
Osaka-fu Board of Education sent questionnaires to 36,825 teachers and 179 head 
teachers
8
. While all teachers working in Osaka were contacted, the head teachers 
were specifically drawn from the schools established and directly administered by 
the Osaka-fu Board of Education
9
. In the end, the Board collected 17,731 
                                                        
8
 The Board also sent questionnaires to 43 municipal boards of education in the Osaka 
Prefecture. However, the results collected from the boards shall not be considered in the 
present thesis. 
9
 Generally, in the Japanese education system, while elementary (primary) and junior 
high (lower secondary) schools are established and administered by municipal boards of 
education, senior high (upper secondary) schools are the responsibility of prefectural boards 
of education. 
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questionnaires from teachers, with a return rate of 48.1%, and 179 questionnaires 
from head teachers, with a return rate of 100%. The Board analysed the results 
and published a report entitled ―The summary of the trial of the Evaluation and 
Development System for Teachers and School Staff (Kyoshokuin Hyoka Ikusei 
System Shiko Jissh no Matome).‖ The report confirmed the rationale behind the 
new system as follows: 
 
The results of the survey show that with regard to the aims of the system 
— the development of teachers‘ and school staff‘s morale, ability, and 
competence, the improvement of teaching and learning, and the 
reinvigoration of schools — the trial proved to be ―useful.‖ Furthermore, 
the processes of the trial improved communication between teachers and 
the head teacher by means of meetings. They also led to discussion about 
the school goals in relation to individual teachers‘ goals. Hence, better 
sharing of goals is needed. 
In addition, in the schools administered by the Osaka-fu Board of 
Education, the trial promoted lesson observations by head teachers which 
had been seldom conducted. This led to the reinvigoration of the schools. 
Thus, we think that the aims of the trial were mostly achieved. (Osaka-fu 
Kyoiku Iinkai Jimukyoku, 2004, p. 50) 
 
Nevertheless, there are some points made by the Board, which are difficult to 
accept. First, it is unlikely that the results confirmed the effectiveness of particular 
parts of the processes as the Board would have us believe. The Board stated: ―out 
of the teachers and school staff that participated in the scheme, those who said that 
the major parts of the procedures were ‗useful‘ outnumbered those who said 
‗useless‘‖ (Osaka-fu Kyoiku Iinkai Jimukyoku, 2004, pp. 48-49). In fact, the 
percentage of the teachers who chose ―useless‖ was 35.0% for the self-report of 
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goals, 24.3% for the meetings with the head teacher, 21.9% for the developer and 
supporter system, and 21.3% for the opinion sheet. However, it should be noted 
that there were sceptical teachers who answered neither positively nor negatively. 
For example, as Table 3.4 shows, in regard to the self-report of goals, 12.0% were 
anxious about its formalities, 9.3% about head teachers‘ lack of understanding, 
6.8% about the way in which the head teachers present their policies, and 15.3% 
about the way in which individual teachers‘ goals are supposed to be articulated in 
relation to oganisational goals. 
Choices that might suggest no more than conditional acceptance (i.e., ―Good, 
but . . .‖) are misleading. The Board, nonetheless, chose to consider these choices 
as positive answers. 
 
Table 3.4 Views held by teachers and head teachers in Osaka on the self-report 
of goals  
 Teacher  
 
n = 17,731 
Head 
Teacher 
 n = 179 
Useful for understanding individual and 
organisational goals. 
25.7% 70.9% 
Useful for sharing issues and objectives. 21.8% 84.9% 
Good, but concerned about its formalities. 12.0% 21.8% 
Good, but concerned about whether the head teachers 
appropriately understand teachers‘ goals.  
  9.3% 22.9% 
Good, but concerned about whether the head teachers 
appropriately present their policies. 
  6.8% 34.6% 
Good, but concerned about whether goals are 
appropriately shared. 
15.3% 30.7% 
 Useless. 35.0%   0.6% 
Source: Osaka-fu Kyoiku Iinkai Jimukyoku (2004) 
 
Certainly, 25.7% and 21.8% of all teachers answered that the self-report was 
―useful‖ for the purposes of ―understanding individual and organisational goals‖ 
and ―sharing goals,‖ respectively. Here, however, it should be noted that teachers 
could choose both of these positive answers, as the questionnaire followed a 
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multiple-choice style. On the other hand, logically, teachers who declared the self-
report ―useless‖ would not have chosen any conditional answers. Considering 
these factors, it is not possible to say that a majority of the teachers confirmed the 
effectiveness of the procedures. Rather, as opposed to the point made by the Board, 
it is possible that those who viewed parts of the procedures positively were in the 
minority. This is applicable to the other parts of the procedures. I reproduce Tables 
3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 below which provide illustrations, though I will not duplicate the 
reasons here. 
 
Table 3.5 Views held by teachers and head teachers in Osaka on meetings with 
the head teacher 
 Teacher 
 
n = 17,731 
Head 
Teacher 
n = 179 
Useful for understanding individual and 
organisational goals. 
19.7% 58.1% 
Useful for sharing issues and goals. 35.4% 79.9% 
Good, but concerned about the way they are 
conducted. 
10.5% 40.8% 
Good, but concerned about whether the head 
teacher appropriately understands teachers‘ goals. 
15.4% 27.9% 
Useless. 24.3%   1.1% 
Source: Osaka-fu Kyoiku Iinkai Jimukyoku (2004) 
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Table 3.6 Views held by teachers and head teachers in Osaka on the trainer 
and supporter system 
 Teacher 
 
n = 17,731 
Head 
Teacher 
n = 179 
Useful for the head teacher to understand teachers‘ 
work. 
24.2% 60.9% 
Useful for receiving advice. 22.6% 50.3% 
Good, but the deputy head is not suitable for the role 
of supporter.  
 9.8% 14.5% 
Good, but concerned about whether the head teacher 
appropriately understands teachers‘ goals.  
16.6% 30.7% 
Good, but concerned about whether advice is 
relevant. 
10.1% 24.0% 
Useless. 21.9%   1.1% 
Source: Osaka-fu Kyoiku Iinkai Jimukyoku (2004) 
 
Table 3.7 Views held by teachers and head teachers in Osaka regarding the 
opinion sheet 
 Teacher 
 
n = 17,731 
Head 
Teacher 
n = 179 
Useful for raising teachers‘ awareness of 
participation in school management. 
20.8% 46.4% 
Good, but concerned about its formalities. 23.3% 23.3% 
Good, but concerned about the practicality for 
reflecting views on school management.  
19.5% 34.1% 
Good, but concerned about whether the head teachers 
appropriately present their policies. 
13.7% 38.1% 
Good, but it should to be handed in to the Board 
instead of the head teacher. 
21.3% 10.6% 
Useless. 14.4%   8.9% 
Source: Osaka-fu Kyoiku Iinkai Jimukyoku (2004) 
 
Meanwhile, the head teachers confirmed the effectiveness of the procedures, 
which contrasts with the teachers, as was the case in Tokyo. Nevertheless, it 
should also be noted that a significant minority of the head teachers raised serious 
concerns regarding aspects of the procedures. Indeed, the head teachers were 
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likely to be anxious about the practicality of the procedures, even when compared 
to the teachers. While a majority of the head teachers approved of the rationale 
behind the new system, they likely felt that the system was in need of reform. 
Also problematic is the Board‘s concluding statement: ―With regard to the 
performance assessment, although issues were raised concerning how to deal with 
the work on which goals are not set, or the different degrees of difficulty of goals, 
we still think that it was accepted as being practical‖ (Osaka-fu Kyoiku Iinkai 
Jimukyoku, 2004, p. 49). The Board also made the same statement in regard to the 
competence assessment. In reality, however, 47.9% of the teachers answered that 
the performance assessment could not or should not be conducted; only 8.1% 
viewed it as practical as seen in Table 3.8. Similarly, 43.2% answered that the 
competence assessment could not or should not be conducted; only 11.2% 
answered that it was practical as seen in Table 3.9. Even among the head teachers, 
no more than 27.4% and 39.1%, respectively, regarded the performance and 
competence assessment as practical. Given these results, the Board‘s above-
mentioned statement hardly makes sense. 
 
Table 3.8 Views held by teachers and head teachers in Osaka regarding the 
performance assessment 
 Teacher 
 
n = 17,731 
Head 
Teacher 
n = 179 
Practical.   8.1% 27.4% 
Good, but the work on which goals are not set 
ought to be assessed. 
26.7% 42.5% 
Good, but the different degrees of difficulty of 
goals should be taken into account.  
24.3% 67.8% 
Cannot or should not be conducted. 47.9%   1.1% 
Source: Osaka-fu Kyoiku Iinkai Jimukyoku (2004)  
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Table 3.9 Views held by teachers and head teachers in Osaka on the 
competence assessment 
 Teacher 
 
n = 17,731 
Head 
Teacher 
n = 179 
Practical. 11.2% 39.1% 
Good, but the teacher‘s role and obligations should 
be taken into account. 
29.8% 46.4% 
Good, but only the positive sides should be noted in 
the ‗special remarks‘ column.  
  7.1% 15.6% 
Good, but professional behaviour should be assessed 
independently. 
  9.0% 43.6% 
Cannot or should not be conducted. 43.2%   4.5% 
Source: Osaka-fu Kyoiku Iinkai Jimukyoku (2004) 
 
The Board reinforced these statements by noting that 40.6% were satisfied 
with their own performance assessment results and that 25.6% were satisfied with 
their own competence assessment results (i.e., they said that their self-evaluation 
concurred with the head teacher‘s assessment). However, it is more important here 
to note that a significant minority of the teachers distinguished their general views 
on the system from those on their own individual assessment results. Individual 
assessment results depend on the circumstances — for instance, who the head 
teacher (i.e., evaluator/trainer) is, what the head teacher‘s policies are, and what 
the relationships between teachers and the head teacher are like. The teachers may 
have made their judgements regarding the practicality of the system as a whole 
independently of whether they were content with the evaluation results that they 
received. Furthermore, there was a notable difference between the rates of 
concurrence of teachers‘ self-review with head teachers‘ evaluations reported by 
teachers and head teachers. While 82.1% of the head teachers confirmed the 
concurrences, only 55.9% of the teachers did so. This suggests that the reports on 
this concurrence were not as reliable as they first appeared. 
As Table 3.10 shows, a minority of teachers confirmed the effectiveness of the 
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new system as a whole. Only 13.3% chose the answer, ―The system is useful for 
professional development of teachers, improvement of teaching and learning, and 
reinvigoration of schools.‖ Meanwhile, 47.4% answered the system is ―useless.‖ 
Thus, on the whole, it is safe to say that views teachers held on the effectiveness 
of the new system were largely negative in opposition to the conclusions drawn by 
the Board. The head teachers responded to the questionnaire more positively than 
the teachers did. However, their attitudes towards the new system were still often 
ambiguous or conditional. 
 
Table 3.10 Views held by teachers and head teachers in Osaka on the 
effectiveness of the new system as a whole 
 Teacher 
 
n = 17,731 
Head 
Teacher 
n = 179 
Useful for professional development of teachers, 
improvement of teaching and learning, and 
reinvigoration of schools. 
13.3% 33.5% 
Good, but the system should be implemented all 
throughout the year
11
. 
 7.0% 33.5% 
Good, but concerned about the evaluator/trainer and 
supporter system. 
 9.6% 67.6% 
Good, but concerned about the lack of understanding 
on the part of teachers and school staff. 
24.6% 43.0% 
Useless. 47.4%  1.7% 
Source: Osaka-fu Kyoiku Iinkai Jimukyoku (2004) 
 
The Board‘s analysis was arbitrary in some regards. For example, the Board 
assumed choices reflecting conditional acceptance indicated affirmation in order 
to claim that the positive answers outnumbered the negative. Furthermore, the 
Board emphasised that those who participated in the scheme were much more 
                                                        
10
 The trial ran from July through January, as preparation took time. 
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favourable than those who did not, which is misleading. Rather, attention should 
be paid to the fact that 17.8% of the teachers and school staff did not submit their 
goals, and that 24.9% did not have any meetings with their head teachers as a part 
of the procedure (Osaka-fu Kyoiku Iinkai Jimukyoku, 2004, p. 7). The Board 
presented an interpretation, which suggested that teachers did not participate 
because they did not properly understand the new system. However, it is possible 
that they did not participate because they disagreed with the system on principle. 
The teachers and school staff were not obliged to participate in the trial, but the 
fact that a significant minority actually chose not to participate suggests a lack of 
confidence in the new system.  
 
3.3 Views of Teachers and Head Teachers in England and Wales 
 
In the UK, there is ample evidence that both head teachers and teachers were 
skeptical of, if not hostile to, the idea of linking pay to performance and its 
claimed advantages (Farrell & Morris, 2004 ; Marsden, 2000; Marsden & French, 
1998; Neill, 2001). For example, a questionnaire survey completed in 1997 
showed that 63.1% of the respondents from National Association of Head 
Teachers, which mainly consists of nursery and primary head teachers, and 50.2% 
of the respondents from Secondary Head Association disagreed with the principle 
of performance-related pay (Marsden & French, 1998, p. 113). Marsden and 
French (1998) indicated that head teachers were less in favour of performance-
related pay than employees of other public service sectors, such as Inland 
Revenue, employment service, and National Health Service trust hospitals. 
Teachers shared their disfavor of performance-related pay with head teachers: 
―teachers stand apart from most other groups of public servants, but alongside 
doctors and nurses, in their opposition to performance-related pay in principle‖ 
(Marsden, 2000, p. 3). Indeed, only 23% of 760 teachers in England agreed that 
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―The principle of relating teachers‘ pay to performance is a good one‖ (Marsden, 
2000). Additionally, Farrell and Morris (2004) reported that 65.4% of 330 teachers 
in Wales disagreed with relating pay to performance in principle, with 31.5% 
disagreeing strongly (Farrell & Morris, 2004 ). 
This skepticism on the part of teachers was associated with their 
understanding of the nature of their work. Indeed, no less than 93% of the 
respondents agreed with ―Performance-related pay will be problematic because it 
is hard to link the work done in schools to individual performance.‖ In addition, 
92.1% felt that performance-related pay would cause resentment among teachers. 
Thus, a great majority of teachers perceived unfairness in the operation of 
performance-related pay schemes, and they were deeply concerned about its 
deteriorating effects on relationships and collaborative work (Farrell & Morris, 
2004, p. 91). 
Farrell and Morris (2004) also showed that the respondents were generally 
suspicious of the advantages that the government promised would derive from the 
introduction of performance-related pay. Specifically, 80.6% of the respondents 
were suspicious of the positive effects on motivation of teachers; likewise, 83.0% 
on teacher recruitment and 83.9% on teacher retention (Farrell & Morris, 2004, p. 
89). Meanwhile, Neill (2001) analysed the returns of questionnaire from 2,722 
teachers in England. The results showed among other findings that: (1) 80.6% 
disagreed with ―Performance review will help improve teacher morale and 
motivation in the school‖; (2) 65.3% disagreed with ―The performance 
management arrangements will help me improve my teaching‖; and (3) 56.3% 
disagreed with ―The performance management process will provide me a valuable 
opportunity to identify my achievements, skills and competence.‖ On the whole, 
these questionnaire-based studies came to almost the same conclusion that the 
new performance-related pay and performance management in England and Wales 
would ―do little to increase teachers‘ motivation, to improve teacher recruitment 
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and retention,‖ which were, after all, ―core to the rationale for the scheme‘s 
introduction‖ (Farrell & Morris, 2004, p. 101). They suggested that the scheme 
would not improve the quality of teaching either. What is worse, the introduction 
of performance-related pay and performance management brought anxiety about 
undesirable side-effects to a majority of teachers. 
A more recent survey noted the changes in teachers‘ and head teachers‘ views 
of performance-related pay and performance management (Marsden & Belfield, 
2005, 2006). Marsden and his colleagues had been conducting panel survey 
research since just before the introduction of performance management in the 
autumn of 2000. In the first wave of the survey in 2000, no more than 23% out of 
760 teachers on the panel agreed with the principle of performance-related pay. 
With the same item in the questionnaire, 37% out of 105 head teachers on the 
panel agreed. These results mostly accorded with those of some other attitudinal 
surveys conducted at almost the same time, as has been shown above (Farrell & 
Morris, 2004; Neill, 2001). However, the results of the latest survey conducted in 
2004 showed that 39% of the same teachers agreed with the principle of 
performance-related pay, an increase from 23% in 2000. Furthermore, the 
percentage of the head teachers who agreed with it dramatically increased to 62% 
in 2004, from 37% in 2000 (Marsden & Belfield, 2006, pp. 9-10). These results 
suggest that, within the intervening years, many head teachers‘ and teachers‘ 
opinions of performance-related pay shifted from the unfavourable to the 
favourable. 
Marsden and Belfield did not explain these shifts by the effectiveness of 
performance-related pay as an economic incentive. Indeed, they found that 
performance-related pay increases neither morale nor motivation for a great 
majority of teachers. What they thought to be the most significant factor causing 
the changes, among others such as dispelled concerns with favoritism and 
unfairness, was improvements in target setting — better articulation between 
Chapter Three 
51 
individual teachers‘ and the school‘s goals and, as a consequence, the 
improvement of school management (Marsden & Belfield, 2005). 
In a later paper, Marsden and Belfield referred to this as the ―joined-up‖ goal 
setting or ―integrative bargaining‖ approach to performance management. The 
integrative, as opposed to the distributive, bargaining approach focuses on 
adapting the contents and priorities of work performance on the part of the 
―agent‖ to the changing needs of the ―principal,‖ and on the need to advance on 
the basis of give and take by both parties (Marsden & Belfield, 2006, p. 6). 
Marsden and Belfield (2005) further considered the concurrence of the 
judgments of improved school management between head teachers and teachers, 
which they argued implies that the improvements were actually happening. Their 
analysis showed that such concurrence could be observed in roughly 15% to 20% 
of the sample schools, where ―joined up‖ goal setting is assumed to be functioning 
effectively (Marsden & Belfield, 2005, p. 16). They also suggested that academic 
records from those schools might well be better than other schools. 
The proposition of ―joined up‖ goal setting is also significant for the purpose 
of the present research, precisely because the new teacher evaluation in Japan is 
intended to cause the articulation of individual and organisational goals. Hence, 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 consider the proposition within the Japanese context, but I 
will briefly comment on Marsden and Belfield studies here. 
Although there was apparently a beneficial effect of performance management 
on school improvement (it was observed in a small proportion of schools), this 
does not represent a radical change. Their methodology was also overly reliant on 
their survey findings. They only hinted at some other reasons that might have 
explained the teachers‘ and head teachers‘ attitudinal shifts, but they could have 
more fully explored the other reasons by means of qualitative investigations. 
Furthermore, what seems more important to me is that the nature of these 
goals, or the nature of school improvement in the end, was not explored. The head 
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teachers and teachers in Marsden and Belfield‘s study reported that they were able 
to set better school goals than they had been before. However, it is not clear 
whether the school goals were good ones in an educational sense. In the English 
context where schools are compared with each other based on their examination 
results, every measure is likely to be used to raise the position of schools in the 
league tables. Given that, what the study presupposes is school improvement may 
be problematic. Indeed, many commentators do not simply believe that raising 
examination results means improvement of teaching and learning in any authentic 
sense, besides recording harmful side-effects of performativity deriving from 
target or objective based education reform (Ball, 2001; Gillborn & Youdell, 2000; 
Thrupp & Hursh, 2006). Better goal setting may lead to better test scores. 
However, here ―are real dangers that distorting the importance of clarity within a 
strongly instrumental process like target setting runs the risk of severely 
weakening its essential links with the larger undertakings which it is designed to 
serve‖ (Fielding, 2001, p. 145, cited in Thrupp & Willmott, 2003, p. 122). As 
Fielding argues, we should ask how those test score are raised (for example, 
through an increasing incidence of ―teaching to the test,‖ greater competition and 
substantial individual and group pressures) and whose scores are raised (for 
example, those on the borderline at the expense of those whose attainment is seen 
to be significantly lower). In other words, whether adopting a particular approach 
of goal setting is morally, as opposed to pragmatically, justifiable is most 
important. 
 
3.4 Summary 
 
In this chapter, I have looked at the previous surveys that have addressed 
teachers and head teachers in Tokyo, Osaka, England, and Wales. In this section, I 
summarise the findings to raise points that I need to explore more fully. 
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In Japan, teachers did not confirm the advantages of the new teacher 
evaluation which had been claimed by the two largest boards of education. Nearly 
70% of the teachers in Tokyo doubted that the processes would lead to higher 
morale, better professional development, and improvement of school management. 
On the contrary, a majority of union member teachers in Tokyo claimed that the 
new teacher evaluation processes had unfavourable impacts, namely, they 
contributed to a less relaxed and animated atmosphere at school and poorer 
relationships between managers and teachers and among the staff. The experience 
of participating in evaluation processes demoralised many teachers. In Osaka, 
nearly half of the teachers answered that the new procedure was ―useless‖ for its 
original purposes, and many others showed concern regarding its practicality, 
despite the reorientation towards the professional development model. On the 
whole, a majority of teachers in both Tokyo and Osaka, whether union members 
or not, did not have confidence in the new teacher evaluation policies and 
practices. 
There were marked differences in viewpoints between teachers and head 
teachers on the effectiveness and practicality of the procedures. In Tokyo, fewer 
than a quarter of the head teachers had an unfavourable opinion of the claimed 
advantages of the processes. In Osaka, the percentage of head teachers who 
thought of the procedures as ―useless‖ was only 1.7%. These results indicated that 
head teachers‘ views were more favourable than teachers‘ were. Looking more 
specifically at how head teachers felt, they were more likely to confirm the 
effectiveness of the new teacher evaluation for school management than for 
teachers‘ morale and professional development. Indeed, 62.3% of the head 
teachers in Tokyo confirmed the favourable effects on school management, while 
no more than 16.1% of teachers did so. 
The surveys that have addressed teachers and head teachers in England and 
Wales allow an interesting comparison, although the meanings and implications 
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of the questionnaire items are not exactly interchangeable. The opinions of the 
ineffectiveness of teacher evaluation held by teachers in Tokyo and Osaka 
mostly concurred with those held by teachers and head teachers in England and 
Wales. At the same time, however, it was found that Japanese head teachers 
were more amenable to the idea of teacher evaluation than their counterparts in 
England and Wales, as well as Japanese teachers. This can be explained by the 
policy developments that have been continually identifying head teachers as 
management who are expected to explain, advocate or simply ―implement‖ 
government initiatives, as stated in Chapter 2. Both these findings and the 
Marsden and Belfield‘s studies draw our particular attention to the way teachers 
and head teachers in Japan respond to the requirement of goal setting. The 
professional development model for teacher evaluation, based on the idea of 
management by objectives, assumes that individual teachers‘ goals accord with 
the head teacher‘s management policies. The results of previous surveys 
conducted in Tokyo and Osaka seem to suggest that head teachers are willing to 
use the processes to help teachers understand their management policies. This 
use made of new teacher evaluation by head teachers can mean changes in the 
way of managing school as well as teachers. Thus, a significant question to be 
addressed by means of using a national survey and interview data is ―How is 
this particular process of goal setting by individual teachers actually enacted?‖ 
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Chapter Four: Review of Literature and Theories 
 
In this chapter, I review two types of literature. One is concerned with the 
policies and practices of teacher evaluation (the subject of the present thesis) and 
the other with performativity (the theory of the present thesis). In conducting this 
literature review, I discuss how a particular perspective of performativity (i.e., the 
work through, as opposed to work upon, perspective) is most relevant to the 
examination of teacher evaluation policies as enacted in Japan. 
 
4.1 Micro-economic Theory Applied to Teacher Evaluation 
 
In Chapter 2, I described the two main assumptions underlying the policies 
and practices of new teacher evaluation in Japan: the micro-economic theory 
applied to teacher evaluation and the professional development model of teacher 
evaluation. In this and the next sections, I critically examine these assumptions in 
turn. 
Micro-economic theory claims that a well-conceived compensation system 
linking evaluation results and pay motivates employees to work for the attainment 
of organisational goals (Lazear, 1995; Lazear & Gibbs, 2009). In Japan, 
performance-based personnel management (seikashugi) for workers in general, 
and teachers in particular, has been proposed as a result of these ideas (Chuo 
Kyoiku Shingikai, 2002, 2004; Jinji In, 2005; Koseirodosho, 2008; Naikaku, 
2001; Nakamura, 2006). However, the argument does not pay adequate attention 
to the particular nature of teachers‘ work. This makes the application of micro-
economic theory to teacher evaluation particularly difficult. 
In the controversial teachers‘ efficiency rating plan in the late 1950s, the 
ideological and political goals of government were at stake. This caused ―violent 
internecine conflict‖ (Duke, 1973, p. 138). But this could not entirely account for 
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the failure of almost all the prefecture boards of education to put performance-
related pay into force. Duke argued that it was both opposition by teachers and 
problems with the policy itself that made teachers‘ efficiency rating plans 
ineffective. 
 
The relative impotence of the rating plan stemmed from the school boards‘ 
concern that the majority of teachers, both non-union and union members, 
did not approve the plan. Hence, to enforce the results of the evaluation 
would invite total opposition by the teaching corps; the results of the 
evaluation that could be obtained from the ratings did not seem worth the 
trouble that was sure to come. Moreover, many school board members 
themselves were not convinced of the validity of the evaluation forms used 
as the basis in determining teachers‘ pay increases. Hence, because of 
Nikkyoso‘s efforts to undermine the plan, in addition to the inherent 
difficulties of evaluating teaching, the rating plan quickly turned 
ineffective. (Duke, 1973, p. 153) 
 
About a half century later, many teachers‘ unions again alleged that the new 
teacher evaluation schemes would be divisive and impair teachers‘ collaborative 
activities and relationships, especially when pay links were threatened. Indeed, as 
stated earlier, the proposed introduction of new teacher evaluation schemes went 
hand in hand with the reform of public employees‘ salary system. In 2005, the 
recommendations of the National Personnel Authority (Jinji In), the state agency 
which determines yearly pay increases and reforms in the salary system of public 
employees, finally included a proposal of performance-related pay (Jinji In, 2005). 
The proposal came after the prolonged debate over a performance-based 
personnel system for public servants. Reliable evaluation was the prerequisite for 
the introduction of performance-related pay. 
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Critics cited the inherent difficulty of properly evaluating the complex and 
collaborative nature of teachers‘ work and the failure of performance-related pay 
for teachers — and government employees in general — in other countries 
(Katsuno, 2002a, 2004; Nakata, 2000; Ogawa, 1996). For example, Katsuno 
(2004) referred to Murnane and Cohen (1986) who drew on contract literature, to 
examine why most merit pay plans had failed in the USA. They illustrated that 
supervisors needed to convincingly answer the following questions, which 
workers might pose: 
 
  Why does worker X get merit pay and I don‘t? 
  What can I do to get merit pay? 
 
As an example, Murnane and Cohen (1986) picked the supervisor of workers 
who are unloading boxes from a truck. In this case, should a dissatisfied worker 
ask either or both questions, the supervisor can simply say, ―Worker X carried two 
boxes at a time, while you carried only one. If you carry two boxes at a time, you 
will get merit pay, too‖ (p. 7). However, due to the ―imprecise nature of the 
activity of teaching‖ or the fact that ―effective teaching cannot be characterized as 
the consistent use of particular well-defined techniques‖ (p. 7), a head teacher 
cannot provide concrete answers to the questions. Thus, the problems plaguing 
merit pay are not just about careless ―implementation‖ or the inadequate training 
of evaluators; the very nature of the teaching activity is a more fundamental 
problem. 
Another requirement for the effective operation of performance-related pay as 
a means for measuring, at relatively low cost, is the actual contribution of the 
individual worker to the firm‘s output (Murnane & Cohen, 1986, p. 4). Again, this 
is not feasible with teacher‘s work and thus merit pay did not work well and was 
often a reason for complaint. As a result, teachers have been demoralised instead 
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of inspired. 
The same evaluation problem applies to government employees in general. 
After reviewing the experience of many countries, the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) report entitled ―Performance-related Pay 
Policies for Government Employees‖ concluded that the economic incentive 
effects of performance-related pay were overestimated (OECD, 2005). In the 
1990s, the OECD had already indicated that performance-related pay for 
government employees in managerial posts did not meet the requirements for the 
system to work as an effective incentive mechanism. The OECD, as well as 
Murnane and Cohen (1986), blamed this failure on the difficulty of judging 
performance, not on system design and operation problems. The public sector 
borrowed the concept of performance-related pay from the private sector to 
enhance the motivation and accountability of public employees. The OECD report, 
however, has put the effectiveness of performance-related pay in doubt. 
Apart from Murnane and Cohen (1986) and the OECD (2005), many scholars 
have discussed problems of introducing performance-related pay owing to the 
nature of work that employees conduct. For example, Holmstrom and Milgrom 
(1991) argued that incentive pay systems could have undesirable effects on overall 
performance when the evaluated work was multidimensional (see also Burgess & 
Ratto, 2003; Dolton, McIntosh, & Chevalier, 2003). Because of the measurement 
problem mentioned above, the incentive pay systems are likely to reward the 
attainment of easily defined tasks or goals. Hence, employees are encouraged to 
divert effort away from other, but possibly important, tasks. Teachers possess 
multiple goals for their practices and their work is characterised as being 
multidimensional (Lortie, 2002). Given this, the misallocation of effort caused by 
thoughtlessly designed performance-related pay systems would have significant 
consequences. Indeed, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) referred to the distortions 
caused by the use of incentive pay for teachers based on their students‘ test result 
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as an illustration of such consequences (p. 25). 
Considering the literature, and also teachers‘ perceptions that have been 
reviewed in Chapter 3 and will be discussed later in Chapter 6, the micro-
economic assumption of teacher evaluation cannot be validated. Some teachers 
agree with the idea of performance-related pay in principle, but disagree with its 
application because of the difficulty of individually evaluating their performance. 
They also observe that enforced performance pay might cause undesirable 
competitiveness among teachers, leading to the deterioration of teaching and 
learning. 
 
4.2 The Professional Development Model of Teacher Evaluation 
 
The new teacher evaluation schemes in Japan invariably adopt the 
professional development model, in a particular form of ―management by 
objectives‖ (Kariya & Kaneko, 2010). Prefecture boards of education claimed that 
management by objectives ought to contribute to the professional development of 
teachers (see Chapter 2). 
For example, the Nagano Prefecture Board of Education was keener than 
others on the idea of teacher development by means of a new teacher evaluation 
scheme. The board declared that evaluation results should not be linked to pay, but 
it adopted management by objectives as a way of teacher development. Thus, the 
new scheme should help individual teachers perform educational activities pro-
actively by self-management and develop themselves further by analysing their 
attainments. The final report of the Inquiry Committee on Teacher Evaluation 
(Naganoken Kyoin Hyoka ni kannsuru Kento Iinkai) gave the following rationale: 
 
 Teachers should enhance their awareness of, motivation for, and involvement 
in their tasks by setting their goals, taking into consideration the congruence 
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between their own goals and the aims of whole school, subject areas, or 
departments, and having in mind their professional development. 
 Through the processes of initial setting of goals, and interim and year-end 
reporting of attainments, teachers and head teachers should have meetings and 
improve their mutual understanding and communication. Also, teachers should 
be encouraged to regularly consult with deputy head teachers and colleagues. 
 Teachers should be encouraged to improve themselves by understanding their 
own dispositions and abilities. 
 Head teachers should be able to extend more appropriate help to teachers and 
improve school management by understanding the teachers‘ dispositions and 
abilities. (Naganoken Kyoin Hyoka ni kansuru Kento Iinkai, 2005) 
 
The report demanded that teachers be encouraged to improve their 
dispositions and abilities by self-reviewing and reflecting on their work and to 
understand themselves more objectively through meetings with the evaluator. 
Here, we can see the theory of intrinsic motivation, as opposed to the micro-
economic motivation theory, being adopted. It argues that teachers will be better 
motivated to work and gain a better sense of self-efficacy if they are given 
autonomy in goal setting. In the USA, Odden and Kelly (1997) summarised how 
the theory of intrinsic motivation could be applied to a new form of teacher 
evaluation: 
 
Overall, motivation theories suggest that employees are more likely to be 
intrinsically motivated when they have control over the quality of their 
work and are given ample opportunities to create a sense of professional 
efficacy through goal-setting, professional development, job enlargement, 
job involvement, and goal attainment. (p. 63) 
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This is also what the goal-setting theory of motivation includes (Lawler, 
Mohrman, & Ledford, 1997; Lock & Latham, 1990). In Japan, advocates of the 
professional development model of teacher evaluation affirmed the plausibility of 
the theory of intrinsic motivation and promoted the concept and procedures of 
management by objectives (Sato & Sakamoto, 1996; Yaosaka, 2005). 
However, this way of conceiving a professional development model (i.e., 
composed of setting goals, meetings with the head and deputy head teachers and 
self-review of performance and competence, with the result of enhanced teachers‘ 
intrinsic motivation and professional development) is still problematic. I will 
expand on this idea in reference to relevant literature from the UK. The rationale 
of the professional development models developed in the UK and Japan and 
elements involved in their processes were mostly identical (Katsuno, 1992, 2004; 
Urano, 1993). Any clear evidence of policy borrowing regarding teacher 
evaluation policies cannot be presented, but considering that both countries shared 
the same political needs for enhancing teachers‘ accountability and performance 
(see Chapter 2), it seems likely that the preceding developments of policy and 
research in the UK had affected those in Japan. 
 
An outline of the professional development model  
In the UK, much of the teacher evaluation literature that appeared around 1990 
advocated the professional development model, explicitly or implicitly criticising 
the accountability model. This literature and research influenced the introduction 
of teacher appraisals, the predecessor of performance management in the UK 
(National Steering Group on the School Teacher Appraisal Pilot Study, 1989). For 
example, Evans and Tomlinson (1989) summarised the background and 
development that led to the introduction of teacher appraisals, using a dichotomy 
of the increasing demand for accountability of schools and teachers on the one 
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hand and the school improvement movement on the other. The authors understood 
that the school improvement movement comprised the combined efforts of 
teachers, local education authorities, and educationists at broad and relevant 
curricula, and more relevant pedagogy and evaluations (Evans & Tomlinson, 
1989). 
The professional development model of teacher evaluation is intended to 
clarify individual teachers‘ needs for professional development and thereby direct 
training and in-service education to meet the needs. The model presumes that, 
based on the attainment of objectives agreed to by an evaluator (manager) and 
teacher at appraisal meetings, the teacher should engage in formal developmental 
tasks. This function of teacher evaluation in diagnosing professional 
developmental needs is called ―appraisal for professional development‖ (Evans & 
Tomlinson, 1989, p. 27). However, the professional development model assumes 
another function — ―appraisal as professional development.‖ Its rationale is that 
by participating in teacher evaluation, teachers have an opportunity for 
professional development, reflecting on and better understanding their own 
teaching activities. The professional development model emphasises self-review 
by teachers, which is thought to be useful for enhancing the validity of evaluation 
by the evaluator. 
Teachers are also supposed to reflect on their own teaching activities through 
self-review, obtain a clearer understanding of their strong and weak points, and 
then improve their practices and themselves even without formal training or in-
service courses. Thus, self-review is not simply the measure of appraisal 
information collected but is, in itself, a ―developmental focus‖ (Bollington, 
Hopkins, & West, 1990, p. 56). 
In the professional development model, lesson observation is assumed to play 
an important role. If, after observation, the observer‘s opinion is made known to 
the teacher without delay, and discussion ensues based on that opinion, teachers 
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should be encouraged to reflect on the practices. For lesson observation to be such 
a collaboration, mutual understanding and trust between the observer and the 
observed is imperative. That same trust should apply to meetings. Meanwhile, a 
lesson observer and evaluator must have a thorough grasp of the complex and 
contingent nature of teaching and improve her/his clinical capabilities. The 
―clinical supervisor‖ cited by Bollington, Hopkins, and West (1990, p. 40) should 
respect the judgment made by a teacher in a concrete pedagogical situation, 
provide an objective and constructive opinion, and help the teacher gain a deeper 
understanding of her/his own teaching practices. 
The professional development model of teacher evaluation tends to relate 
individual teachers‘ practices to the activities of the school and professional 
development to organisational development. Indeed, a professional development 
model firmly locates a teacher‘s self-review within the parameters of whole-
school review (Hopkins, Howard, Johnston, Glover, & Woodburn, 1991). It is 
claimed that the appraisal of individual teachers ought to be more substantive 
within an organisational context. Communication among teachers could thus 
improve, and effective strategies could also be found for improving overall school 
educational activities. 
 
Tensions between the accountability and professional development models 
Evans and Tomlinson (1989) understood that the two teacher appraisal models, 
professional development and accountability, were distinct and ―mutually 
exclusive and impossible to integrate‖ (Evans & Tomlinson, 1989, p. 15). For the 
professional model to thrive, there should be an open relationship based on mutual 
trust and understanding that enables educational discussion between the evaluator 
and the evaluated. It is hardly possible to obtain such a relationship, though, if 
summative judgments for personnel decisions are to be made. Most of the teacher 
evaluation literature in Japan shares this tension (Kiyohara, 2005; Yaosaka, 2005), 
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and the professional development model is rarely criticised. Presumably, one of 
the exceptions is a sociological study into the development of local teacher 
evaluation schemes in a particular prefecture (Kaneko, 2010). This study 
illustrates the variance between the model of teacher development held by 
policymakers and the ideas of teacher development conceived by teachers. This 
variance led to abandonment of an originally conceived plan. However, for the 
most part, the teacher evaluation literature tends to adopt a problem solving 
approach (Thrupp & Willmott, 2003, pp. 54-55) and focuses on operational 
problems. 
Here my main objection concerns the lack of perspective on micro-politics or 
power relations in the professional development model. It seems that advocates of 
this model base their arguments on the humane or subjective understanding of 
organisation while paying attention to teachers‘ intrinsic motivation, beliefs, and 
values. If we accept this perspective, individual and organisational development 
should be considered political and would be laden with conflicts. On the contrary, 
the professional development model takes for granted the concurrence between 
personal, organisational, and systemic objectives. I would argue that the process 
of teacher evaluation is a crucible of social and political negotiation even if it is 
intended to promote individual and organisational development. 
The professional development model puts weight on teachers‘ participation in 
the process of evaluation, claiming that it will enhance their intrinsic motivation 
and commitment to organisational objectives. This is called a ―commitment 
strategy‖ (as opposed to a ―control strategy‖) — the way by which teachers can be 
persuaded to contribute to their individual and organisational development (Skyes, 
1990, p. 192) — and it is based on a notion of collaboration. However, if we pay 
enough attention to how power works in the process of participation, motivation, 
commitment, and collaboration, the professional development model would be no 
less constrictive than the accountability model. I agree with Hoyle (1989) when he 
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noted that: 
 
It could be argued that participative appraisal — and indeed, the whole of 
the collaborative approach to professionalisation referred to above — 
could be seen as a greater threat to autonomy than the managerial form, 
since the intrusiveness of the latter is likely to be limited by the fact that 
schools are characterized by a structural looseness, allowing heads and 
teachers to collude in the ritualisation of appraisal, observing the form but 
not the substance. (p. 65) 
 
Seen in this light, the dichotomy of the accountability and professional 
development models would be misleading. The professional model of teacher 
evaluation, as well as the accountability model, may be considered a control 
strategy or ―disciplinary power‖ (Rose, 1999, pp. 22-23). Furthermore, at the 
macro level, the professional development model of teacher evaluation will enable 
the state to ―steer at a distance‖ teachers‘ work (Whitty, et al., 1998, p. 35).  
Since the professional development model of teacher evaluation lacks 
perspectives on power and micro-politics, it cannot seriously deal with the effects 
on teachers‘ subjectivity of self-reviewing and being evaluated, which has been 
discussed in the literature of performativity and teachers‘ identity (see the next 
section). The professional development model deals with the effects almost 
exclusively in terms of individual and organisational developments. In this regard, 
Power (1997) explored what we may call the productive power of evaluation, in 
his critical review of the audit regime emerging in public administration and 
corporate governance. According to Power, the values and practices which 
evaluation entails will penetrate deeply into the core of organisational operations, 
not just in terms of requiring energy and resources to conform to evaluation 
demands but in the creation of new mentalities, new incentives, and perceptions of 
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significance. In other words, the evaluation regime may contribute to the 
construction of a new organisational actor (Power, 1997, p. 97). I argue that 
Power‘s insight is also highly relevant to the professional development model of 
teacher evaluation in Japan. 
 
4.3 Theories of Performativity 
 
As stated in Chapter 1, a particular reading of performativity is relevant to the 
present study of how teacher evaluation polices are being enacted in Japanese 
schools. Thus, I will introduce the work through perspective of performativity, 
which allows us to analyse the impact of teacher evaluation from a micro-political 
or relational viewpoint. The need for this viewpoint has been partly shown by the 
examination of the problematic rationale of the professional development model 
in the previous section, and discussion of the literature on performativity 
illustrates it further. 
Beginning with the meaning of performativity, the post-modernist theorist 
Lyotard stated: ―knowledge and power are simply two sides of the same question: 
who decides what knowledge is, and who knows what needs to be decided?‖ 
(Lyotard, 1984, pp. 8-9) For Lyotard, all of the ―grand narratives‖ such as ―the 
dialects of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or 
working subject, or the creation of the wealth‖ (p. xxiii) have been losing their 
legitimating function since the late 1950s. This modern mode of legitimation has 
been replaced by performativity, defined as the maximisation of a system‘s output 
and the minimisation of its input. 
In defining performativity as such, Lyotard used the idea of Wittgenstein‘s 
language games (i.e., modes of legitimation) and applied it to ―a general field of 
social agonistics‖ (Mckenzie, 2001, p. 162). Then he observed: 
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Decision makers attempt to manage these clouds of sociality according to 
input/output matrices, following a logic which implies that their elements 
are commensurable and that the whole is determinable. They allocate our 
lives for growth of power. In matters of social justice and of scientific truth 
alike, the legitimation of that power is based on the system‘s performance 
— efficiency. (Lyotard, 1984, p. xxiv) 
 
Under this principle of performativity, other language games are allowed only 
if they are calculable in terms of system optimisation. As a result, ―the application 
of this criterion to all of our language games necessarily implies a certain level of 
terror, whether soft or hard: be operational (that is commensurable) or disappear‖ 
(Lyotard, 1984, p. xxiv). 
Here Lyotard conceptualised performativity explicitly as a mode of power, 
regulation and control. In this thinking, the most important question is who knows, 
decides and controls. The following question posed by Ball (2003) echoes this: 
 
Who is it that determines what is to count as a valuable, effective or 
satisfactory performance and what measures and indicators are considered 
valid? (p. 216) 
 
Elliott‘s formulation of ―indirect regulation of performance by central 
government‖ (Elliott, 2001, p. 192) or ―steering at distance‖ (Whitty, et al., 1998, 
p. 35) answers Ball‘s question. Meanwhile, it is possible that these formulations of 
questions and answers, despite their significance, distract us from a different view 
of the way performativity is enacted in schools. 
Related to this, Youdell (2010) summarised the way performativity is adopted 
in policy sociology as follows: 
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In policy sociology performativity is regularly interrogated for the ways 
that it remakes education by reducing both education and those who 
populate it to what is measurable, manageable, knowable. It is an account 
of the performative production of constraint. (p. 226) 
 
As will be discussed later in this chapter, my reading of the literature on 
performativity in schools is that this constraint comes from elsewhere (at least 
from outside schools) as mandates, and it is the thing which teachers are required 
to individually face. I challenge this. My assumption is that performativity 
policies initiate performativity in schools but that performativity is enacted 
through the social interactions of teachers. In other words, performativity, as a 
―disciplinary system‖ (Ball, 1998, p. 190) or ―disciplinary power‖ (Rose, 1999, pp. 
22-23), does not simply work upon individual teachers‘ selves and practices. As 
discussed below, it also works through the social interactions of teachers. 
 
Performativity and control over teachers’ work 
Concepts of performativity are useful in examining the impacts of recent 
education policies that are preoccupied with performance of teachers, students and 
schools — performativity policies such as target-setting, evaluation of a school‘s 
and teacher‘s performance, league tables constructed from pupil test scores, and 
performance-related pay for teachers. These policies most likely result in ―the 
refocusing of school management on the attainment of narrow and partial, albeit 
important, short term outcome measure‖ (Husbands, 2001, p. 15). However, the 
performativity culture that these policies introduce to schools at the same time has 
a serious limitation. Elliot (2001) stated: 
 
Paradoxically, making performance visible by measuring it against 
indicators depends on making evidence about its real impact invisible, 
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since such evidence would reveal the dependence of outcomes on time and 
context, and limits on their predictability. (p. 197) 
 
While quality of teaching and learning is essentially time-dependent, the 
performativity culture is based on the assumption that the relationship between 
cause and effect can be captured in a time-less form, in the here-and-now (i.e., the 
audit language). ―If quality cannot be measured against timeless, fixed and 
immutable standards or targets, it does not exist‖ (p. 194). 
A problem with this culture is that schools and teachers find it difficult to 
provide flexible responses to their students‘ needs. Elliott (2001) illustrated this: 
 
The more pervasive the gaze of performance audit on the activities of 
teachers, the less it becomes possible for them to balance learning 
requirements against the need of their students for non-formal space and 
time in which to pursue their own ―learning agendas.‖ (p. 195) 
 
Chua (2009) framed this difficulty from a somewhat different point of view. 
Citing Simon (1996), Chua (2009) regards teachers as designers whose activities 
aim to transform the present state of affairs into a preferred one — a student who 
is more knowledgeable, more skilled, and more enlightened. However, to the 
extent that performativity privileges visible, measurable outcomes, it diminishes 
teachers‘ cognitive ability to conceive of a variety of other intrinsically valuable 
goals and thus ―lowers the professional standards of educators just as it cultivates 
unscientific designerly ways of knowing‖ (p. 160). A teacher‘s ―cognitive soul‖ (p. 
162) has been occupied by the performativity discourse and consequently the 
teacher is obsessed with those particular goals measured by performance 
indicators. Hence, Chua (2009) argued for the necessity of broadening this 
―irrationally muted design cognition‖ and developing ―designerly ways of 
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knowing‖ (p. 162).  
Certainly, this situation has much to do with the teachers‘ dilemma and 
compliance, and identity work. With regard to performance management, an 
equivalent of teacher evaluation in Japan, Gleeson and Gunter (2001) stated that it 
was not simply concerned with teacher pay and recruitment, and that it had further 
implications which connect managerial procedures with desired outcomes and 
behaviour which may have little to do with learning or professional development. 
These outcomes and behaviours, with a primary focus on pupil achievement, are 
presented as targets to teachers. This has the following effects: 
 
From ―playing the game‖ to strategic compliance, professionals have 
become adept at distancing themselves from the values they believe in to 
those which require manipulation in order to get through the wide range of 
internally and externally imposed targets. (p. 149) 
 
In a similar vein, Ball (2001, pp. 216-218) wrote about ―fabrications‖ that are 
selections among possible representation of the organisations or individuals who 
are required to account for their performance. 
There is a further problematic assumption on which the culture of 
performativity is based; perfect information about the workings of individuals or 
organisations can be provided by means of measurement, audit, assessment and 
evaluation. According to Elliot (2001), this assumption reflects ―an interest in 
making individuals or organisations objects of social engineering‖ (p. 194). In as 
much as the culture of performativity is underpinned by this assumption, it will 
strengthen ―indirect regulation of performance by central government‖ (p. 192).  
While control over teachers‘ work has been in existence for a considerable 
time, its meaning has been changing. Gleeson and Gunter (2001) depicted how the 
modes of regulation has shifted from ―relative autonomy‖ (since 1960s through 
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mid-1980s), through ―controlled autonomy‖ (since 1980s through 1990s), to 
―productive autonomy‖ (since 2000 through onwards) (pp. 142-143). The latest 
mode of the performance control of teacher and their work (i.e., performativity) is 
characterised as follows: 
 
 Teachers must be internally accountable to themselves and their organisations 
through formal audit of students learning and outcomes. Head teachers and 
senior managers take control of the process. 
 Teacher and organisational targets are assimilated into the national curriculum 
and performance framework. Performance-related pay is integrated into audit, 
appraisal and target procedure. 
 Head teachers and senior managers are middle managers between the 
government and teachers, and are publicly accountable for performance 
outcomes.  
 Formalised quantitative evidence based on pupil outcomes, and qualitative 
evidence based on personal statements and classroom evaluation are utilised. 
 Performance is measured through transparent, statistical calculations about the 
value added by the teacher to pupil outcomes. 
 Children are commoditised as objects and targets to be assessed and counted. 
 
Thus, performativity is concerned with regulation or control by means of targets, 
outcomes, appraisal, assessment, audit, measurement and transparent and 
statistical calculations. This idea of performativity follows that of Lyotard (1984) 
as already discussed (Ball, 1998, 2001, 2003; Elliott, 2001). 
 
Teachers’ experiences of performativity policies 
These kinds of performance control are causing problems for teachers, not 
only in England but also in other countries, including Japan. 
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In England, the performativity measures have been in tension with parallel 
developments that place creativity at the heart of education policy (Craft & Jeffrey, 
2008). Thus, teachers are ―encouraged on the one hand to innovate, take risks and 
foster creativity, and on the other, are subject to heavy duty accountability‖ (p. 
579). According to Doherty and McMahon (2007), despite its distinctive ―social 
democratic virtues of policy-making,‖ the Scottish education system has not been 
immune to a policy paradigm constructed around ―the desirability of national 
economic competitiveness in a global market and the repositioning of knowledge 
as the fundamental resource in wealth creation‖ (pp. 251-252). The professional 
context of Scotland‘s teachers has been reconstructed by Scotland‘s own particular 
performativity regime consisting of a range of measures, such as the use of 
development planning, statistical monitoring, and self-evaluation of schools. 
Troman, Jeffrey, and Raggl (2007) also investigated the complex policy 
context in which the maximisation of test scores is imperative whilst some 
creativity initiatives or ―nurturing programmes‖ (p. 560) have to be adopted in 
order to maintain the motivation and commitment of staff and pupils. The authors 
found some variance in approaches to creativity programmes between English 
primary schools that they studied. Contrary to their expectations, on the whole, 
high SES (Socio-economic Status) schools were more cautious than low SES 
schools. This was not least because in the high SES schools, middle-class parents 
demanded the basics and better test scores. In addition, the authors argued that 
performativity as well as creativity initiatives had a positive impact: ―they both 
provided two of the most important sources of professional work satisfaction in 
teaching,‖ namely, ―curriculum coverage and task completion,‖ and ―the psychic 
rewards of teaching‖ (p. 564). According to the authors, while ―the theoretical and 
analytical single-policy focused writing in the area of performativity has been 
almost negative,‖ that in the area of creativity has been almost positive (p. 568). 
Their argument was that these forms of analysis have not paid enough attention to 
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the complexity involved when teachers are enacting a range of distinct but not 
entirely oppositional policies. Thus, they argued: 
  
If the policy context is complex then we can expect teachers‘ 
interpretations, reactions and responses to it to be as well. In the schools of 
our research the drive to raise test scores involved both performative and 
creative strategies, and this critical mediation went beyond amelioration 
towards a more complex view of professional practices. (p. 568) 
 
Sachs (2001), and Day and Sachs (2004) formulated the tensions teachers 
faced, not only in the UK but also in Australia, in terms of competing discourses 
of managerial and democratic professionalism. Following Brennan (1996), the 
authors considered that managerial professionalism exhorts teachers to meet 
efficiently and effectively the standardised criteria for the achievement of both 
students and teachers, and thereby to contribute to the school‘s formal 
accountability processes. In essence, managerial professionalism is closely 
associated with performativity. On the other hand, democratic professionalism is 
concerned with collaborative and cooperative endeavours between teachers and 
other educational stakeholders. Both these forms of teacher professionalism share 
the desire to improve the performance of teachers and ultimately to enhance 
student learning outcomes. However, how they accomplish this (by means of 
external regulation or professional regulation and collaboration) and who has 
control of the process (external authority or teachers and other local stakeholders) 
distinguishes between them. The author observed that while both kinds of 
discourse were apparently evident in the UK and Australia, the managerial 
professionalism was clearly mandated by the states and informed their policies. In 
this context, ―teachers move between the two, negotiating the contradictions and 
multiple demands that are placed on them in their busy and complex workplaces‖ 
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(Day & Sachs, 2004, p. 7). 
Burnard and White (2008) explored the way that teachers in both the UK and 
Australia must deal with tensions residing in the education policies that 
simultaneously advocate performativity and creativity. In both countries, emphasis 
is put on teaching creativity, which can enhance learners‘ flexibility and initiative 
that a knowledge-based economy demands. At the same time, teachers are 
required to meet benchmarks and improve standards. The authors argued for a 
―rebalancing pedagogy‖ rather than a dichotomised way of developing pedagogy 
based either on performativity or creativity (pp. 676-677). Drawing on research 
conducted in schools in Queensland, Australia, Lingard (2009) also argued that 
pedagogies should be reinforced as an element of teacher identities in the context 
of some forms of accountability (for example, standardised testing, national 
league tables of school performance, and international league tables of 
performance) threatening to ―thin out pedagogies and reduce the intellectual 
demand and reach of pedagogies‖ (p. 91). 
However, balancing the conflicting discourses and policies, whether of 
creativity and performativity or managerial and democratic professionalism, is not 
an easy task. Keddie, Mills, and Pendergast (2011) found ―a clear sense of 
disenfranchisement and dissatisfaction from teachers‖ at an Australian school 
where the administration placed emphasis on the school being ―number one‖ — a 
high performing school of first choice (p. 79). This construction of school identity 
around academic excellence involved continuous comparison of student 
performance outcomes, sanctioning the teachers deemed to be under-performing, 
and adherance of teachers‘ practices to a prescribed and standardised curriculum 
and pedagogy. The teachers, however, felt dissatisfied with these disciplinary 
processes, which were excessively demanding, producing undue pressure, 
generating a sense of anxiety and fear, narrowing pedagogy and curriculum, and 
ignoring the social aspects of schooling. In these processes, the authors argued, 
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the teachers‘ confidence and trust in their own capacities were undermined, with 
their ―coherent narratives of professional identity‖ being destabilised (p. 89). 
Lipman (2004) described similar contradictions and dilemmas that teachers 
faced within the context of standards and accountability in the United States of 
America. They included teaching to the test, a narrowed curriculum, less 
intellectually demanding work, and intense regulation and deskilling of teachers 
with devastating consequences for their morale, confidence, and commitment (pp. 
42-48). A compromise needs to be found between teacher professionalism and 
standardisation (Wills & Sandholtz, 2009). However, finding an acceptable 
compromise is not always easy for some teachers. Santoro (2011) suggested a new 
way of examining teacher attrition, introducing a category of ―principled leavers‖ 
(pp. 2680-2681) who leave the profession on grounds that they are being asked to 
engage in practices that they believe contradict their beliefs about good teaching. 
The author analyses the ―moral situation‖ in which teachers experience 
―incompatibility of ends‖ (Dewey & Tufts, 1926, p. 207, quoted in Santoro 2011 p. 
2680) in terms of their responsibilities to the profession, the institution, students, 
and the self. A dilemma between teacher professionalism and standardisation that 
standards and accountability movement causes is potentially concerned with this 
moral situation. 
The impact of performativity policies on teachers‘ work and subjectivities has 
been investigated also in Hong Kong. Choi (2005) described Hong Kong‘s 
education reform since the transition of sovereignty in 1997 as part and parcel of 
economic globalisation, mainly in terms of privatisation and managerialism. The 
author then continued by pointing out goal displacement: ―Massive paperwork 
demanded of schools and teachers leads to a high level of work intensification for 
teachers, who are now left with little time for their core duties of teaching and 
helping students‖ (p. 247). This goal displacement required under the regime of 
performativity causes emotional and existential disturbances such as alienation, 
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self-doubt, and guilt. All of this can ―displace the core values and self-identity that 
teachers have originally brought to their work‖ (p. 247). 
In Japan, as stated in Chapter 2, schooling has become increasingly focused on 
the nation‘s economic need for human resources in an era of globalised economies. 
With the aims of enabling intervention in which accountability, developments, and 
outcomes are subjected to scrutiny, a range of policies have been developed, such 
as National Testing, school evaluation, and teacher evaluation. Professional and 
public perceptions that academic standards in Japanese schools had declined
12
 
were a catalyst for the neo-liberal education reform (Thrupp & Katsuno, 2010). 
Consequently, many schools now set targets for students‘ performance and publish 
school development plans that elaborate on how the school is reaching those 
targets. One of the consequences of these policy developments is the 
intensification of work for teachers. Teachers now need to complete massive 
amounts of paperwork, such as goal-setting and self-review documents, which 
leave them with little time for lesson preparation and communication with 
students. This goal displacement can cause teachers to suffer emotional and 
existential disturbances, such as guilt, self-doubt, and alienation, exactly as 
teachers suffer in Hong Kong. A teacher working in an urban school stated this: 
 
My days begin with making calls to some pupils to ask, ―Have you had 
                                                        
12
 Many traced this back to 2002, when textbook content was reduced 30% and the school 
week was shortened from six days to five. This policy change, called yutori kyoiku (relaxed 
education), was launched in response to many problems, such as bullying, physical attacks 
on peers and school staff, school phobia, and apathy and suicides among children and 
youths, which were attributed to the competitive and stressful nature of Japanese schooling. 
However, this change was soon retracted amidst public concerns about declining academic 
standards. 
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breakfast?‖ or ―Are you fit enough to come to school today?‖ I come to 
school at seven, and making these calls is the first thing to do. It‘s really 
hard work, but I don‘t care because this is the work I have chosen. What I 
can‘t put up with is the work imposed from above — a lot of paperwork 
and various tasks dictated by the administration. These things make me feel 
sorry. I should have done more for my children. (quoted in Katsuno, 2007b, 
p. 4) 
 
Many commentators have noted that Japan‘s teachers have a self-image as 
humane professionals who are responsible for and committed to the whole 
development of the children in their charge (for example, Inagaki & Kudomi, 
1994). The teachers believe that their personal and emotional relationships with 
children play an important role in enacting effective teaching and learning 
(Rohlen & LeTendre, 1996). In the current situation of work intensification, 
however, these self-images and professional beliefs are likely to be a cause of 
teachers becoming ―crippled by conscience‖ (Hargreaves & Evans, 1997, p. 2). 
If this line of reasoning is true, more recent comments illustrating a shift in 
teachers‘ self-images away from a fully committed professional seem plausible 
(Kudomi, 2003, 2008). Yamada (2003) asked why the burnout rate of Japan‘s 
teachers had been declining since 2000 despite the continued intensification of 
work, suggesting that teachers were retreating from the troublesome concerns of 
their professional work to their private lives. In a similar vein, Hasegawa (2008) 
stated that teachers were delimiting their professional responsibilities in order to 
maintain their professional identities. The author calls this ―a strategy of dualism,‖ 
which is ―the way teachers try to avoid the overall collapse of their professional 
identities by seeing a part of the conditions and consequences of their work as 
being beyond their control‖ (Hasegawa, 2008, p. 118). 
Returning to the UK context, Woods and Jeffrey (2002) and Perryman (2006) 
Chapter Four 
78 
specifically explored the impact of performativity on schools, focusing on how 
teachers experienced the Office for Standards in Education (OFSTED) inspections. 
Woods and Jeffrey (2002) explored how English primary teachers were 
negotiating new identities within the experience of school inspection by the 
OFSTED. Their experiences were sometimes ―traumatic‖ (p. 99), not least 
because the social identity assigned by the requirements of the inspections ran 
counter to their personal identities. The authors called this collision the ―challenge 
to the Plowden self-identity‖ (p. 93). For them, the Plowden self-identity 
consisted of humanism and vocationalism (in other words, a missionary 
commitment to teaching), and provided teachers with the basis for an integrated 
self. However, school inspection, as an essential part of the National Curriculum 
and Testing regime, pressured teachers to abandon or, at least, modify these value 
systems in many ways. For example, ―the process of an OFSTED inspection 
reduced the complex, multiple qualities of Plowden teaching to a series of 
measurable criteria, assessed in 20-30 minutes as to how well children had 
‗received‘ specific factual knowledge‖ (p. 94). This was a serious assault on the 
child-centred philosophy that was a main constituent of humanism. Furthermore, 
the ever-tightening control over and detailed recording of practices connoted a 
diminution in the trust that had previously been extended to teachers. 
Overall, the newly assigned roles and social identities created serious 
dilemmas for the teachers. Drawing on the Giddens‘ formulation of four major 
dilemmas that the self in late modernity typically confronts (Giddens, 1991), the 
authors explained this situation in terms of the fragmented self with the old values 
becoming difficult to retain, an assault on teacher autonomy, a heightened sense of 
uncertainty about one‘s abilities, aims, relationships and commitment to teaching, 
and commoditisation of personal relationships. While some teachers could simply 
embrace the newly assigned social identity, others found it difficult to negotiate 
some consistency between self-concept and social-identity. The authors found two 
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major responses among the latter type of teachers: self-positioning (refusal and 
self-assertion) and separation of the self from the new social identity. Self-
positioning was concerned with ―a strong resolve to maintain the Plowden self-
identity, rejecting the new assigned social identity‖ (p. 99). 
On the other hand, separation of the self from the new social identity was a 
strategy by which teachers developed ―new personal identity to meet the 
ostensible requirements (although not the spirit) of the new social identity, while 
reserving and cultivating what to them were more important aspects of the self for 
their private life outside the teacher role‖ (p. 100). This act of detaching oneself 
from work involved acting (game-playing) in inspection situations. However, as 
the authors pointed out, this identity strategy could not keep the teachers‘ self 
intact: ―Game-playing can leave teachers ambivalent about their self-identity. In 
face of authority and loss of trust, uncertainty occurs and creates yet another 
dilemma for teachers‖ (pp. 102-103). Furthermore, for some teachers, their 
commitment to teaching was now underpinned by instrumentalism rather than by 
vocationalism — thus the Plowden-identity was undermined. 
Perryman (2006) also examined the nature of OFSTED inspection, 
particularly the impact of being under special measures, as a disciplinary 
mechanism. Perryman uses the conceptual metaphor of ―panoptic performativity‖ 
(pp. 156-158) derived from the work of Foucault (1977) to describe the 
experience of teachers under the inspection regime. In this regime, the ―frequency 
of inspection and sense of being perpetually under surveillance lead to teachers 
performing in ways dictated by the discourse of inspection in order to escape the 
regime‖ (p. 148). Drawing on the case study of a secondary school called 
Northgate, which had been under special measures for nearly two years, she 
argued that the teachers could not help adhering to rigid and predetermined 
criteria for ―the normal‖ (p. 155), in terms of policy and pedagogy. Perryman 
found that Northgate ―increasingly seemed like an organisation existing purely for 
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the purposes of ‗passing‘ an inspection‖ (p. 155). Here, the condition of being 
continuously observed ushered in performativity as well as normalisation. Such 
performativity could cause the teachers to have ―a sense of de-professionalisation‖ 
(p. 158) as they felt that they were performing in order to demonstrate their 
competence. 
The OFSTED inspection system has spurred the development of elaborate 
self-evaluation systems in some schools. Hall and Noyes (2009) explored the 
ways that teachers were re-positioned in these newly engendered conditions, ―the 
regimes of truth,‖ from a Foucauldian perspective. In a large rural secondary 
school called Greenbank, the leadership team energetically observed lessons, gave 
feedback, verified departmental standards, and assigned grades to each subject 
area, using OFSTED inspection criteria and schedules. The authors found that 
members of leadership team often used, in everyday discourse, the grading 
terminology stipulated in the criteria to describe standards of teaching and 
teachers. They then suggested that a disciplinary regime of normalisation, as 
depicted by Perryman (2006) in relation to the national inspection regime, was 
reproducing itself within schools. They also observed, ―Greenbank‘s SLT 
established their system with a display of power‖ (p. 852). The senior leadership 
team (SLT) assumed formal power to conduct unannounced formal observations, 
audits, and grade teachers and their teaching. The authors also reported that the 
senior leadership team was planning to devolve this power to subject leaders.  
 
In Foucauldian terms, disciplinary power in Greenbank was, by these 
means, becoming more anonymous and more functional, being exercised 
through surveillance and observation rather than through higher profile 
―ceremonial‖ events or post hoc accounts of practice. (Hall & Noyes, p. 
852) 
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Importantly, however, this ―more anonymous and more functional‖ internal 
quality assurance system was all the same as the OFSTED in that it ―created its 
own kinds of pressures‖ (p. 853) and consequently upset many teachers. 
 
Need for the work through perspective of performativity 
These works illustrate how teachers experienced particular performativity 
policies in varied national contexts. Significantly to me, most of them seem to 
share another feature — what I call the work upon perspective of performativity. 
In other words, they are likely to have us believe that the performativity policy 
simply impacts upon teachers as outside forces. However, there are some reasons 
for believing that this cannot always be apposite. 
Theoretically, the work upon perspective would lead to the reification of 
performativity; performativity derives from elsewhere as mandates and it is the 
thing to which teachers could manage to adapt, comply with, appropriate, or resist. 
If we see performativity as such, we can become trapped in the dualism of 
structure and agency. My assumption is that performativity is being enacted 
through the social interactions of teachers and is not always forced on them. 
The work upon perspective may reinforce analytical individualism as well. 
Jeffrey and Woods (2002) explored the identity work of teachers confronting 
performativity policies. The teachers, faced with a dilemma between personal 
identity and social identity, employed varied strategies, including refusal, self-
assertion, separation of the self from the new social identity, and game-playing. I 
have no objection to this observation per se, but I had the impression that the 
identity work is being done individualistically. 
Another typical example of this sort of analysis is that of Moore, Edwards, 
Halpin, and George (2002), which explored the issue of the reconstruction of 
teacher identity in the general context of rapid socio-economic change and 
educational reform. Although their work did not specifically address 
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performativity, its historical, societal, and policy background is almost the same as 
that of Woods and Jeffrey (2002) and Perryman (2006). 
One of the main arguments of Moore et al. (2002) is that English teachers 
talked about their professional outlooks and practices eclectically and 
pragmatically. Thus, the authors abandon the conceptual dichotomy of compliance 
and resistance, which have been thought feasible in examining teachers‘ responses 
to public policy. Instead, they elaborate upon the analytical concept of pragmatism. 
They differentiate between two types of pragmatism — principled and contingent 
— with full reference to their interview data. They use principled pragmatism as a 
signifier ―to describe the identification of teachers who, regardless of the extent to 
which their choices may be unconsciously guided by ‗external‘ constrains, self-
present as decision-making individuals with a clear professional plan and purpose 
that guide those decisions‖ (p. 554). On the other hand, the authors find a different 
signifier of contingent pragmatism ―when teachers illustrate very visibly, and 
often quite uncomfortably in their narratives, a sense of compromise and 
uncertainty in their eclecticism‖ (p. 554) even if most the respondents drew on a 
range of educational traditions and discourse (in other words, they were invariably 
eclectics). What distinguishes a ―principled pragmatist‖ from ―contingent 
pragmatist‖, therefore, was the sense of making one‘s own choice — pro-activism 
as opposed to re-activism. 
Having presented these elaborations, Moore et al. (2002) were careful to not 
overly reify the teachers‘ identity, which is the reason they stressed the importance 
of eclecticism and pragmatism as signifiers. They were interested in ―why 
teachers use particular signifiers of identification at different moments in 
educational history, and in particular, why pragmatism and eclecticism are such 
popular and powerful signifiers of identification in the present conjuncture‖ (p. 
561). This is an interesting point both theoretically and analytically. However, it is 
more to the interest of the present research that Moore and his colleagues dealt 
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with the shift in teachers‘ identification (more correctly, their signifiers), mostly as 
regards their individual inner conflicts and adaptation. 
The authors hint at a relational influence. For example, Edward, a principled 
pragmatist, was aware of the potential conflicts with his colleagues over an issue 
of academic rigor. Meanwhile, for Graeme, a contingent pragmatist, increased 
pressure from management changed his pedagogy and outlook on teaching. 
However, these micro-political issues seem to have attracted only transient 
interest from the authors. 
The professional identification of both Edward and Graeme might have been 
more a result of social interactions and negotiations with their colleagues, not to 
mention management, than what the authors would have us believe. The accounts 
seem to tell us that the two teachers responded, whether comfortably or not, to 
socio-economic change and educational reform by themselves, within their own 
minds. I would like to challenge this individualism. I believe that teachers‘ 
identity work is enacted in local politics within the school.  
This line of analysis of the literature leads me to adopt a different perspective 
of performativity in the present study — what I call the work through perspective 
of performativity. As opposed to the work upon perspective of performativity, 
which will see the culture of a certain school as being rather monolithic and the 
impact of performativity policies or discourse coming from the outside, the work 
through perspective will pay attention to the way performativity capitalises on the 
value divisions already present (or being produced) within the school organisation. 
Accordingly, it will locate the identity work of teachers in the micro-politics of the 
school. Here, my concern echoes that of Hall and Noyes (2009), which paid 
attention to the micro-power relations that the new self-evaluation systems were 
cultivating within schools. Following both Foucault (1977) and Ball (2001), the 
authors suggested that the workings of performativity have ―a powerful social and 
interpersonal, as well as personal, dimension‖ (p. 854). They particularly referred 
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to fabrication going on in a school where an elaborate system of internal 
evaluation has been established. However, the identity work employed by teachers 
under the pressures of performativity can be more wide-ranging and more 
complex, as the other works mentioned above have suggested. Therefore, in this 
study, I explore in more detail the way performativity, in the form of teacher 
evaluation policies and practices, influences and shapes teachers‘ identities as well 
as their work.  
The work through perspective of performativity enables this study. However, 
as a newly conceived analytic lens, this perspective is difficult to delineate more 
clearly at the moment. Rather, the meaning of the perspective will articulate itself 
as analysis proceeds. For me, it is a heuristic device. Additionally, it should be 
noted that the need for the work through perspective does not deny that for the 
work upon perspective of performativity. On the contrary, both the perspectives 
are complementary in understanding the ways teachers‘ work are being 
reconstructed and their selves are repositioned in relation to new teacher 
evaluation. In some schools, head teachers demand that teachers set numerical 
goals in terms of their students‘ academic achievement. From a teachers‘ point of 
views, this represents a work upon type of performativity, which in turn gives rise 
to work through types of performativity between teachers.  
 
Cultural context of school leadership 
As stated in Chapter 2, any analysis of the enactment of teacher evaluation 
policies needs to consider the wider policies. For the purpose of the present 
research, the most relevant are concerned with school leadership. As the 
Japanese government is determined to respond effectively to a globalising 
economy, it increasingly regards the role of head teachers as a guarantee of 
national goals that are set mainly in economic terms. The goals are ultimately 
concerned with producing a workforce with the appropriate skills and attitudes 
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required by changing capitalism. What Bottery (2002) elucidates with regard to 
English institutional leadership can also be applied to Japanese head teachers: 
―educational leaders increasingly use the terms of economists (such as 
customers, clients, markets, stakeholders, etc.), and are therefore led down to a 
road where the validity and dubious morality of commercial oxymoron like 
customer intimacy are accepted‖ (p. 161). Here, the author is concerned about 
the downgrading of primary educational values, such as respect, trust, and care 
that ―can be practiced only if they achieve the aims of the marketplace‖ (p. 161). 
These kinds of changes with regard to function and value are required not only 
of educational leaders but of regular teachers. Yet, as literature on shifting 
headship towards the ―new manager‖ in the English context has shown (Ball, 
1994; Gewirtz, 2002; Grace, 1995; Whitty, et al., 1998), head teachers are more 
vulnerable to the pressures for new professional values and identities than are 
teachers. 
Bottery (2002) illustrates an apparent contradiction in education policies that 
the UK government has adopted. On the one hand, as business developments 
predict, greater responsibility and implementation have been devolved to the 
school, and the need for flattening the management structure is recognised. 
These changes are supposed to encourage more effective use of the local 
knowledge and skills that practicing teachers possess. On the other hand, in 
order to achieve the same goal of developing economic and human capital, the 
government has strived for a tightly controlled and directed education system. 
The author suggests that the latter model is largely borrowed from the Far East 
in the belief that such directive approaches underpinned their economic success 
in the 1980s and 1990s (p. 163). 
As a member of the Far East, Japan‘s societal and cultural characteristics 
have attracted the attention of many commentators and have been variously 
discussed. For example, Ouchi (1981) searched for the secret of Japan‘s 
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economic success and argued that a unique management style contributed to the 
improvement of employees‘ loyalty to the company and thereby to high 
productivity. It has also been argued that this management style is undergirded 
by the paternalistic culture of Japanese society or ―tateshakai [vertical society],‖ 
which makes it possible for organisational leaders to forcefully direct 
subordinate members without harming their commitment (Nakane, 1967). Thus, 
this particular culture is assumed to underlie ―a hierarchical organisation of a 
group, with a paternalistic leader at the apex, who is the source of satisfying 
both affective and instrumental needs of subordinate members‖ (Befu, 1980, p. 
170).  
Until recently, Japan had developed a highly centralised and prescriptive 
education system, with little room for teachers to decide what they would teach 
and how they would teach it (Horio, 1994, 2002). To ensure the fulfillment of its 
directives, the government demanded that head teachers be authoritative figures 
in relation to teachers. More recently, as described in Chapter 2, decentralisation 
and market focus have become current trends in education policies. Within the 
resulting education market, every school must develop its distinctive character 
to compete with other schools. For this purpose, schools are given a mandate to 
develop not only students‘ scholarly skills but also teachers‘ professionalism (the 
new teacher evaluaion is clearly a case in point). At the same time, a hierarchical 
management structure and an authoritative decision-making style are 
strengthened through national and local policy enforcement (Sako, 2005). For 
example, in April 2006, the Tokyo Metropolitan Board of Education circulated 
letters to all schools in its jurisdiction, saying that voting by a show of hands as 
a method of confirming the intentions of school staff at meetings should be 
strictly forbidden to ensure strong headship and ―proper‖ school management. 
Japan‘s head teachers have been coping with the task of not only 
instrumentally but also normatively contolling teachers on behalf of the state for 
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a longer period than have school leaders in any other country. Arguably, this 
complex task has been fulfilled owing to the above-mentioned paternalistic 
culture of Japanese society. However, school leadership is becoming more 
difficult to exercise because of the increasing volume of demanding directives 
that are imposed on teachers. These strictures have had demoralising effects, as 
mentioned. In response to this situation, the government has been providing 
head teachers with various measures to help them perform their leadership 
responsibilities, such as new subordinate managerial posts to support them. 
Although head teachers continue to rely on the paternalistic culture, they can 
supplement, if not replace, it through these new measures, one of which is the 
new teacher evaluation. 
Thus, the present study is concerned with the reorientation of school 
leadership culture, with a particular focus on the role that the new teacher 
evaluation plays in this process. However, this cultural viewpoint does not 
exclude a political viewpoint. On the contray, the workings of culture always 
involve power. Hence, it is necessary to study how the enactment of new teacher 
evaluaion policies influence the transformation of the cultural base of school 
leadership into a more performative culture, focusing on power-relationships 
within schools. In this regard, it should be noted that Befu (1980) has critically 
examined, if not totally disputed, the ―tateshakai [vertical society]‖ model of 
Japanese society, which is predicated on hierarchical relationships and 
psychological interdependence. She assumed that in reality, society is rife with 
different forms of conflict and competition and blamed the model for lacking a 
political perspective. In a sense, the present study‘s criticism of the consensual 
assumption of the professional development model of teacher evaluation follows 
suit. 
In summary, I argue that the work through perspective of performativity, 
which pays close attention to micro-politics and micro power relations will 
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allow us to draw not only a more subtle picture of the way teacher evaluation is 
being done in schools against a background of performativity but also 
performativity itself is enacted in schools. Performativity is certainly affecting 
students. Jeffrey and Troman (2011) examined the way primary school students‘ 
performative identities are being constructed as they complete Key Stage 
examinations. The harmful side effects of numerical goals or target setting, 
which do not fully consider the nature of educational processes have been well 
documented in various countries (Ball, 2001; Lipman, 2004; Thrupp & Hursh, 
2006). Although the present study into the workings of performativity with a 
particular focus on teachers is limited in scope, this limitation should be justified 
when considering the significance of teachers‘ work and identities for the 
learning and well-being of students. 
 
4.4 Summary 
In this chapter, I have critically examined literature on teacher evaluation 
(micro-economic theory to teacher evaluation and the professional development 
model) and theories of performativity. By reviewing the literature of the latter type, 
I found that most of it heavily relied on what I call the work upon perspective of 
performativity and I argued that this particular perspective should be 
complemented by what I call the work through perspective. By adopting this 
perspective as a heuristic device, the present study can pay more attention to the 
micro-politics occurring around the processes of teacher evaluation. 
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Chapter Five: Research Design and Methods 
 
In this chapter, I discuss the research design, methods of data collection and 
analysis, and ethics of research. Those research design and methods that I adopted 
in the present study are guided by not only the nature of the research subject 
(teacher evaluation as performativity policies and practices) but by that theoretical 
perspective that I have discussed in Chapter 4. A particular theoretical perspective 
is related to a research orientation. I state my transformative, as opposed to 
problem solving, orientation. 
 
5.1 Research Design 
 
Focusing on the micro-politics associated with teacher evaluation processes 
demands a detailed understanding not only of what is actually happening, but 
what sense teachers and head teachers are making of their experiences. A problem 
with this inquiry is that significant events, such as goal-setting and review 
meetings, are not accessible to researchers on account of privacy requirements 
associated with personnel procedures. I therefore chose to conduct a survey and 
interviews rather than direct observations to collect the relevant data. The study 
has employed a ―concurrent mixed methods procedure‖ in which ―the researcher 
converges or merges quantitative and qualitative data in order to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the research problem‖ (Creswell, 2009, p. 14; Creswell 
& Plano Clark, 2011). More specifically, quantitative data from a survey has been 
used to provide a general picture of how teachers experience and perceive the new 
teacher evaluation policies and practices, and qualitative data from interviews has 
been used to provide the depth of analysis required to examine the nature of 
performativity in schools. 
The research design is guided by my use of a specific theoretical perspective, 
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the work through perspective of performativity. As stated in Chapter 4, most 
previous research on the new teacher evaluation by Japanese scholars has adopted 
problem-solving approaches associated with professional development models. 
Such approaches are characterised by their blindness to conflicts and domination, 
and further marginalisation of individuals in disadvantaged positions. Previous 
survey research has shown that there are problems with both the development and 
effectiveness of teacher evaluation (see Chapter 3). However, the results cannot be 
of much help in explaining how the teachers‘ and head teachers‘ views have been 
formed. More significantly, against the overall trend from the quantitative 
research, it is likely that views and experiences of a minority are not seriously 
considered. What is needed is an approach that is able to consider the particular as 
well as overall trends, and then probe further into the particular. 
Attention to the views and experiences of individuals who suffer from the 
processes of teacher evaluation in some ways and others, even if they are not a 
majority, is demanded by the theoretical perspective. Creswell (2009) discusses 
the use of theory in qualitative method and mixed methods approaches as ―an 
overall orienting lens for the study of questions of gender, class, and race‖ (p. 62). 
My own theoretical perspective of performativity is not particularly associated 
with gender, class, or race, but with dominated and marginalised voices in general. 
Here I assume that the domination and marginalisation occurring around the 
processes of teacher evaluation have undesirable consequences for teachers‘ work 
and selves, and that the situation should be changed as a result. Here, I concur 
with Mertens (2007) when she argues for transformative mixed methods research: 
 
The transformative mixed methods approach is needed because research 
does not necessarily serve the needs of those who have traditionally been 
excluded from positions of power in the research world, and therefore the 
potential to further human rights through a research agenda has not been 
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fully realized. The transformative paradigm provides such a framework for 
examining assumptions that explicitly address power issues, social justice, 
and cultural complexity throughout the research process. (pp. 212-213) 
 
Mertens (2007) examined transformative ontological, epistemological, and 
axiological assumptions in turn, and then stated: 
 
Methodologically, mixed methods are preferred for working toward 
increased social justice because they allow for the qualitative dialogue 
needed throughout the research cycle, as well as the collection of 
qualitative data as appropriate. (p. 224) 
 
I understand that research with a transformative orientation should provide not 
only the researcher but also the researched with a basis for change based on better 
understanding of their reality; participative action research shares the same 
orientation (Kemmis & Wilkinson, 1998). The mixed methods approach has an 
advantage in promoting this research agenda. 
 
5.2 Methods of Data Collection  
 
As stated in the previous section, I conducted a nation-wide survey and in-
depth interviews with twelve teachers and four head teachers in four focus schools 
– three senior high schools and one special school. These research methods 
address different kinds of research question; while the survey is concerned with 
teachers‘ and head teachers‘ perspectives on new teacher evaluation, the 
interviews are concerned with the actual enactment of the policies (see Chapter 1 
for the full statement of research questions). In the following, I provide more 
detail about the data collection. 
Chapter Five 
92 
 
A nation-wide survey 
Questionnaires were sent to 3787 head teachers of public primary, secondary, 
and special schools across Japan in February 2008. For this purpose, I randomly 
selected every 10
th
 school, by prefecture and school type, from the School 
Registry. The head teachers were asked whether, besides filling in their own 
questionnaires, they would distribute questionnaires to the teachers in their 
schools. In total, 1368 questionnaires were received, with the return rate being 
36%. Of the 1368 head teachers who responded, 146 agreed to distribute 
questionnaires to the teachers in their schools.  
I sent the questionnaire packages to the cooperating schools and each package 
included sufficient copies for all the teachers in the school. The teachers were also 
provided with stamped envelopes so that they could return their questionnaires on 
their own, rather than via their head teachers. I adopted this procedure with the 
intentions not only of raising the response rate, but of also reducing such a bias as 
may accrue from a culture of conformity in which teachers may find themselves 
pressurised to answer in a particular way (this is one of the themes to be discussed 
in the present thesis. See Chapter 4 for Japan‘s societal and cultural characteristics 
as a context of school management). In my study, it turned out that differences in 
the views of the head teachers and teachers were large as will be shown in Chapter 
6. This fact suggests that teachers felt free to answer the questions. 
The head teachers and teachers were asked three categories of questions: (1) 
views on teachers‘ pay, (2) views on the ―implementation‖ and effectiveness of 
the new teacher evaluation, and (3) views on the current state of their schools (see 
Appendices 1 and 2 for translated questionnaires for head teachers and teachers 
respectively). In designing the questions, I tried to avoid inadequate wording and 
poorly defined terms: a key strategy to increase the reliability of answers (Fowler, 
2002, pp. 78-88). However, as I did not conduct a preliminary pilot survey, the 
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reliability cannot be well established.  
The questionnaires included some items specifically designed for head 
teachers and teachers. For example, the head teachers were asked whether they 
thought that the new teacher evaluation practices had been helpful in identifying 
particularly incompetent teachers, whereas the teachers were asked whether they 
consulted colleagues when setting their own goals. The rest of the questionnaire 
items were mostly identical so that comparisons could be made between head 
teachers and teachers. 
In the end, responses from 567 teachers were collected – an average of 3.9 
teachers per cooperating school. However, I am not sure whether all the teachers 
in the cooperating schools actually received the questionnaires. I am also not sure 
whether all respondents were volunteers or if they were told to complete the 
questionnaire. If the head teachers had chosen only like-minded teachers, the 
sample would be biased. However, it seems reasonable to believe that this did not 
occur because the differences in the views of the head teachers and teachers were 
large as already mentioned above. 
Overall, considering the related literature (Cohen & Manion, 1989, p. 114; 
Fowler, 2002, pp.40-41), the response rate can be considered to be modestly good. 
However, more importantly, the sample is highly representative of the national 
population in terms of school type and size, and the teachers‘ and head teachers‘ 
attributes, except for gender (see Chapter 6 for more detail).  
 
The sample of schools for in-depth interviews 
Alongside the questionnaire survey, I conducted in-depth interviews to obtain 
a more nuanced picture of what is happening in the process of teacher evaluation. 
I had planned to select a few focus schools from the 146 cooperating schools, but 
all of the schools that I approached declined to cooperate further. I had chosen 
three head teachers whose views on new teacher evaluation policies ranged from 
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extremely favourable to rather sceptical and had asked them for permission to 
interview staff in their schools. However, none of these head teachers granted 
permission. One of them, who thought that their teachers in his school had poor 
opinions of the new teacher evaluation procedures, referred to the repercussions 
that the interviews could have. The others made excuses, referring to the extra 
burden that their staff would have to bear. However, in communications with these 
two head teachers, I realised that the real reason for not allowing their teachers to 
be interviewed was the same as the one provided by the first head teacher. These 
developments revealed the serious sensitivities of the issue, which made me 
realise that approaching the others in the group of 146 schools was unlikely to be 
successful. 
I therefore took a ―convenience-sampling approach‖ (Cohen & Manion, 1989, 
p. 103) and conducted interviews only in schools where I had some previous 
contacts, such as a school governor or as a friend of a member of the school staff. 
The four schools where I conducted interviews were overseen by two particular 
prefectural boards of education, both of which had been implementing rather 
stringent teacher evaluation schemes. Both linked the result of teacher evaluation 
to remuneration to some extent. In addition, one of these boards of education 
strongly promoted numerical goals. This meant that I had an advantage in 
observing the micro-politics that performativity could cause. 
It should be also noted that none of the schools were elementary or junior high 
schools. Generally speaking, senior high schools are under stronger pressure for 
performativity than elementary and junior high schools, not the least because their 
performance, as typically represented by university entrance examination results 
and drop-out rates, is more visible and subject to numerical goals. 
Overall the sample of schools was one in which the impact of performativity 
was probably stronger than would be seen in a more broadly representative 
sample. Nevertheless by exploring theoretical issues concerned with the manner 
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in which performativity is being enacted in schools, I have been able to 
―generalise a particular set of results to some broader theory‖ (Yin, 2009, p. 43). 
What I have attempted to do is an ―analytical‖ generalisation, if not a ―statistical‖ 
generalisation. 
 
The interviews 
I conducted the interviews of four head teachers and 12 teachers over the 
period from May 2008 to July 2009. Each of the interviews lasted about an hour 
after school and occurred when and where the participants felt most convenient 
and safe (predominantly in her/his office). The interviews were semi-structured 
around the following key questions: 
 
 What do you think are the beneficial and harmful effects of teacher 
evaluation?  
 What is your view of the evaluation meetings between the head teacher and 
the teachers? 
 Do you think your management/teaching approach has somehow changed as a 
result of this teacher evaluation? 
 Are there elements in the process of teacher evaluation that particularly 
impressed/dismayed you? If so, why? 
 
All of the interviewees except one head teacher agreed that their interviews could 
be audio recorded and then transcribed for analysis. 
Some teachers appeared uneasy at the beginning of their interview, but they 
gained confidence as the interview progressed. Although the interviews were 
semi-structured, the interviewees were permitted to express their opinions openly. 
One young teacher began to talk about her own experience of breakdown, which 
at first she only vaguely associated with the teacher evaluation. Some other 
Chapter Five 
96 
teachers also used the interview time to reflect on their experiences, making or re-
making sense of them in context. 
 
5.3 Methods of Data Analysis 
 
The purpose of conducting the survey was not to confirm or refute any 
hypothesis, but to obtain a recent, national picture of views held by teachers and 
head teachers. As such, the survey was not able to recognise such local differences 
in the new teacher evaluation policies as I discussed in Chapter 2. Thus, I present 
the overall trends and interpreted features I believed were worth mentioning. As 
stated above, the differences in the views of the head teachers and teachers were 
large. I also paid particular attention to differences of teachers‘ views on and 
experiences of the new teacher evaluation policies and practices by type of school, 
gender, and age. The results are also compared to those from previous surveys. 
Here, it should be noted that there are some items that are not reported upon in 
this thesis. These are mainly the results of the judgement regarding the relevance 
of individual items in light of the themes to be discussed. A different reason 
applies to many items in the category (3). Originally, I intended to select sample 
schools for in-depth interviews from those participating in the survey, and then to 
match the data from case studies to those from this particular section of the survey. 
However, as will be stated below, I could not obtain permission to conduct in-
depth interviews from the schools that I approached. Consequently, I had no 
choice but to give up utilising that part of the survey data as originally planned. 
With regard to the qualitative analysis, I employed ―thematic analysis‖ 
strategy (Mutch, 2005, p. 176; Creswell, 2009). Specifically, I repeatedly read 
through the transcriptions to develop codes and then to generate themes for 
analysis. As stated earlier, the sample consisted of four head teachers and 12 
teachers in four schools. I paid particular attention to the divergence as well as 
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congruence of the ways they are making sense of their circumstances and they are 
positioning themselves (Ball, Maguire, Braun, & Hoskins, 2011; Weick, 1995). 
For the purposes of improving the validity of analysis, I adopted the method 
called ―peer debriefing‖ (Marshall & Rossman, 2011, p. 221). Specifically, on 
several occasions, I invited knowledgeable researchers, including Professor 
Toyokazu Urano of the University of Teikyo (my ex-supervisor), to double-check 
my data and interpretations. They mostly supported my analysis, but drew 
attention to some points that I had missed.  
 
5.4 Ethical Issues 
 
In Japan, ethical issues of research, particularly in social sciences and 
humanities, have only recently come to be debated. Most universities have 
established research ethics committees, but their review processes tend to be slack 
when the proposed research involves surveys or interviews. However, over the 
course of the present research, the Human Research Ethics Regulations of the 
University of Waikato were observed. In the introductory letters (see Appendices 
3 and 4 for head teachers and teachers respectively) and prior to each interview, I 
explained to the possible participants the purpose, methodology, and likely use 
made of the research. The participants were advised that they could decline to 
participate, decline to answer any of the interview questions, or withdraw 
completely from the research before completion of data collection. They were also 
informed that they had the right to read the transcripts of the interview and 
withdraw or change any points before completion of data collection. I asked for 
informed consent in writing from all the interviewees (see Appendix 5) but many 
of them did not bother to complete the consent form. This is because against the 
background mentioned above, research participants as well as researchers tend to 
feel it too formal to complete consent forms and prefer relying on the mutual 
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trust
13
.  
In this thesis, pseudonyms have been used for all the participants and schools 
so that they will not be identifiable. 
 
5.5 Summary 
 
In this chapter, I have presented a rationale for the mixed methods approach 
with a transformative orientation that I have employed in the present study. 
Specifically, I have used quantitative survey data to provide a general picture of 
how teachers experience and perceive the new teacher evaluation practices and 
qualitative data from interviews to provide the depth of analysis required to probe 
the nature of performativity in schools. The theoretical perspective has been a 
guide for collecting and analysing data. I have then discussed in more detail the 
methods of collecting and analysing data and also ethical issues.  
 
                                                        
13
 Some academic associations in the fields of social sciences and humanities have 
published ethical guidelines for research, but normally they do not make the completion of 
consent forms mandatory. For example, the Japan Sociological Society‘s research guidelines 
published in 2006 make it a requirement for researchers to explain to possible participants 
the purpose, methodology and likely use made of the research, and to receive their consent. 
However, with regard to consent forms, it simply states, ―in some cases, you might consider 
asking participants to sign consent forms‖ (Japan Sociological Society, 2006, p. 2). 
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Chapter Six: Results of a National Survey 
 
In this chapter, I introduce results of a national survey that I conducted to 
investigate teachers‘ and head teachers‘ views on the new teacher evaluation 
policies and practices. The previous surveys, which I described in Chapter 3, 
provided us with significant but local and early findings. Considering that almost 
all of the prefectural boards of education have introduced new schemes of teacher 
evaluation, it is possible to produce a national and more current picture. Thus, I 
conducted the national survey to examine how these national and more recent 
findings correspond with the local and earlier ones. I will also use these findings 
as background for the qualitative research discussed in subsequent chapters. 
 
6.1 Outline of the National Survey 
  
Over the period from February to April 2008, I conducted a national survey of 
teachers‘ and head teachers‘ views on the new teacher evaluation policies and 
practices and the related organisational conditions of schools. Questionnaires were 
sent to 3,787 head teachers at both primary and secondary schools
14
, with the 
exclusion of private schools, across the country. I asked the head teachers if they 
would distribute questionnaires to teachers in their schools in addition to 
completing the questionnaires themselves. Questionnaires were collected from 
1,368 head teachers, out of which 146 head teachers agreed to cooperate further. 
Packages of questionnaires were then sent to the cooperating schools with each 
containing sufficient copies for all the teachers at the school. A total of 567 returns 
                                                        
14
 In Japan‘s national education system, primary sector consists of elementary schools 
(age 6-12) and secondary sector of junior high (age 12-15) and senior high schools (age 15-
18).  
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were collected from the teachers, which meant that, on average, 3.9 teachers from 
every cooperating school took part in the survey (see Chapter 5 for more details 
on the survey method).  
Only returns from the cooperating schools will be reported in this thesis, 
which means that the sample consists of 146 head teachers and 567 teachers. This 
decision was made in order to ensure that comparisons between the replies of 
head teachers and teachers would be plausible (although in fact the returns from 
the larger sample of 1,368 head teachers did not statistically differ from those 
analysed here). In addition, 63 teachers and 15 head teachers reported that they 
had not yet taken part in the new teacher evaluation processes, all of whom I 
excluded when examining the views based on experience. 
Table 6.1 presents a breakdown of cooperating schools by type and Table 6.2 
by size (according to the number of full-time teachers). No type of school is either 
under- or over-represented (Monbukagakusho, 2008a). The most common range 
for the number of full-time teachers is 11-20, which accounts for 34.9% of the 
schools. The number of full-time teachers largely depends on the type of school. 
Among the 29 cooperating schools with a maximum of ten full-time teachers, 23 
are elementary and six are junior high schools. Among the nine cooperating 
schools with no fewer than 51 full-time teachers, two are junior high, six senior 
high, and one is a special school. 
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Table 6.1 Breakdown of the cooperating schools by type, compared to the 
national population 
 Cooperating Schools National Population 
Elementary School 82 (56.2%) 22,270 (60.4%) 
Junior High School 42 (28.8%) 10,180 (27.6%) 
Senior High School 18 (12.3%) 3,922 (10.6%) 
Special School  4 (2.7%)  506 (1.4%) 
Total 146 (100%) 36,878 (100%) 
Sources: The national data is drawn from Gakko Kihon Chosa (Monbukagakusho, 
2008a). 
 
Table 6.2 Breakdown of the cooperating schools by size  
Number of full-time teachers  
10 and below 29 (19.9%) 
11-20 51 (34.9%) 
21-30 28 (19.2%) 
31-40 17 (11.6%) 
41-50 12 (8.2%) 
51 and over 9 (6.2%) 
Total 146 (100%) 
 
The breakdown of teachers and head teachers for the cooperating schools are 
shown in terms of gender (Table 6.3) and age (Table 6.4). Table 6.3 indicates that 
female teachers and head teachers are under-represented among the teachers and 
head teachers in the cooperating schools. The most frequent age range for teachers 
in the cooperating schools is 46-50 while 64.4% of the head teachers are over 55 
years of age. These age profiles of teachers and head teachers in the cooperating 
schools are consistent with the national profile. In 2007, the average ages of 
teachers across the nation were 43.2 in elementary, 42.8 in junior high, 44.8 in 
senior high, and 43.1 in special schools. In the same year, the average ages of 
head teachers across the nation were 56.7 in elementary, 56.7 in junior high, 57.7 
in senior high, and 57.4 in special schools (Monbukagakusho, 2007).  
Having described the attributes of teachers and schools in the present sample, I 
Chapter Six 
102 
then move on to examine the findings of the survey: views on teacher‘s pay and 
the implementation and effectiveness of the new teacher evaluation. Here it 
should be noted that throughout the present thesis I report the results in terms of 
three scales (i.e., ―agree‖, ―disagree‖, and ―do not know‖), instead of original, five 
point scales (see Appendix 2 for reproduced questionnaires). This is because the 
respondents were likely to choose less straightforward scales. In Japan, this 
approach to handling survey data is common. 
 
Table 6.3 Breakdown of teachers and head teachers in the cooperating schools 
by gender, compared to the national population 
 Teacher Head Teacher 
 Cooperating  
Schools 
n = 567 
National 
Population 
n = 708,517 
Cooperating 
Schools 
n = 146 
National 
Population 
n = 36,328 
Female 241 (42.5%) 352,334 (50.3%) 9 (6.2%) 4,641 (12.8%) 
Male 321 (56.6%) 356,183 (49.7%) 137 (93.8%) 31,687 (87.2%) 
N.A. 5 (0.9%)    
Sources: The national data is drawn from Gakko Kyoin Kihon Chosa 
(Monbukagakusho, 2007). 
 
Table 6.4 Breakdown of teachers and head teachers in the cooperating schools 
by age 
 Teacher Head Teacher 
n = 567 n = 146 
25 and below 13 (2.3%) — 
26-30 48 (8.5%) — 
31-35 54 (9.5%) ― 
36-40 85 (15.0%) — 
41-45 111 (19.6%) — 
46-50 122 (21.5%) 5 (3.4%) 
51-55 82 (14.5%) 47 (32.2%) 
56 and over 51 (9.0%) 94 (64.4%) 
N.A. 1 (0.2%) — 
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6.2 Views on Teachers’ Pay 
 
In this section, I present a general picture of teachers‘ views related to pay 
issues and then probe further into the findings. Differences in the views by type of 
school, gender, and age are reported.  
 
Overview 
Table 6.5 summarises agreement and disagreement with various propositions 
on teachers‘ pay, collected from both teachers and head teachers across Japan. As 
stated in Chapter 2, the policies for the new teacher evaluation developed at the 
same time as the reform of the public employees‘ salary system, particularly the 
introduction of performance-related pay.  
A high percentage of agreement with the principle of performance-related pay 
became apparent. More specifically, 63.9% of all head teachers and 51.5% of 
teachers agreed that ―Linking pay to performance and competence is a good way 
for rewarding hardworking and competent teachers,‖ a statement often used 
during the government‘s recent reform of teachers‘ pay. However, their views on 
performance-related pay might not be as straightforward as they initially appear. 
In fact, they are ambiguous or contradictory in various ways. 
First, compared to the degree of agreement with linking pay to the evaluation, 
survey respondents are less confident that this link will lead to substantial benefits, 
such as improvement of quality or standards in education or teachers‘ motivation. 
Consider their responses to the following two propositions in Table 6.5:  
 
 Linking pay to performance and competence should contribute to 
improvement of quality or standards in education. 
 Linking pay to performance and competence should prompt teachers to work 
harder to meet goals or develop professionally. 
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Those who disagreed outnumbered those who agreed, with the exception of head 
teachers who responded to the second proposition.  
 
Table 6.5 Views on teachers‘ pay held by teachers and head teachers across the 
country 
 Teacher Head Teacher 
 n = 567 n = 146 
 Agree Disagree Agree Disagree 
Linking pay to performance and 
competence is a good way of 
rewarding hardworking or competent 
teachers. 
51.5% 44.9% 63.9% 34.7% 
Linking pay to performance and 
competence should contribute to the 
improvement of quality or standards 
in education. 
38.2% 57.7% 45.5% 51.8% 
Linking pay to performance and 
competence should prompt teachers to 
work harder to meet goals or develop 
professionally. 
37.1% 59.6% 51.0% 48.3% 
Teachers' pay should reflect the 
demands of posts such as head of a 
department or ―lead teacher.‖ 
56.3% 42.3% 76.2% 23.8% 
Teachers' pay should reflect 
differences in workloads, including, 
for instance, supervision of club 
activities. 
67.9% 30.1% 67.8% 32.2% 
In order to reward the hard work of 
teachers, salary levels for all, rather 
than only some, teachers should be 
raised. 
84.7% 12.8% 83.3% 15.3% 
Teachers‘ pay should not be linked to 
performance and competence, because 
it is difficult to attribute students‘ 
attainment to individual teachers. 
62.1% 29.3% 52.4% 45.5% 
Teachers‘ pay should not be linked to 
performance and competence, because 
this will cause competition and 
jealousy among teachers. 
68.6% 25.2% 55.9% 40.6% 
Note: In this table, figures for ―do not know‖ are omitted. Consequently, the sum 
of the percentages for ―agree‖ and ―disagree‖ does not always equal 100%. 
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Second, while teachers agreed with the idea of performance-related pay, they 
were concerned about its practicality once their attention was drawn to potential 
difficulties or problems. It appears contradictory that, out of the 93 head teachers 
who agreed with the idea of performance-related pay, 40 agreed that ―Teachers‘ 
pay should not be linked to performance and competence because it is difficult to 
attribute students‘ attainment to individual teachers.‖ Thus, they switched their 
opinion on the performance-related pay from the affirmative to the negative on 
account of the collaborative nature of teaching. Similarly, 31 of the same head 
teachers agreed that ―Teachers‘ pay should not be linked to performance and 
competence because it will cause competition and jealousy among teachers.‖ 
Similar changes in opinion have occurred among teachers, too. Furthermore, a 
majority of both head teachers (83.3%) and teachers (84.7%) felt that teachers‘ 
pay should be raised on the whole. 
These findings prompt us to consider the reasons teachers and head teachers in 
Japan seemed to support, perhaps without much thought, the government‘s logic 
for pay reform. One possible reason concerns the existent variation in the 
demands of teachers‘ duties and workloads. Of the head teachers, 76.2% thought 
that teachers‘ pay should reflect the different demands and obligations of their 
posts such as are associated with managerial or supervisory roles. At the same 
time, 67.9% of teachers agreed that teachers‘ pay should reflect different 
workloads. It seems that they were not satisfied with the present pay system which, 
in their view, failed to properly consider such variation. For that reason, they were 
predisposed to endorse the new proposal.  
Thus, teachers may have misconceived the principles behind and operation of 
performance-related pay. As indicated in Chapters 1 and 2, performance-related 
pay (apart from new teacher evaluation itself) has not yet come into full force, and 
it should be noted that the general results shown here were obtained in advance of 
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the across-the-board introduction of performance-related pay. If the government 
does not dispense a large enough fund for performance-related pay and if a quota 
system is applied (which is likely given the precedents in Tokyo and some other 
prefectures), teachers‘ support for performance-related pay could plummet.  
 
Differences in views on teachers’ pay by type of school, gender, and age 
A closer examination of the views on teachers‘ pay held by teachers and head 
teachers across the nation indicates certain differences due to the type of school 
(Table 6.6), gender (Table 6.7), and age (Table 6.8) of teachers. To confirm the 
differences statistically, I conducted χ-squared tests. The results are shown in the 
tables, along with their significant levels. 
First, in regard to type of school, junior high school teachers were more likely 
to believe that their pay should reflect the demands of their posts and differences 
in their workloads. In other words, 63.6% of them agreed that ―Teachers‘ pay 
should reflect the demands of posts, such as head of a department or lead 
teacher,‖15 while 73.8% agreed that ―Teachers‘ pay should reflect differences in 
workloads, including, for instance, supervision of club activities.‖ Compared with 
teachers in other types of school, junior high school teachers seemed to be more 
aware of their varied demands and workloads. As stated above, this may cause 
them to feel dissatisfied with the present pay system. Indeed, junior high school 
teachers were the least likely to agree that ―Teachers‘ pay should not be linked to 
performance and competence, because it is difficult to attribute students‘ 
attainment to individual teachers‖ (57.9%). Additionally, on the whole, junior high 
school teachers were more supportive of the idea of performance-related pay with 
                                                        
15
 A lead teacher is supposed to help her/his colleagues at her/his school improve their 
teaching, besides fulfilling her/his own teaching duties. Local boards of education have 
been choosing and appointing this category of teachers since 2008. 
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45.9% agreeing that ―Linking pay to performance and competence should 
contribute to the improvement of quality or standards in education.‖ The average 
response across all types of schools was 38.2%. Similarly, 44.3% of junior high 
school teachers agreed that ―Linking pay to performance and competence should 
prompt teachers to work harder to meet goals or develop professionally,‖ with the 
average across all types of school being 37.1%.  
By comparison, elementary school teachers were the least likely to confirm 
the effectiveness of performance-related pay. Indeed, 74.1% of elementary school 
teachers agreed that ―Teachers‘ pay should not be linked to performance and 
competence, because this will cause competition and jealousy among teachers,‖ 
while the average rate across all types of schools was 68.6%. In addition, head 
teachers in elementary schools were more likely to approve across-the-board pay 
raises for teachers. These results suggest that elementary school teachers, 
including head teachers, tend to value collective, as opposed to individual, 
professionalism. 
Second, gender affects teachers‘ views on pay. 55.9% of male teachers agreed 
that ―Linking pay to performance and competence is a good way of rewarding 
hardworking or competent teachers,‖ while only 45.2% of female teachers agreed. 
Likewise, 41.4% of male, compared to 33.3% of female, teachers agreed with the 
statement ―Linking pay to performance and competence should contribute to the 
improvement of quality or standards in education.‖ In general , male teachers are 
more sympathetic to performance principles than female teachers. However, men 
still strongly approved of an across-the-board pay raise for teachers. In fact, male 
teachers were more likely to agree with an across-the-board pay raise than female 
teachers, as 87.5% agreed as opposed to 81.5% of the women. 
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Table 6.6 Views on teachers‘ pay held by teachers across the country 
according to type of school（percentages of agreement） 
 Element-
ary 
school 
n = 216 
Junior 
high 
school 
n = 185 
Senior 
high 
school 
n = 140 
Special 
school 
 
n = 22 
Linking pay to performance and 
competence is a good way of 
rewarding hardworking or 
competent teachers. 
45.8% 57.3% 51.4% 59.1% 
Linking pay to performance and 
competence should contribute to 
the improvement of quality or 
standards in education. ** 
30.1% 45.9% 41.4% 31.8% 
Linking pay to performance and 
competence should prompt 
teachers to work harder to meet 
goals or develop professionally. * 
30.1% 44.3% 36.2% 50.0% 
Teachers' pay should reflect the 
demands of posts such as head of 
a department or ―lead teacher.‖ * 
54.6% 63.6% 48.9% 59.1% 
Teachers' pay should reflect 
differences in workloads, 
including, for instance, 
supervision of club activities. * 
66.5% 73.8% 63.1% 63.6% 
In order to reward the hard work 
of teachers, salary levels for all, 
rather than only some, teachers 
should be raised. 
88.4% 84.9% 78.7% 86.4% 
Teachers‘ pay should not be 
linked to performance and 
competence, because it is difficult 
to attribute students‘ attainment to 
individual teachers. * 
64.4% 57.9% 68.1% 36.4% 
Teachers‘ pay should not be 
linked to performance and 
competence, because this will 
cause competition and jealousy 
among teachers. * 
74.1% 65.4% 68.1% 45.5% 
Note: * = p < .1, ** = p < .05, and *** = p < .01. 
 
Third, age is shown to be a significant source of differences in views on 
teachers‘ pay. The younger the teachers are, the more supportive they are of the 
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rationale and claimed advantages of performance-related pay. Furthermore, young 
teachers are more likely to approve of the idea of pay differentiation based on 
positions and workloads. However, teachers in their 40s and 50s were more likely 
to be aware of the difficulty of attributing students‘ attainment to individual 
teachers. In addition, 71.9% and 83.5% of teachers in their 40s and 50s 
respectively agreed that ―Teachers‘ pay should not be linked to performance and 
competence, because this will cause competition and jealousy among teachers.‖ 
The head teachers‘ views according to gender and age are not reported as the 
sample is not diverse enough in these areas. 
In summary, these results indicate that there are considerable differences in 
views on teachers‘ pay based on gender and age exist, including differences 
between the views of teachers and head teachers.  
Table 6.7 Views on teachers‘ pay held by teachers according to gender
（percentages of agreement） 
 Female 
n = 240 
Male 
n = 319 
Linking pay to performance and competence is a good 
way of rewarding hardworking or competent teachers. ** 
45.2% 55.9% 
Linking pay to performance and competence should 
contribute to the improvement of quality or standards in 
education. * 
33.3% 41.4% 
Linking pay to performance and competence should 
prompt teachers to work harder to meet goals or develop 
professionally. 
34.2% 38.8% 
Teachers' pay should reflect the demands of posts such as 
head of a department or ―lead teacher.‖ 
52.3% 59.1% 
Teachers' pay should reflect differences in workloads, 
including, for instance, supervision of club activities. 
67.5% 68.1% 
In order to reward the hard work of teachers, salary levels 
for all, rather than only some, teachers should be raised. * 
81.6% 87.5% 
Teachers‘ pay should not be linked to performance and 
competence, because it is difficult to attribute students‘ 
attainment to individual teachers. 
62.1% 62.2% 
Teachers‘ pay should not be linked to performance and 
competence, because this will cause competition and 
jealousy among teachers. ** 
72.9% 65.6% 
Note: * = p < .1, ** = p < .05, and *** = p < .01. 
Chapter Six 
110 
Table 6.8 Views on teachers‘ pay held by teachers according to age group
（percentages of agreement） 
 20s 
n = 60 
30s 
n = 139 
40s 
n = 230 
Over 50 
n = 133 
Linking pay to performance and 
competence is a good way of 
rewarding hardworking or competent 
teachers. *** 
73.3% 62.6% 49.6% 33.1% 
Linking pay to performance and 
competence should contribute to the 
improvement of quality or standards 
in education. ** 
48.3% 41.3% 39.0% 28.6% 
Linking pay to performance and 
competence should prompt teachers to 
work harder to meet goals or develop 
professionally. *** 
41.7% 41.7% 39.8% 24.8% 
Teachers' pay should reflect the 
demands of posts such as head of a 
department or ―lead teacher.‖ * 
78.3% 65.5% 53.7% 40.9% 
Teachers' pay should reflect 
differences in workloads, including, 
for instance, supervision of club 
activities. *** 
83.3% 78.3% 70.1% 45.8% 
In order to reward the hard work of 
teachers, salary levels for all, rather 
than only some, teachers should be 
raised. *** 
78.3% 79.9% 86.5% 90.2% 
Teachers‘ pay should not be linked to 
performance and competence, because 
it is difficult to attribute students‘ 
attainment to individual teachers. ** 
60.0% 52.5% 63.2% 71.4% 
Teachers‘ pay should not be linked to 
performance and competence, because 
this will cause competition and 
jealousy among teachers. *** 
56.7% 54.7% 71.9% 83.5% 
Note: * = p < .1, ** = p < .05, and *** = p < .01. 
 
6.3 Views on the “Implementation” of New Teacher Evaluation 
 
In this section, I examine the views on the ―implementation‖ of the new 
teacher evaluation. First, a general picture of the views is presented and then 
differences by type of school, gender, and age are examined.  
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Overview 
Table 6.9 describes how teachers and head teachers reflected on the approach 
taken to the new teacher evaluation. This consists of such processes as goal setting, 
lesson observations and feedback, self-reviews of performance and competence, 
and evaluations conducted by the head teacher. 
First, in regard to goal setting, a great majority of head teachers were keen to 
give instructions to teachers. Specifically, 85.6% of head teachers reported that 
they had instructed teachers to set goals in line with their school management 
policies; likewise, 90.2% in line with the goals of school and its sub-units. In 
addition, 76.5% of head teachers reported that they had repeatedly required 
teachers to set ―concrete and objective‖ goals such as numerical goals. On the 
other hand, a majority of teachers confirmed these head teachers‘ reflections, but 
there was still a significant minority of teachers who denied that they were given 
these instructions. This gap was also observed in relation to the experiences of 
rewriting goals. In other words, while 34.8% of head teachers reported that they 
had repeatedly required teachers to rewrite, only 13.2% of teachers remembered 
that they had been asked to do so. Given that the head teachers and teachers were 
from the same schools, these discrepancies suggest that head teachers behaved 
differently with different teachers.  Additionally, it was found that a proportion of 
teachers (34.1%) used the goal setting meetings as opportunities to express their 
opinions regarding the head teacher‘s school management policies.  
Another characteristic found in regard to goal setting was that the process was 
predominantly confined to the teacher concerned and the head teacher. No more 
than 17.2% of teachers consulted their colleagues about what goals they should 
set.  
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Table 6.9 Views on the ―implementation‖ of new teacher evaluation held by 
teachers and head teachers across the country 
Note: In this table, figures for ―do not know‖ are omitted. Consequently, the sum 
of the percentages for ―agree‖ and ―disagree‖ does not always equal 100%. 
 
Second, in regard to lesson observations, it was found that despite the 
importance attached to the process by the professional development model of 
teacher evaluation (see Chapter 4), they had not been taken seriously. Indeed, only 
 Teacher Head teacher 
 n = 504 n = 131 
 Agree    Disagree Agree  Disagree 
Goal setting     
Head teachers instructed teachers to set 
goals in line with her/his school 
management policies. 
49.8% 45.8% 85.6% 12.9% 
Head teachers instructed teachers to set 
goals in line with school goals, and goals 
of year or subject groups. 
54.1% 42.5% 90.2% 8.4% 
Head teachers instructed teachers to             
set ―concrete and objective‖ goals such as 
numerical goals. 
64.7% 32.3% 76.5% 21.2% 
Head teacher repeatedly required teachers 
to rewrite goals. 
13.2% 85.0% 34.8% 63.6% 
Teachers consulted colleagues when 
setting goals. 
17.2% 81.0% N.A. N.A. 
Teachers know each other‘s goals. 5.0% 87.3% N.A. N.A. 
Teachers expressed opinions regarding      
head teacher‘s management policies. 
34.1% 62.2% N.A. N.A. 
Lesson observation     
Teachers had enough pre-observation 
discussion with the evaluator. 
15.6% 78.9% N.A. N.A. 
Teachers received enough feedback from 
the evaluator after lesson observations. 
34.3% 60.2% N.A. N.A. 
Evaluation results     
Teachers felt that evaluation results were 
subjective or arbitrary. 
30.6% 54.0% N.A. N.A. 
Teachers received enough feedback from 
head teacher regarding evaluation results. 
34.2% 60.1% N.A. N.A. 
Teachers were mostly satisfied with 
evaluation results. 
50.6% 26.9% N.A. N.A. 
Teachers‘ self-evaluations mostly accorded 
with evaluation results. 
51.5% 26.0% N.A. N.A. 
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15.6% of teachers reported that they had received sufficient pre-observation 
consultation, and no more than 34.3% had had adequate feedback from the 
evaluator (in most cases, head teacher) after lesson observations. 
Third, in regard to the evaluation of performance and competence, a majority 
of teachers were satisfied with the evaluation results, which also concurred with 
self-evaluations. However, it should be also noted that about 30% of teachers felt 
that the evaluation results were subjective or arbitrary, or differed from their self-
evaluations, while a minority of teachers were not satisfied with the evaluations.  
 
Differences in views on the “implementation” of new teacher evaluation by 
type of school, gender, age 
Some of the views on the new teacher evaluation were found to be different 
due to the type of school (Table 6.10), gender (Table 6.11) and age (Table 6.12) of 
teachers. To confirm the differences statistically, I conducted χ-squared tests. The 
results are shown in the tables, along with their significant levels. 
First, types of school for which teachers are working affect their experiences. 
Specifically, elementary school teachers were more likely to believe that they had 
enough pre-observation discussion with the evaluator (22.2%), and that they had 
received enough feedback after observation (44.3%). These results can be 
attributable to little specialisation in primary teaching (most primary teachers are 
supposed to teach all subjects and therefore head teachers have some expertise in 
any subject). Possibly, in other types of schools, head teachers do not have 
confidence in conducting observations to give instructions about lessons that are 
different from their own specialisation.  
On the other hand, senior high school teachers were more likely to feel free to 
talk when meeting with the head teacher. Specifically, 43.8% of the teachers felt 
that they had expressed their opinions regarding the head teacher‘s school 
management policies, with the average percentage across all types of school being 
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34.1%. Additionally, senior high school teachers were less satisfied with their 
evaluation results; 37.0% of the teachers, as opposed to 51.4% of elementary and 
61.2% of junior high school teachers, reported that they were mostly satisfied with 
their evaluation results. This result corresponds to the other finding that senior 
high school teachers were most likely to feel that evaluation results were arbitrary 
or subjective (44.5%).  
Second, the gender of teachers was found to be related to differences in their 
experiences of teacher evaluation. The salient differences between female and 
male teachers were concerned with goal setting. Specifically, 40.1% of male, as 
opposed to 26.9% of female teachers expressed their opinions regarding their head 
teacher‘s management policies, in addition to setting goals. Furthermore, male 
teachers were more likely to feel that evaluation results were subjective or 
arbitrary, while female teachers were more likely to feel that they had been 
repeatedly required to rewrite their goals.  
Third, the age of teachers affects their reflections on the new teacher 
evaluation. Compared to their elder colleagues, teachers in their 20s were more 
passive at the meetings with the head teacher; only 12.7% of the teachers 
expressed their opinions regarding the head teacher‘s school management policies, 
with the average percentage across the all age ranges being 34.1%. In addition, 
younger teachers were more likely to believe they received adequate feedback 
from the evaluator after lesson observations. On the other hand, teachers in their 
50s were least likely to interact with the evaluator (head teacher) in relation to 
lesson observations and evaluation results. It can be assumed that the lack of 
communication has something to do with their distrust of the evaluation results.  
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Table 6.10 Views on the ―implementation‖ of new teacher evaluation held by 
teachers according to type of school（percentages of agreement） 
Note: * = p < .1, ** = p < .05, and *** = p < .01. 
 Element-
ary 
school 
n = 190 
Junior 
high 
school 
n = 172 
Senior 
high 
school 
n = 122 
Special 
school 
 
n = 20 
Goal setting     
Head teachers instructed teachers 
to set goals in line with her/his 
school management policies. 
52.6% 43.9% 52.9% 55.0% 
Head teachers instructed teachers 
to set goals in line with school 
goals, and goals of year or subject 
groups. 
57.9% 49.1% 55.8% 50.0% 
Head teachers instructed teachers 
to set ―concrete and objective‖ 
goals such as numerical goals. 
66.3% 56.7% 73.6% 65.0% 
Head teacher repeatedly required 
teachers to rewrite goals. 
17.4% 8.2% 14.2% 10.0% 
Teachers consulted colleagues 
when setting goals. 
20.1% 16.5% 16.5% 0% 
Teachers know each other‘s goals. 
** 
9.5% 2.4% 2.5% 0% 
Teachers expressed opinions 
regarding head teacher‘s 
management policies. ** 
30.6% 30.4% 43.8% 40.0% 
Lesson observation     
Teachers had enough pre-
observation discussion with the 
evaluator. *** 
22.2% 14.6% 8.5% 5.0% 
Teachers received enough 
feedback from the evaluator after 
lesson observations. *** 
44.3% 30.4% 27.4% 15.0% 
Evaluation results     
Teachers felt that evaluation 
results were subjective or 
arbitrary. ** 
24.2% 29.0% 44.5% 20.0% 
Teachers received enough 
feedback from head teacher 
regarding evaluation results. 
38.9% 36.5% 24.4% 30.0% 
Teachers were mostly satisfied 
with evaluation results. *** 
51.4% 61.2% 37.0% 35.0% 
Teachers‘ self-evaluations 
mostlyaccorded with evaluation 
results. 
54.1% 58.2% 39.8% 40.0% 
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Table 6.11 Views on the ―implementation‖ of new teacher evaluation held by 
teachers according to gender（percentages of agreement） 
Note: * = p < .1, ** = p < .05, and *** = p < .01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Female 
n = 214 
Male 
n = 284 
Goal setting   
Head teachers instructed teachers to set goals in line with 
her/his school management policies. 
50.0% 50.0% 
Head teachers instructed teachers to set goals in line with 
school goals, and goals of year or subject groups. 
54.5% 53.9% 
Head teachers instructed teachers to set ―concrete and 
objective‖ goals such as numerical goals. 
61.2% 67.3% 
Head teacher repeatedly required teachers to rewrite goals. 
** 
15.5% 11.3% 
Teachers consulted colleagues when setting goals. 20.1% 14.9% 
Teachers know each other‘s goals. ** 6.1% 3.9% 
Teachers expressed opinions regarding head teacher‘s 
management policies. ** 
26.9% 40.1% 
Lesson observation   
Teachers had enough pre-observation discussion with the 
evaluator. 
18.1% 14.0% 
Teachers received enough feedback from the evaluator after 
lesson observations. 
36.7% 32.6% 
Evaluation results   
Teachers felt that evaluation results were subjective or 
arbitrary. ** 
25.4% 34.5% 
Teachers received enough feedback from head teacher 
regarding evaluation results. 
34.3% 34.6% 
Teachers were mostly satisfied with evaluation results. 46.7% 53.9% 
Teachers‘ self-evaluations mostly accorded with evaluation 
results. 
47.1% 55.2% 
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Table 6.12 Views on the ―implementation‖ of new teacher evaluation held by 
teachers according to age group（percentages of agreement） 
Note: * = p < .1, ** = p < .05, and *** = p < .01. 
 
Examining head teachers‘ views on the ―implementation‖ of the new teacher 
evaluation did not confirm any differences due to type of school. Again, as the 
sample is not diverse enough in these areas, findings will not be reported. 
 20s 
 
n = 55 
30s 
 
n = 125 
40s 
 
n = 205 
Over 
50 
n = 116 
Goal setting     
Head teachers instructed teachers to set 
goals in line with her/his school 
management policies. 
43.6% 52.8% 49.3% 50.0% 
Head teachers instructed teachers to set 
goals in line with school goals, and goals 
of year or subject groups. 
58.2% 56.0% 51.2% 54.8% 
Head teachers instructed teachers to set 
―concrete and objective‖ goals such as 
numerical goals. 
69.1% 67.2% 63.4% 62.1% 
Head teacher repeatedly required 
teachers to rewrite goals. 
21.8% 12.0% 11.2% 13.9% 
Teachers consulted colleagues when 
setting goals. 
21.8% 20.8% 12.3% 20.0% 
Teachers know each other‘s goals. 5.5% 3.2% 4.9% 8.9% 
Teachers expressed opinions regarding 
head teacher‘s management policies. *** 
12.7% 36.3% 36.3% 38.6% 
Lesson observation     
Teachers had enough pre-observation 
discussion with the evaluator. ** 
18.5% 18.5% 17.8% 7.1% 
Teachers received enough feedback from 
the evaluator after lesson observations. 
*** 
48.1% 37.9% 33.7% 25.0% 
Evaluation results     
Teachers felt that evaluation results were 
subjective or arbitrary. 
29.1% 26.0% 33.0% 32.1% 
Teachers received enough feedback from 
head teacher regarding evaluation results. 
30.9% 40.3% 35.3% 27.4% 
Teachers were mostly satisfied with 
evaluation results. ** 
52.7% 57.3% 52.2% 39.8% 
Teachers‘ self-evaluations mostly accorded 
with evaluation results. 
56.4% 55.6% 53.2% 42.0% 
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6.4 Views on the Effectiveness of New Teacher Evaluation 
 
In this section, the views on the effectiveness of new teacher evaluation are in 
focus. First, a general picture of the views is presented and then differences in the 
views by type of school, gender, and age are examined.  
 
Overview 
When it comes to views on the effectiveness of the new teacher evaluation, as 
Table 6.13 shows, differences between head teachers and teachers were 
remarkable, as was applicable to the results of previous surveys. It can be easily 
assumed that the evaluator tends to have a more favourable outlook on the 
effectiveness of the evaluation than the evaluated. In regard to almost all the 
possible effects, the percentages of head teachers who affirmed the evaluation‘s 
effectiveness were almost twice as high as the percentages of teachers who did so. 
For instance, 76.5% of all head teachers agreed that the evaluation would have an 
effect on the improvement of communication and mutual understanding between 
teachers and themselves, while only 31.7% of teachers agreed. Indeed, a majority 
(60.1%) of teachers disagreed with this expected advantage.  
Compared with the effectiveness of improving communication, understanding 
school management policies and goals, and better prioritising work-related duties, 
head teachers were less confident of the effects of the new teacher evaluation on 
teachers‘ morale, and teaching and learning, although a majority of them retained 
favourable perspectives. Again, this suggests that head teachers regard the new 
practices as management tools — more specifically, a measure to convey their 
policies more effectively to teachers. At the same time, nearly 70% of all teachers 
did not believe that the evaluation would have favourable impacts on their morale 
and quality of teaching. Compared to the rather hostile replies of union member 
teachers in Tokyo (see Table 3.1), the attitudes of the teachers, including both 
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union and non-union members, appear relatively benign, particularly in light of 
the extent to which teachers associated the evaluation with divisiveness and 
unfavourable effects on relationships. However, teachers were far from neutral, 
indeed they were skeptical of the claimed advantages of the new teacher 
evaluation. Specifically,  
 
 72.5% disagreed with ―New teacher evaluation improved quality or standards 
of teaching and learning.‖ 
 70.8% disagreed with ―New teacher evaluation helped to better identify 
teachers‘ needs for professional development.‖ 
 
Table 6.13 Views on the effects of the new teacher evaluation held by teachers 
and head teachers across the country 
 Teacher Head teacher 
 n = 504 n = 131 
 Agree Disagree Agree Disagree 
Improved communication and mutual 
understanding between head teacher and 
teachers. 
31.7% 60.1% 76.5% 21.9% 
Improved teachers‘ understanding of head 
teacher‘s school management policy. 
30.0% 62.1% 74.2% 23.5% 
Improved teachers‘ understanding of 
school goals. 
27.8% 65.5% 71.8% 25.9% 
Teachers came to think about work 
priorities more effectively. 
27.8% 66.1% 67.4% 28.8% 
Better identified teachers‘ needs for 
professional development. 
23.2% 70.8% 62.1% 34.9% 
Improved teachers‘ overall morale. 22.0% 73.0% 50.4% 45.0% 
Improved quality and standards of 
teaching and learning. 
18.9% 72.5% 51.5% 44.0% 
Caused some kinds of attrition in the 
relationships between head teacher and 
teachers. 
23.8% 64.3% 18.2% 74.3% 
Caused some kinds of attrition in 
relationships among teachers. 
20.3% 68.4% N.A. N.A. 
Note: In this table, figures for ―do not know‖ are omitted. Consequently, the sum 
of the percentages for ―agree‖ and ―disagree‖ does not always equal 100%. 
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Differences in views on the effectiveness of the new teacher evaluation by type 
of school, gender, age 
A closer examination of the views that teachers and head teachers across the 
nation held on the effectiveness of new teacher evaluation confirmed differences 
due to types of school (Table 6.14), gender (Table 6.15), and age (Table 6.16) of 
teachers. To confirm the differences statistically, I conducted χ-squared tests. The 
results are shown in the tables, along with their significant levels.  
First, concerning types of school, senior high school teachers were more likely 
to report that the processes had unfavourable impacts on their relationships. 
Specifically, 36.1% of them agreed that the evaluation ―Caused some kinds of 
attrition in the relationships between head teacher and teachers.‖ In addition, 
33.1% of senior high school teachers agreed that the evaluation ―Caused some 
kinds of attrition in the relationships among teachers.‖ On the other hand, 
compared to the other types of schools, elementary school teachers (34.2%) were 
more likely to agree that ―Teachers came to think about work priorities more 
effectively.‖  
Second, gender affects the teachers‘ views on the effects of the new teacher 
evaluation on relationships. For instance, 15.8% of female teachers agreed that the 
evaluation ―Caused some kinds of attrition in the relationships among teachers,‖ 
while 23.6 % of male teachers agreed. In addition, 17.7% of female teachers 
agreed that the evaluation ―Caused some kinds of attrition in the relationships 
between head teacher and teachers,‖ while 28.4% of male teachers agreed. Thus, 
female teachers were less likely to report unfavourable impacts of the new teacher 
evaluation on relationships. 
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Table 6.14 Views on the effects of the new teacher evaluation held by teachers 
according to type of school （percentages of agreement） 
 Element- 
ary 
school 
n = 190 
Junior 
high 
school 
n = 172 
Senior 
high 
school 
n = 122 
Special 
school 
 
n = 20 
Improved communication and 
mutual understanding between 
head teacher and teachers. 
32.1% 32.0% 30.3% 35.0% 
Improved teachers‘ 
understanding of head 
teacher‘s school management 
policy. 
31.6% 30.2% 27.9% 25.0% 
Improved teachers‘ 
understanding of school goals. 
28.4% 27.9% 28.7% 15.0% 
Teachers came to think about 
work priorities more 
effectively. *** 
34.2% 27.9% 21.3% 5.0% 
Better identified teachers‘ 
needs for professional 
development. 
25.8% 25.0% 18.0% 15.0% 
Improved teachers‘ overall 
morale. 
21.6% 22.7% 21.3% 25.0% 
Improved quality and 
standards of teaching and 
learning. 
20.2% 19.2% 17.2% 15.0% 
Caused some kinds of attrition 
in the relationships between 
head teacher and teachers. *** 
18.4% 22.1% 36.1% 15.0% 
Caused some kinds of attrition 
in relationships among 
teachers. *** 
16.8% 16.9% 33.1% 5.0% 
Note: * = p < .1, ** = p < .05, and *** = p < .01. 
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Table 6.15 Views on the effects of the new teacher evaluation held by teachers 
according to gender （percentages of agreement） 
 Female 
n = 214 
Male 
n = 284 
Improved communication and mutual understanding 
between head teacher and teachers. 
27.9% 35.1% 
Improved teachers‘ understanding of head teacher‘s 
school management policy. 
29.8% 30.5% 
Improved teachers‘ understanding of school goals. 27.4% 28.4% 
Teachers came to think about work priorities more 
effectively. 
26.5% 29.1% 
Better identified teachers‘ needs for professional 
development. 
25.1% 21.8% 
Improved teachers‘ overall morale. 20.0% 23.9% 
Improved quality and standards of teaching and learning. 17.8% 19.6% 
Caused some kinds of attrition in the relationships 
between head teacher and teachers. ** 
17.7% 28.4% 
Caused some kinds of attrition in relationships among 
teachers. * 
15.8% 23.6% 
Note: * = p < .1, ** = p < .05, and *** = p < .01. 
 
Third, age greatly affects how teachers view the teacher evaluation processes, 
as well as teachers‘ pay. All of their views, with the exception of the idea that the 
evaluation ―Better identified teachers‘ needs for professional development,‖ 
differed according to age. Teachers in their 30s and 40s were more likely to affirm 
the effectiveness of the teacher evaluation, while teachers in their 20s and over 50 
were less likely to do so. Furthermore, there was a another difference between the 
views held by teachers in 20s and those over 50; younger teachers were less likely 
to perceive unfavourable effects on relationships, while older teachers were more 
likely to notice them.  
Thus, there are differences in views on the effectiveness of new teacher 
evaluations due to the type of school, gender, and age. However, we must 
remember that the majority of teachers reported a lack of confidence in the 
effectiveness of the teacher evaluation.  
Examining head teachers‘ views on the effectiveness of new teacher 
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evaluation did not confirm any differences due to type of school. Again, as the 
sample is not diverse enough in these areas, results will not be reported. 
 
Table 6.16 Views on the effects of the new teacher evaluation held by teachers 
according to age group （percentages of agreement） 
 20s 
n = 55 
30s 
n = 125 
40s 
n = 205 
Over 50 
n = 116 
Improved communication and mutual 
understanding between head teacher 
and teachers. *** 
21.8% 38.1% 38.0% 18.8% 
Improved teachers‘ understanding of 
head teacher‘s school management 
policy. ** 
23.6% 36.5% 31.7% 23.1% 
Improved teachers‘ understanding of 
school goals. ** 
16.4% 31.7% 30.7% 23.9% 
Teachers came to think about work 
priorities more effectively. ** 
14.5% 34.1% 30.2% 23.1% 
Better identified teachers‘ needs for 
professional development.  
20.0% 26.2% 23.4% 21.4% 
Improved teachers‘ overall morale. * 25.5% 23.8% 22.4% 17.9% 
Improved quality and standards of 
teaching and learning. * 
16.7% 19.2% 20.0% 17.9% 
Caused some kinds of attrition in the 
relationships between head teacher 
and teachers. *** 
9.1% 14.3% 24.4% 40.2% 
Caused some kinds of attrition in 
relationships among teachers. ** 
7.4% 13.5% 22.9% 29.1% 
Note: * = p < .1, ** = p < .05, and *** = p < .01. 
 
6.5 Discussion of the Survey Results 
 
From the results of the national survey, I can add to the earlier findings. In this 
research, approximately 60% of teachers in the national sample were doubtful 
about the possible effectiveness of the new teacher evaluation practices. These 
results indicate that most teachers across the nation see little value in the policies 
and practices of the new teacher evaluation.  
At the same time, differences between the views of teachers and head teachers 
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have been reconfirmed. A majority of head teachers in the national sample 
approved the claimed advantages of the new teacher evaluation. Compared with 
the head teachers in Tokyo and Osaka, surveyed just after the development of the 
new systems, head teachers in the national sample tend to respond less 
ambiguously regarding effects, particularly in regard to communication and 
mutual understanding between head teachers and teachers, and teachers‘ 
understanding of head teacher‘s school management policies and goals. The 
professional development model of teacher evaluation commonly demands that 
individual teachers‘ goals accord with the head teacher‘s management policies. 
The national survey, like the local ones, suggests that head teachers are willing to 
use the evaluation processes to ensure this accordance. However, it is impossible 
to assume that this always happens without conflict. Indeed, a proportion of 
teachers reported unfavourable impacts on their relationships within their schools. 
Affected relationships not only include those between teachers and head teachers, 
but also those among teachers. 
In Chapter 3, I noted that the way teachers and head teachers judge the effects 
of the new teacher evaluation on goal setting in schools is a significant point to be 
explored given the previous survey results and the Marsden and Belfield‘s studies. 
As Table 6.13 showed, no more than 30% of teachers in my survey agreed with 
the questionnaire items that implied beneficial impacts on goal setting — a 
majority of the teachers disagreed. However, a great majority of the head teachers 
confirmed the impacts. There is a large gap between the judgements of teachers 
and head teachers in relation to what Marsden and Belfield called joined-up goal 
setting or integrative bargaining. 
How then is goal setting for individual teachers actually done? I also asked the 
teachers and head teachers specifically about how teachers‘ annual goals were 
decided over the processes of new teacher evaluation. As Table 6.9 showed, a 
great majority of the head teachers felt that they had instructed the teachers to set 
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goals consistent with their own school management policies (85.6%) and also the 
goals of the school and its sub-units (i.e., year or subject groups) (90.2%). On the 
other hand, while a majority of teachers confirmed the head teachers‘ views, there 
was still a significant minority who differed from their head teachers in their 
reflections on the experience of goal setting. This discrepancy may suggest that 
head teachers behave differently toward different teachers; they require some 
teachers to set goals in line with their management policies or school goals, but 
they do not require other teachers to do so. The seniority (age) and gender of 
teachers (among other factors) are likely to define their social position in relation 
to their head teachers, which in turn shapes how the head teachers‘ behave toward 
them. I will revisit this social justice issue later with interview data in Chapter 7.   
On the whole, based on a combined analysis of these survey results, it seems 
to suggest that through the processes of new teacher evaluation a majority of 
teachers are required to pay close attention to their head teachers‘ management 
policies or school goals, but that many teachers still feel that this has been done in 
vain; these practices improve neither their understanding of the policies and goals, 
nor objective setting. This suggestion will be corroborated by qualitative analysis. 
On the other hand, we cannot ignore the fact that about 30% of teachers 
supported the effects of new teacher evaluation on their understanding of their 
head teachers‘ management policies or school goals and their practices of goal 
setting. Using the criterion that Marsden and Belfield adopted, there are some 
schools in Japan where joined-up goal setting or integrative bargaining approach 
to teacher evaluation is functioning. However, as I already noted in Chapter 3, a 
more significant issue is whether this joined-up goal setting or an integrative 
bargaining approach to teacher evaluation leads to improvement of teaching and 
learning, and if it does, then what are the features of the improvement.  
My questionnaire included some broad questions concerning the current 
conditions of schools. The results showed that 52.0% of teachers felt that their 
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colleagues were always conscious of the head teacher‘s management policies. Not 
surprisingly, these teachers were more likely to feel that the practices of teacher 
evaluation improved their understanding of the head teacher‘s management 
policies. In other words, 42.7% of them agreed to the item, with the average of 
30.0% on the whole (Table 6.17). Furthermore, 26.7% of teachers felt that their 
colleagues gave the highest priority to raising the measurable academic and 
physical attainments of students, and these teachers were more likely to attest to 
the effects of teacher evaluation on their understanding of the head teacher‘s 
management policies. That is to say, 39.8% of them agreed to the item, again, with 
the average of 30.0% on the whole (Table 6.18). χ-squared tests confirmed that 
both the differences were statistically significant. 
These results suggest that when the head teacher‘s school management 
policies focus on measurable achievement of students, the processes of teacher 
evaluation are likely to promote the articulation of individual and organisational 
goals in these terms. As Table 6.9 showed, 76.5% of head teachers believed that 
they had repeatedly instructed teachers to set ―concrete and objective‖ goals such 
as measurable goals and 64.7% of teachers felt that they were required to do so. 
These percentages were both high, and the gap between them was smaller, 
compared to the gaps in the other views on the way goal setting was done. 
Considering these, it is likely that teacher evaluation can help introduce 
measurable achievement into both school and individual teachers‘ objectives and 
goals. 
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Table 6.17 Consciousness of the head teacher‘s management policies  
Teacher evaluation improved teachers‘ understanding of head teacher‘s school 
management policy. 
 Agree Disagree 
Colleagues are always conscious of the head 
teacher‘s management policies. *** 
Agree 111 
(42.7%) 
134 
(51.5%) 
Disagree 35 
(17.2%) 
132 
(65.0%) 
Sum 150 
(30.0%) 
310 
(62.0%) 
Note: In this table, figures for ―do not know‖ are omitted. Consequently, the sum 
of the percentages for ―agree‖ and ―disagree‖ does not equal 100%. *** p < .01  
 
Table 6.18 Priority to raising the measurable academic and physical 
attainments of students  
Teacher evaluation improved teachers‘ understanding of head teacher‘s school 
management policy. 
 Agree Disagree 
Colleagues give the highest priority to raising the 
measurable academic and physical attainments of 
students. *** 
Agree 53 
(39.8%) 
76 
(57.1%) 
Disagree 94 
(27.6%) 
221 
(70.1%) 
Sum 150 
(30.0%) 
309 
(62.0%) 
Note: In this table, figures for ―do not know‖ are omitted. Consequently, the sum 
of the percentages for ―agree‖ and ―disagree‖ does not equal 100%. *** p < .01 
 
Unlike the study conducted by Marsden and Belfield, it was not possible to 
collect the academic records of the sample schools. Thus, I cannot confirm 
whether the articulation of individual and organisational objectives in this way 
contributes to raising student achievement levels. However, it should be noted that 
Marsden and Belfield might have missed some other reasons that could explain 
the improvements to academic achievement, such as changes in the classroom 
composition of students. More significantly, even if student achievement is raised, 
it is difficult to determine whether this achievement is as it seems. Better 
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examination results do not always mean improvement of teaching and learning in 
any authentic sense. Further, as stated in Chapter 4, in many countries, 
performativity deriving from target or objective based education reform policies 
provides teachers with difficult dilemmas between what they want to do and to be, 
and what they are required to do and to be. 
Having thus discussed the results of the national survey, there remains a need 
to probe further into the ways new teacher evaluation policies affected social 
interactions between teachers. Attention needs to be given particularly to the 
impact of teacher evaluation on school management and teacher‘s work and selves. 
The enactment of new teacher evaluation policies may well involve changes in 
modes of managing school as an organisation as well as teachers. While a 
majority of teachers felt neither favourable nor unfavourable impacts of teacher 
evaluation (Table 6.13), it is not clear whether teachers were actually affected and 
in what ways. Teachers have different ideas about what teaching is like and how 
they should behave professionally, and teacher evaluation, as a performativity 
policy, supports particular ideas of these kinds and negate others. Considering 
these, the enactment of the new teacher evaluation is likely to have impacts on 
teachers‘ work and identity. Qualitative analysis can help to draw a more nuanced 
picture of these impacts. 
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Chapter Seven: The Enactment of New Teacher Evaluation 
Policies 
 
In the last chapter, I described the views held by a national sample of teachers 
and head teachers about the new teacher evaluation policies and the related pay 
reform. Their views mostly concurred with those already found in previous 
studies (see Chapter 3). Teachers held unfavourable views of the claimed 
advantages of teacher evaluation while in contrast, head teachers were much more 
in favour of the new policy. Among the advantages expected by head teachers 
were improved communication and mutual understanding between teachers and 
the head teacher, followed by improved teachers‘ understanding of the head 
teacher‘s school management policies and school goals.  
In this chapter, against the background of these survey results, I probe further 
into the enactment of the new teacher evaluation policies in schools. For this 
purpose, I conducted interviews at three senior high schools and one special 
school (see Chapter 5 for how these schools were selected). The local education 
boards administering the four schools have all been enforcing rather stringent 
teacher evaluation policies and, to a certain extent, they all link the results of 
teacher evaluation to remuneration. Consequently, despite the predominantly 
consensual perceptions presented by head teachers, most teachers I interviewed 
had become involved in what I call the micro-politics of numerical goals. The idea 
of micro-politics that I follow is articulated by Ball as ―the process which links 
these two basic facets of organisational life — conflict and domination‖ (Ball, 
1987, p. 278). Certainly, the enactment of the new teacher evaluation policies 
involved conflicts and domination. The main aim in this chapter is to describe the 
micro-politics of numerical goals by school, drawing on qualitative data from the 
interviews. 
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7.1 Local Boards of Education and Schools 
 
I conducted interviews at East Senior High School, West Senior High School, 
South Special School, and North Senior High School (all the school names are 
pseudonyms). The first three schools are administered by a local board of 
education that played a pioneering role in introducing new teacher evaluation 
schemes. The scheme adopted by this particular local board of education is 
characterised by a strong managerial emphasis and a performance-related pay 
element. It demands that individual teachers set a number of numerical goals in 
line with head teachers‘ management policies. The teachers‘ evaluation results are 
linked to both a bonus called a ―diligence allowance‖ and their annual pay raise. 
East Senior High School is located in one of Japan‘s most populated 
prefectures. However, because it is in a suburban area, the students enjoy spacious 
grounds and facilities. Since it was first established about 50 years ago, this 
school has been regarded as a ―community school,‖ which means that students are 
mixed in terms of their academic records and future career paths. After graduating, 
about half of the students attend higher education, a third attend vocational 
training institutions, and the remainder immediately enter the workforce. This is 
typical of academic senior high schools. However, the head teacher at East Senior 
High School was not satisfied with the mediocre image of ―community school‖ 
and sought to increase the number of students advancing to higher education, 
especially ―brand‖ universities.  
West Senior High School is located in the same prefecture as East Senior High 
School, but it is much nearer to the centre. Like East Senior High School, this 
school is generally regarded as having a middle status in terms of prestige. 
However, students are less diverse in terms of future orientation of careers; almost 
all of them aspire to attend universities or colleges. The local board of education 
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classifies West Senior High School as ―a school of middle standing.‖ However, 
this status does not mean stability in terms of the working environment for 
teachers. The local board demands that the school make every effort to better meet 
the demands of students and their parents. Consequently, the teachers were 
acutely concerned with students‘ test results. 
At South Special School, students with both mental and physical special needs 
learn and receive training. It is located in a suburban area of the same prefecture 
as East Senior High School and West Senior High School. The school includes 
elementary, junior high, and senior high divisions, serving students aged 6 
through 18. As a special school, it has, first and foremost, the goal of meeting the 
individual needs of students. To this end, the present head teacher recently added 
a new objective regarding specific future careers of students. South Special 
School employs about a hundred teaching and training staff members, almost 
twice that of other schools in the study. This staff size as well as the specialised 
nature of special needs education further complicated the school‘s approach to 
teacher evaluation. 
North Senior High School is located in a northern prefecture of Japan. The 
prefectural board of education introduced a teacher evaluation scheme a few years 
later than the other board mentioned above. Compared with the scheme covering 
the other three schools, the scheme adopted by this prefectural board places less 
emphasis on managerialism. Instead, it focuses on the collaborative nature of 
planning and working in schools. However, even in a region far from the centre of 
Japan, senior high schools are highly stratified and function within competitive 
relationships with each other, each striving for a better profile. As a result, the 
development of a new teacher evaluation system at this school site involved 
strong pressure for setting numerical goals regarding students‘ academic 
achievement. With regard to performance-related pay, the scheme links results to 
bonuses, but not yet to annual pay raises. North Senior High School is generally 
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regarded as having a middle status in the hierarchy of local senior high schools. 
Located in the politically and industrially central city in this prefecture, it 
competes with neighbouring schools for students. Consequently, the head teacher 
and some teachers strongly felt the need to develop merits that would distinguish 
their school from others. 
The three senior high schools are all academic rather than vocational in 
orientation. Yet, schools of this type vary greatly in terms of previous academic 
records and future careers of students, as 73.9% (Monbukagakusho, 2008a) of 
senior high schools are classified as ―academic.‖ 
For my research, I interviewed the head teacher of each school and a total of 
twelve other teachers across the four schools. After obtaining permission from the 
head teachers, I asked all the teachers whether they would agree to participate in 
the research. In response to my request, some teachers volunteered. I also directly 
contacted a number of teachers whom I had already known or to whom I had been 
introduced by other teachers. To all these teachers and the head teachers, I 
explained the purpose of the research, possible use of the interview data, and their 
rights. Having understood the ethical implications of being involved in the 
research, they agreed to participate although the head teacher of North Senior 
High School did not permit his interview data to be used in this thesis. I made an 
effort to ensure that the teachers I interviewed varied in terms of gender, age, and 
the subject they taught. Appendix 6 lists details of the teacher characteristics. 
The following sections describe how new teacher evaluation policies were 
being enacted in each school, based on the head teachers‘ and teachers‘ interviews. 
 
7.2 East Senior High School  
 
Motivating teachers to raise students’ academic achievements 
The head teachers I interviewed unanimously welcomed the opportunities 
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facilitated by the introduction of the new teacher evaluation system. They 
regarded the new practices as having positive effects on the motivation of many, 
if not all, teachers. For example, the head teacher of East Senior High School 
regarded the new teacher evaluation system as an opportunity to motivate the 
teachers to work towards higher academic achievement of students.  
 
We must gain higher attainments, yet not all the teachers are fully 
motivated for this aim. I have been thinking a lot about doing something 
to break the impasse. I believe this [new teacher evaluation system] is it 
[...] Some teachers came to me saying, ―It [new teacher evaluation 
system] is a good challenge for me.‖ They highly regard setting annual 
goals, saying that the practice inspires them to be forward-looking. 
(Head Teacher, East Senior High School) 
 
Recently, the head teacher had been articulating school management policies 
that have a clear focus on raising student achievement. He appreciated the newly 
introduced processes of teacher evaluation, particularly meetings with individual 
teachers, believing that in these meetings, he could communicate his own 
policies to the teachers more effectively.  
 
[Author: Do you often talk about your management policies at the 
meetings with individual teachers?] Yes, I do. I believe this is the most 
beneficial part of the new system. I talk about my policies at the all-staff 
meetings, but I often find it difficult to get the teachers to understand 
what I mean. This is frustrating. This year, we have started to move for 
higher achievement. So, I have asked all the teachers what they can do 
for this goal of improving students‘ performance, and also what, if 
anything, they are already doing for the goal. (Head Teacher, East Senior 
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High School) 
 
At the same time, however, the head teacher noted some teachers‘ ―rather fierce 
resistance‖ to the new scheme. The resistance, as he perceived it, was of two 
broad types: resistance to being assessed for the purpose of ranking and 
principled and practical objections to setting ―concrete and objective‖ goals. The 
first type of resistance was concerned with teachers being annually assessed in 
terms of competence (noryoku), dispositions (joi, iyoku, and taido), and 
performance (gyoseki) with the results linked to pay.  
According to the national survey, while about a half of the teachers (51.5%) 
agreed with the idea of performance-related pay, a significant minority (44.9%) 
disagreed (Table 6.5). The views of the respondents are mostly split. At East 
Senior High School, teachers‘ union members, joined by a number of non-union 
members, raised a public objection to this aspect of the new scheme and called 
its validity into question at staff meetings. Although performance-related pay 
has not been introduced nationally, the local board of education administering 
this school demanded that head teachers rank all the teachers not only in 
categories (A, B, C, D) but also in order (No. 1, No. 2, No. 3, ...) for the purpose 
of performance-related pay. The objecting teachers pointed out the 
impracticality, unfairness, and divisiveness of assessing teachers in this way, 
and the head teacher himself admitted the impracticality of ―ranking all the 
teachers‖:  
 
The board tells me to differentiate all the teachers. This is for the board 
to treat them differently for remuneration. Yet, it is a very difficult task, 
you know. I can easily name incompetent teachers. But the idea of 
ranking all the teachers, about fifty teachers in this school, is impractical. 
(Head Teacher, East Senior High School) 
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However, to the objecting teachers, he reiterated that ―Although I personally 
understand your points, we must go through the official procedures, anyway. 
Then, we should make good use of it.‖ In this way, he apparently succeeded in 
suppressing their objections. 
For the head teacher of East Senior High School, it was most important for 
teachers to have specific goals and criterion for judging the degree to which the 
goals had been attained. However, this was where he encountered other 
difficulties.  
 
The first goal-setting meeting matters very much. Without specific goals, 
we cannot evaluate properly. Therefore, I ask the teachers to make their 
goals as specific as possible. You need also a proper criterion for judging 
the degree to which your goals have been attained, so that you can say 
you have achieved 90%, 70%, or 30% of the goals. But this is the most 
difficult part of the processes. Numerical goals and quantitative criterion 
are most apposite. In my school, almost half of the teachers have agreed 
to set such goals and criteria. Yet, there are some teachers who cannot 
set such goals and still a few others who refuse to do so. (Head Teacher, 
East Senior High School) 
  
Raising the academic profile of the school was the most important part of his 
management policies. He demanded that individual teachers‘ goals be set in 
accordance with his policies. However, some teachers did not like ―seeing things 
only from a rational point of view.‖ 
 
In the event, our work is wide-ranging, concerned with the holistic 
development of students. Thus, it is understandable that they find it 
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difficult to pick up and define only a few aspects of their work as goals. 
Yet, we should work hard to produce results. Sometimes, we must see 
things from a rational point of view and this [new teacher evaluation 
system] should serve the purpose. I have been reiterating this at the 
meetings with teachers. (Head Teacher, East Senior High School) 
  
As shown in Table 6.9, the majority of head teachers (85.6%) across the nation 
instructed teachers to set goals in line with their school management policies. 
Fewer head teachers, but still a majority (76.5%), also instructed teachers to set 
―concrete and objective‖ goals such as measurable goals. Thus, it seems that the 
demands of the head teacher of East Senior High School well represented what 
was happening nationally.  
 
Teachers’ varied reactions to numerical goals 
The story told above by the head teacher of East Senior High School 
corresponded with those of the teachers there. Some teachers were happy with 
the introduction of a new teacher evaluation system, particularly with numerical 
goals. For senior high school teachers, measurable goals are typically concerned 
with examination performance, completion of various assignments, and student 
promotion (or drop out). Ms. Yamamoto, a mathematics teacher in her 30s, 
stated the following: 
 
A numerical goal such as the students‘ completion of assignments makes 
things clearer. For me, working mindful of the goals makes a difference. 
Actually, I got better results this year. (Ms. Yamamoto, East Senior High 
School) 
 
Ms. Yamamoto accepted the goal that was suggested by her head teacher at the 
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goal-setting meeting, instead of what Ms. Yamamoto described as an ―obscure 
goal‖ that she herself had been pondering over before the meeting. She was not 
concerned so much about the ―more concrete and assessable‖ goal, but felt 
uneasy about the assessment of her achievements. 
 
One of my goals was that 90% of my students should complete and hand 
in their math assignments. This year I accomplished it. But if I was not 
successful and at the review meeting my head teacher had told me, ―You 
achieved ‗only‘ 70%,‖ I certainly should have felt that I achieved ―no 
less than‖ 70%. (Ms. Yamamoto, East Senior High School) 
 
However, for other teachers, to the extent the task of setting ―concrete and 
assessable‖ goals involves seeing things from a limited viewpoint, this 
requirement of teacher evaluation conflicted with the more holistic educational 
values that they held. For example, Mr. Shimura, an English teacher in his 50s, 
thought of numerical goals as contradictory to his original aims of teaching, 
although he eventually accepted them because of his head teacher‘s strong 
persuasion. He reflected on his embarrassing experiences of setting goals as 
follows: 
 
Under this system, we are required to set specific, measurable goals. For 
instance, you have to set goals such as, ―I shall have more than 80 
students pass the third level of the Eiken [Test in Practical English 
Proficiency].‖ I personally feel I have to write down objectives that may 
be a little distanced from the nature of education. Here I see some 
contradictions. (Mr. Shimura, East Senior High School) 
 
At first, he intended to set ―I shall have many students interested in English‖ as 
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one of his annual goals, but he rewrote the original goals in the end because 
―Our head teacher pointed out specifically how they should be reworked.‖ 
According to the results of my survey, 34.8% of head teachers in the national 
sample had repeatedly required teachers to rewrite goals (Table 6.9). My 
interview data shows that not only at East Senior High School but also in the 
other schools, this occurred predominantly because the head teachers believed 
that original goals were too ambiguous and should be replaced by numerical 
goals. 
 
A sense of comparison and rivalry 
Mr. Kitano, a chemistry teacher in his 30s, also felt distressed with the 
school management policies that had a strong emphasis on higher examination 
results of students. Like Mr. Shimura, he was unhappy with the numerical goals 
that he was required to set. However, he made another point in his interview. 
For him, it was not so much numerical work per se as the strained relationships 
with his colleagues that caused his suffering: 
 
Examination results of my chemistry classes were worse than any other 
subject. No one explicitly blamed me for the results, but I felt as if 
everyone looked at me reproachfully. (Mr. Kitano, East Senior High 
School) 
 
At East Senior High School, individual teachers were required to attain their 
own goals that were derived logically from the all-school targets. Thus, if a 
teacher failed to achieve her/his goals, the whole school would fail to achieve its 
objectives too. This caused the teachers to be more aware of each other‘s 
attainment rather than teaching practices. As he described it, although the 
teachers did not explicitly blame each other, their relations became awkward. He 
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explained this further. 
  
Since the teacher evaluation began, I have certainly become more aware 
of the test results of my classes, although I have understood that the 
processes of evaluation are rather complex, the test results do not simply 
determine my own evaluation results. I suppose that most of my 
colleagues here feel the same way. For me, the sense of rivalry is 
particularly acute with my colleagues. (Mr. Kitano, East Senior High 
School) 
 
This provides us with an important insight into how the micro-politics of 
numerical goals have been enacted; the new teacher evaluation systems can 
cause teachers to internalise a sense of comparison and rivalry. It is worth 
investigating whether this was observed in the other schools as well as East 
Senior High School. 
 
7.3 West Senior High School 
 
Individualised modes of decision making and working  
Like the head teacher of East Senior High School, the head teacher of West 
Senior High School appreciated the new teacher evaluation system. For him it 
was a useful tool for effective communication with the teachers but seemingly 
only in a one-way manner. 
 
I like this new system [of teacher evaluation] because now I have more 
opportunities to communicate to my teachers what I am thinking, what I 
want them to do. (Head Teacher, West Senior High School) 
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As this statement implies, the teachers of West Senior High School often felt 
that the head teacher forcefully imposed goals that they did not like. In 
addition, it should be noted that the teachers did not know each other‘s goals, 
as Ms. Miyakawa, an English teacher in her 40s, commented. 
 
 I wondered why he [one of the colleagues teaching the same subject] 
had been taken up with collecting and checking students‘ notebooks and 
I realised that that was the goal that he had set at the beginning of the 
year. (Ms. Miyakawa, West Senior High School) 
 
The results of my national survey corroborated this; 81.0% of teachers across 
the nation did not consult their colleagues when setting goals, and 87.3% did not 
know each other‘s goals (see Table 6.9).  
If a majority of teachers are pursuing goals that their colleagues do not know, 
it is possible to say that the new teacher evaluation system is promoting an 
individualised, as opposed to collective, way of working in schools. During the 
interviews, some teachers were willing to refer to the changes in how the school 
was managed. As stated in Chapter 2, recent government policies have been 
championing head teacher‘s managerial powers, while blaming collective modes 
of decision making for the lack of agility and accountability of school 
management. The policy proponents argue that enhancing head teachers‘ 
managerial powers will lead to a school management that can respond more 
promptly to, and consequently meet more fully, the needs of students and 
parents as consumers in the educational market. In this context, the introduction 
of the new teacher evaluation system helps to institutionalise an individualised 
method of decision-making and working in which a head teacher can ask or 
require teachers on an individual basis, as opposed to a collective basis, to 
undertake tasks derived from their management policies.  
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At the same time head teachers themselves may feel constrained in 
formulating their own goals for school management, despite the rhetoric of 
government policies. The head teacher of West Senior High School flatly denied 
having such decision-making power, saying: 
 
In reality, the local board of education dictates school management 
policies. They have established a comprehensive plan of restructuring 
schools, and every single school is a part of the whole picture consisting 
of various types of school, such as elite school, vocational training 
school, and school especially for students having difficulties adapting 
themselves to school life. The assigned types of school determine the 
way schools should be managed, with little room for maneuvering left to 
the site. The board wants me to implement such management policies 
exactly as it wants. (Head Teacher, West Senior High School) 
 
It should also be noted that head teachers are subject to the requirements of 
goal-setting and evaluation conducted by local boards of education. While 
head teachers‘ power to persuade teachers to work within their management 
policies has been enhanced, in a broader perspective, their power in relation 
to the local board of education is constrained. Thus, the politics of numerical 
goals stretches over the whole system of local educational governance. This 
observation of head teachers‘ power being constrained in relation to the local 
board of education does not diminish the previous observation that their 
power is fortified in relation to other teachers.  
 
Dilemmas between professional beliefs and performativity 
Also at West Senior High School numerical goals conflicted with teachers‘ 
educational values. Again, some of the teachers were persuaded to set numerical 
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goals, albeit unwillingly, as the head teacher demanded, but others declined to 
do so. Ms. Kawabata, a physics teacher in her 40s, was one who successfully 
declined to comply.  
 
I was instructed to set numerical goals by my head teacher. But I found 
them unsuitable. So I said to my head, ―Excuse me [from the 
requirement].‖ (Ms. Kawabata, West Senior High School) 
  
Ms. Kawabata did not approve of placing too much emphasis on measurable 
aspects of student achievement although she did not articulate well the reason 
for her noncompliance.  
As with the case of Mr. Kitano of East Senior High School, Ms. Kawabata‘s 
successful refusal suggests that there is still some room left for teachers to 
decline to set numerical goals against the head teacher‘s strong exhortations. 
However, such resistance scarcely left the teachers‘ values and identities intact. 
The following statement by Ms. Kawabata illustrates this point: 
 
I feel increasingly powerless in the face of this new teacher evaluation 
system. I am tolerating it. But sometimes I feel as if my professional 
beliefs are completely outdated […] I did not set numerical goals, but 
goals that I set instead are still about academic standards. Recently, I have 
become more conscious of test results, although I refused to set goals 
about them. (Ms. Kawabata, West Senior High School) 
 
Even for Ms. Kawabata, the micro-politics presented a dilemma between her 
own educational beliefs and performativity. This happened to her by way of the 
power relations in which the head teacher increasingly came to dominate over 
teachers.  
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There is also some evidence that the micro-politics induced by the new 
teacher evaluation systems was affecting collegial relations, as a sense of 
comparison and rivalry was being internalised among the teachers of East Senior 
High School. Ms. Miyakawa felt restrained from doing more or initiating 
anything new.  
 
I was thinking about proposing new pedagogy to my colleagues in the 
same subject group. I really believed in the effectiveness of the new 
method of teaching English. But I gave up in the end, because I was 
nervous about being seen by them as trying to ―get points.‖ It was a 
shame. (Ms. Miyakawa, West Senior High School) 
 
This statement implies that some teachers may be afraid that their colleagues 
could view them as trying to stand out for better evaluation results. Thus, in 
West Senior High School, the micro-politics seemed to contribute to a less 
relaxed and animated atmosphere. 
 
7.4 South Special School 
 
A decline of collegial relations 
Recently, the head teacher of South Special School had been proposing a 
new policy concerning future careers of the students. He insisted that the school 
should provide all the students with proper vocational training so that they 
would be able to gain employment immediately after graduation. Although he 
did not specifically refer to this policy in his interview, he welcomed the new 
teacher evaluation system on the ground that he ―sees it an effective tool to 
integrate the entire work of teachers for school goals‖ (Head Teacher, South 
Special School). However, Ms. Miyazaki, a special education specialist in her 
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50s, objected to this proposal.  
 
Recently, the board of education emphasised that every student in special 
high schools should be trained for employment. Therefore, our head 
teacher suggested that our school prospectus include an aim of a ―100% 
success rate for employment.‖ I objected to this because I did not think 
that all of our students are both competent and suited for employment. 
So I asked the head teacher which students he was thinking about. Then, 
he replied, ―I do not know the actual state of the students. However, the 
board of education insists on thorough training for employment. 
Therefore, we should do so.‖ (Ms. Miyazaki, South Special School) 
 
Ms. Miyazaki had asked the question at a meeting with the head teacher when 
she was asked to set her own goals in line with the new school aim. Naturally, 
she could not accept the head teacher‘s answer. However, under pressure to set 
those goals that would contribute to the fulfillment of the school goal, she 
conceded in the end.  
As at the other schools, for the interviewed teachers of South Special School, 
meetings with the head teacher were attached special importance over the whole 
process of teacher evaluation. The meeting was the place where the micro-
politics laden with conflicts and domination became most tangible. Furthermore, 
it is not just the head teachers but also some teachers who were willing to make 
use of the meeting. Ms. Miyazaki gave an example. 
 
Last year, a dormitory tutor [attached to the special school] was rated C 
[i.e., below the average], and we wondered why. It so happened that one 
of her senior colleagues had told the head teacher that the tutor was quite 
incompetent. I myself cannot justify that. She is far from incompetent, 
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although her tactic is a bit unique. Sometimes, she does things her way. I 
suppose that the senior colleague was not happy with that, and hence, 
called the tutor names in the meeting with the head teacher. (Ms. 
Miyazaki, South Special School) 
 
Thus, the new teacher evaluation system drove a wedge between colleagues. On 
the other hand, it is possible that the meetings provide some teachers with 
opportunities to pledge loyalty to their head teacher. Consequently, horizontal 
communication among colleagues was sacrificed for vertical communication 
between individual teachers and the head teacher.  
 
Harassment and discrimination 
At South Special School, the closed nature of meetings seemed to facilitate 
differing treatment of teachers, depending on their age and experience.  
  
At my school, teachers with less experience, for example, novice teachers, 
are persistently instructed to rewrite their goals. I have heard that the head 
teacher assumed an overbearing attitude towards young teachers. But he 
never does this towards experienced teachers like me. (Mr. Kagawa, 
South Special School) 
 
Mr. Kagawa himself was an experienced, male teacher in his 50s who felt ―free 
to talk to, sometimes even criticise‖ the head teacher. However, he was 
concerned that less experienced teachers and female teachers were being 
harassed by the head teacher at the meetings.  
Given that the enactment of new teacher evaluation policies is closely 
related to a shift in power relations within the school, harassment and 
discrimination can occur over these processes. Indeed, not only at South Special 
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School but also at East Senior High School, discrimination in relation to the 
evaluation results was reported
16
. The head teachers may feel that younger 
teachers are easier to deal with than experienced, older teachers, even when the 
young teachers are unhappy with their own evaluation results. 
These examples echoed the results of the national survey. While 26.9% of 
female teachers stated that at the goal-setting meetings they expressed their 
opinions regarding the head teacher‘s management policies, 40.1% of male 
teachers reported doing so. Further, it was found that it was more likely that 
female teachers would be required to rewrite annual goals. In regard to age, 
young teachers were less likely to have such an active attitude as mentioned 
above, although they seemed to be happier than their older colleagues with the 
processes and results of teacher evaluation (see Tables 6.11 and 6.12).  
In addition, Mr. Kagawa raised concerns about the disadvantages that (again, 
in many cases, female) teachers with heavy home responsibilities would suffer. 
He referred to his colleague who was taking care of her toddler.  
 
On the ground that she assumes only a minimal amount of duties at 
school, she might have been judged as being poorly motivated and 
accordingly evaluated. Suspicious of this possibility, she came to talk to 
me. I strongly recommended that she ask the head teacher the precise 
                                                        
16
 Mr. Shimura of East Senior High School reported the case: ―One of my young 
colleagues self-evaluated his own performance of the year as ‗A.‘As a criterion-referenced 
judgment, I believe, this self-evaluation is right. Yet, the head teacher rejected it, saying, 
‗Young teachers cannot get ―A‖ because they are inexperienced.‘ We have been told that 
evaluations are made criterion-referenced, rather than norm-referenced. The reality is totally 
different. Many young teachers feel that they are discriminated against simply because they 
are young.‖ 
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reasons for her evaluation results, but she hesitated. I am afraid that she 
was not confident enough to do so. (Mr. Kagawa, South Special School) 
 
Thus, the introduction of new teacher evaluation policies can reinforce, if not 
produce, social injustice. In such cases, relevant appeal actions should be taken, 
but disadvantaged teachers are often afraid that taking any action would put them 
in a more disadvantaged position. In any case, not all the boards of education have 
established systems for complaint or appeal (see Chapter 2). Further investigation 
of social justice issues involved in the new teacher evaluation policies is 
warranted. 
 
7.5 North Senior High School 
 
Excessively narrow goals  
Just as at East Senior High School and West Senior High School, the head 
teacher of North Senior High School insisted that teachers set numerical goals. 
He clearly endorsed this in his interview although he did not allow me to 
directly use his interview data in the present thesis (his refusal may be related to 
the incident of a teacher‘s breakdown which I describe below). Again, however, 
not the all teachers were persuaded to do so. Ms. Minamisawa, a chemistry 
teacher in her 50s and an active union member, declined to set numerical goals 
concerning the attendance rate of her students. This was despite repeated 
exhortations by the head teacher. She did not object to the idea of setting annual 
goals, but could not accept being forced to set numerical ones. She explained the 
reason: 
 
I do not want to make concessions when I set my goals. I do not disagree 
with the idea of setting goals at all. But students will never develop 
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exactly as I expect. I cannot set numerical, too specific goals because 
they will constrain the level of flexibility in work. For example, 
regarding absent students, I suppose that some of them have good 
reasons. So, I cannot simply say that I aim for 100% attendance. Rather, 
I think that what I should do is make every effort to understand my 
students better. (Ms. Minamisawa, North Senior High School) 
 
The reason Ms. Minamisawa cited for her refusal to set numerical goals was 
similar to that cited by Mr. Shimura of East Senior High School for his 
embarrassment. For these teachers, numerical goals seemed to be too narrow 
and too specific. The idea of setting such goals contradicted with their beliefs in 
the wholeness and flexibility of pedagogical processes. 
 
Pressure and emotional stress  
At North Senior High School, all the meetings occurred face to face in the 
head teachers‘ offices. Naturally, some teachers felt anxious about how the 
meeting would proceed. They were embarrassed or upset when the head teacher 
imposed numerical goals with which they disagreed. Others felt that they could 
ask their head teachers for advice or recognition of their efforts and 
achievements. This expectation on the part of teachers was related to the 
communication gaps and rivalry between colleagues. As Ms. Minamisawa stated, 
the more the teachers feel too busy to talk to each other or the more they feel 
that a sense of rivalry hinders communication with colleagues, the more they 
think of meetings with their head teacher as ―helpful and reassuring‖ (Ms. 
Minamisawa, North Senior High School). Here, it is important to note that 
relationships in schools are being affected by, and at the same time are affecting, 
the enactment of new teacher evaluation policies.  
At North Senior High School, the micro-politics of numerical goals certainly 
Chapter Seven 
149 
stretched beyond the relationships between the head teacher and the teachers to 
the relationships with colleagues. Ms. Hatakeyama, an English teacher in her 
20s, had developed a mental illness and could not work for more than six 
months. At the meeting with the head teacher, she set numerical goals concerned 
with the examination results of her students. She exerted great effort to achieve 
the goals, giving her students many assignments and grading the assignments 
collected every day. She would often end up grading until 1:00 am and wake up 
at 5:00 am to prepare for the day‘s lessons. At first, she noticed that her students 
were exhausted. It was not long before an increasing number of them failed to 
complete and hand in their assignments. Then, she felt that she could not 
motivate them to work harder because she herself had become less confident in 
her method. 
Ms. Hatakeyama had been a good practitioner of communicative English 
teaching. She studied pedagogy at the university and believed in it. However, 
she decided to ignore her beliefs, hoping that ―teaching to the test‖ would work 
better for her students who intended to attend higher education. However, 
eventually, it turned out that ―teaching to the test‖ was not simply unsuccessful 
but also a source of emotional stress for both herself and her students: 
 
It was when the summer term nearly came to an end that I found myself 
completely stuck on my chair in the staff room. I could not move at all 
although the time had already come for a class. I was asking myself, 
―Why did I, such an incompetent woman, become a teacher? I should not 
have become a teacher at all.‖ (Ms. Hatakeyama, North Senior High 
School) 
 
For some time before this breakdown happened, she had been suffering from 
a dilemma between ―teaching to the test,‖ which numerical goals required, and 
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using a communicative approach to English teaching, which she had been 
practicing since she entered the profession. She was wondering whether she had 
made the right choice. However, when the breakdown occurred, the dilemma 
had almost disappeared. She blamed herself and kept repeating to herself, ―I 
should not have become a teacher.‖ 
It seems that the power relations with her head teacher, who insisted that she 
set numerical goals, contributed to her dilemma and her self-blaming mentality, 
which eventually led to the breakdown. At the same time she said, ―I remember 
that I was not particularly aware of the numerical goals, but rather, I was always 
feeling beholden to my colleagues, particularly to my year group colleagues.‖ 
Thus, it is important to look at micro-politics, not only in terms of relations 
between the teacher and her head teacher (i.e., vertical relations), but relations 
among teachers (i.e., horizontal relations). Ms. Hatakeyama felt strong pressure 
from her colleagues, particularly from her year group leader. She told me that 
this senior teacher ―stirred up rivalry between us in the same year group.‖ She 
supposed that the year group leader himself had set a goal of a significant 
increase in tests results for the year group students.  
 
“Doubts beget doubts” atmosphere among teachers 
At North Senior High School, most, if not all, teachers were involved in the 
micro-politics of numerical goals, but some teachers were not as affected as 
others. The case of Ms. Hatakeyama shows that teachers who are more willing 
to adapt to numerical goals (like the year group leader in this case) can cause 
other teachers to suffer by promoting performativity and stirring rivalry among 
colleagues.  
The less relaxed and animated atmosphere observed at both East Senior 
High School and West Senior High School was more clearly felt at North Senior 
High School. The following comments by Ms. Minamisawa are good 
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illustrations. 
 
Our relations have become much tenser. I am most worried about the 
spread of the ―doubts beget doubts‖ atmosphere among us. For example, 
if someone is working hard, perhaps he is sincerely devoting himself, 
going the extra mile, for the sake of students, but people will cast a 
suspicious glance at him, feeling that maybe he wants to get points. (Ms. 
Minamisawa, North Senior High School) 
 
I feel that teachers here are more conservative than before. They do what 
they must do anyway, or they do what they are instructed to do by the 
head teacher, but they are not willing to do more. It seems to me that they 
are careful not to be noticeable. (Ms. Minamisawa, North Senior High 
School) 
 
At the same time, the teachers of North Senior High School came to work in 
more isolation than before.  
 
It sometimes happens that something new had already been undertaken 
when I noticed it. For example, some teachers abruptly began to examine 
students‘ clothes at the school gate every morning to ensure the 
observance of dress code. We had received many complaints from 
neighbours about the untidy ways some students dress themselves. We 
understood that we should deal with this problem, but we had never 
discussed this particular measure at staff meetings. As far as I remember, 
things like this never happened before. (Ms. Minamisawa, North Senior 
High School) 
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At North Senior High School, proposals of changes in relation to instruction and 
guidance of some students used to be discussed at staff meetings so that teachers 
could express their opinions. Recently, however, Ms. Minamisawa felt that the 
discussion was becoming a mere formality because many decisions had already 
been made by the head teacher and senior management team and then were 
simply announced. She explained, ―Still, some teachers stand up to present their 
opinions at staff meetings. But they often begin by saying, ‗I know that 
conclusions will not change, even though I state my view.‘ A mood of 
resignation has been spreading among us‖ (Ms. Minamisawa, North Senior High 
School). This change means that when teachers feel uncomfortable with specific 
initiatives that their head teacher proposes, they have fewer opportunities to 
discuss them with colleagues. At North Senior High School, questions about the 
particular policy issue of teacher evaluation were not raised in public (although I 
noted that at East Senior High School such questions were raised at the staff 
meetings). Thus, individualised modes of decision making and working can help 
the top-down style of school management to operate.  
 
Broader backgrounds of changes in modes of decision making and working 
Ms. Minamisawa, who had been learning about policies as a union activist, 
attributed the causes for the ―more conservative‖ attitudes, individualised way of 
working, and top-down style of decision-making, not simply to the introduction 
of new teacher evaluation policies, but to other recent changes. These changes 
included downgrading of democratic decision making within schools, further 
stratification of school organisational structure with the introduction of new 
administrative positions, and sanctions against the dissident teachers with regard 
to the local government‘s policies of the national anthem and flag. In this 
particular prefecture, teacher unions still maintain higher rates of membership 
than in other prefectures. Occasionally, they have had fierce confrontations with 
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the local board of education over these issues. 
All these changes originated from national or local education policies. 
However, not many teachers I interviewed had such a macro-political point of 
view as this particular teacher had. Indeed, many teachers felt strained relations 
among themselves, sometimes rather acutely, but they did not relate the affected 
relations to particular policy mandates. There were fewer opportunities for them 
to address and redress the problems.  
Remembering the statistical findings (see Chapter 6), teachers in senior high 
schools were more likely than their colleagues in other types of schools to report 
the unfavorable effects of teacher evaluation on their relationships. I have 
already suggested a reason for this (stronger pressure for performativity), which 
corresponds to the qualitative analysis. With regard to another significant 
differentiator of the views, the age of teachers, I could not find any significant 
correspondence between the findings from the questionnaire survey and those 
from the interviews. The survey showed that older teachers were more likely to 
report unfavourable effects while amongst the interviewees, the teacher that 
suffered most from the affected relations was young and female. This fact drew 
my attention to the problems of social injustice.  
From the above descriptions of the enactment of new teacher evaluation 
policies in the schools, a number of common themes regarding the micro-
politics have appeared. I will discuss the themes further, linking them to the 
broader theory and literature, in the concluding chapter.  
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Chapter Eight: The Failure of the New Teacher Evaluation 
Policies 
 
In Chapter 7, I explored how the new teacher evaluation policies were 
enacted in schools. It was found that the new teacher evaluation systems were 
inducing the micro-politics of numerical goals or performativity that was laden 
with conflicts and domination. While the last chapter focused on the aspects of 
management and social relations of schools, in this chapter I look at whether and 
how the new practices of teacher evaluation were affecting teachers‘ work and 
teachers themselves. Although I could have organized the discussion by school, 
the positions of different ―policy actors‖ (Ball, et al., 2011a) within the schools 
were often so different that it has been easier to organize the discussion 
according to themes that cut across the schools.  
The new teacher evaluation policies — in particular, their professional 
development model — are intended to promote teacher development and 
contribute to better teaching quality. According to the national survey I 
conducted, however, a majority of teachers (over 70%; see Table 6.13) denied 
these effects. The results prompt me to explore further why most teachers had 
such poor perceptions of the claimed advantages. Furthermore, the analyses in 
Chapter 7 suggested that the micro-politics induced by the new teacher 
evaluation policies can cause some teachers a serious dilemma between their 
educational beliefs and performativity, and thus destabilise their professional 
identities.  
Considering these, this chapter explores three questions. First, why do the new 
teacher evaluation policies fail to fulfill their claimed advantages? Second, given 
this failure were there any impacts of the new teacher evaluation systems on 
teachers‘ work and identities? Third, if there were such impacts, how can we make 
sense of them? As in Chapter 7, I draw on first-hand experiences of teachers as 
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described in the interviews. 
 
8.1 Why Did Teacher Evaluation Fail? 
 
Distrust 
An annual cycle of teacher evaluation leads to the head teacher‘s 
assessments of individual teachers‘ abilities and performance. In the national 
survey, almost half of teachers (50.6%; see Table 6.9) reported that they were 
predominantly satisfied with their evaluation results. Interestingly, however, 
most teachers I interviewed distrusted their own evaluation results. Indeed, not a 
single teacher fully relied on the head teachers‘ judgments.  
 
I suppose that no one believes in the evaluation results. If I knew other 
teachers‘ evaluation results, I would be more confident in saying so 
[evaluation results are not valid]. A good teacher is really hard to define 
and evaluate. If you spend many hours listening to a student who often 
gets into trouble, I am sure that you are a good teacher. However, under 
the present teacher evaluation system, you will never get good results. 
Sometimes we hear that a teacher who did not seem very dedicated to 
students‘ well-being got an ―A,‖ and then we say, ―Why did this teacher 
get an ‗A‘ and that teacher get a ‗C‘?‖ (Ms. Miyakawa, West Senior High 
School) 
 
Even a teacher who confirmed the beneficial effects of teacher evaluation on her 
work motivation expressed concerns about the validity of the teaching 
assessment given to her by her head teacher. 
 
After lesson observations, we had time to talk about the lessons. But he 
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[the head teacher] would not pick up on what I myself thought I had not 
done well, and thus we had to discuss. He did not encourage me by 
praising what I thought I had done well, either. It was regrettable that he 
gave me none of those comments, advice, or commendations that I had 
sought. (Ms. Yamamoto, East Senior High School) 
 
Ms. Yamamoto received feedback from her head teacher but was not satisfied 
with it. As this suggests, in a number of cases, distrust of teacher evaluation 
resulted from a dissatisfying experience of lesson observation and its feedback. 
Without exception, official procedures of teacher evaluation demand that head 
teachers observe lessons and provide appropriate feedback. However, I found 
that not all of the head teachers gave feedback after lesson observations.  
 
Last year, my head teacher came to see my classes three times, once per 
one semester, each time for one period of class, but I had received no 
feedback. I do not believe that my head teacher is exceptional. I hear that 
not a single lesson observation has been conducted elsewhere. (Ms. 
Miyakawa, West Senior High School) 
 
This teacher suggested that there are schools where no lesson observations take 
place. Indeed, at North Senior High School, Mr. Tada reported that his lessons 
had never been observed.  
 
My head teacher has never seen my classes, but I got a ―B‖ for my 
teaching. I do not understand how he was able to make this judgment. (Mr. 
Tada, North Senior High School) 
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Different specialisations 
As the reasons for this superficial observance, and even breach, of the 
procedural requirements, the teachers often referred to specialised knowledge 
and skills, which hinder head teachers with different specialisation from having 
confidence in conducting lesson observations to give proper feedback. These 
difficulties occurred not only in the senior high schools but in the special school. 
The following quote illustrates the latter case: 
 
I am a specialist of autonomic training for physically handicapped children. 
Our head teacher has been working only in schools for mentally 
handicapped children and therefore he cannot understand what we are 
doing with our [physically handicapped] students in rehabilitation classes. 
He told me, ―I may not say this, but, to be honest, I do not have any 
knowledge about what you are doing.‖ For this reason, he could not but 
confirm my own self-evaluation. (Mr. Kagawa, South Special School)  
 
The national survey showed that 51.5% of teachers (see Table 5.9) confirmed a 
concurrence between their self-evaluation and the evaluation by the head teacher. 
However, situations such as the one described by Mr. Kagawa may be true for 
other teachers and if so, the concurrence does not help the teachers to trust the 
head teachers‘ judgments.  
 
Staff size and time 
Another reason teachers cited for the difficulties of conducting lesson 
observations and giving feedback was the size of a school‘s teaching staff. 
 
On average, elementary and junior high schools have 20 to 30 teachers, a 
typical senior high school, 40 to 50, and some special schools no less than 
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100 teachers. You must remember all the teachers first. Knowing what 
they are doing is really hard work. Assessing them one by one is far from 
realistic. (Ms. Miyazaki, South Special School) 
 
Related to this, one head teacher complained that lesson observation was 
time-consuming:  
 
I have about 57 teachers here. If I spent two hours observing a lesson and 
discussing it afterword, the total would amount to 114 hours. That would 
mean that almost three weeks should be consumed exclusively on the 
evaluation tasks. Given other commitments of mine, I do not think that it is 
possible. (Head Teacher, West Senior High School) 
 
The new teacher evaluation policies were introduced into schools without 
consideration of these practical conditions.  
 
The nature of work 
In addition, teachers expressed more substantial reasons for their distrust of 
teacher evaluation. For example, Mr. Aoyama of East Senior High School, a 
physical education teacher in his 50s stated: 
 
I do not see any point [in the new teacher evaluation system]. We are 
supposed to set goals and self-monitor what we are doing, seeing that we 
are always on the track for the accomplishment of the goals all through 
the year, in addition to being evaluated in the end. But we must be 
flexible enough to respond to unfolding events and student needs. I had 
completed both the goal-setting and self-evaluation forms, but they are 
just paper work, making no sense […] it is often said that teachers‘ work 
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is invisible. The evaluation is supposed to make visible what is invisible, 
but it is not possible with regard to our work. (Mr. Aoyama, East Senior 
High School) 
 
By ―visible,‖ Mr. Aoyama seemed to mean ―quantifiable.‖ He distrusted the 
evaluation in principle, because of the incompatibility between his own beliefs 
in the nature of work, which demand a great deal of flexibility, and the 
requirements of teacher evaluation, which encourage conformity. 
While Mr. Aoyama set some numerical goals as a mere formality, Ms. 
Kawabata and Ms. Minamisawa refused to set numerical goals because of the 
nature of the work as they perceived it, despite exhortation to do so by their head 
teachers. The following explanation by Ms. Minamisawa echoed the reason Mr. 
Aoyama disagreed with the idea of teacher evaluation; both teachers believed in 
the flexibility of teaching.  
 
[...] Students will never develop exactly as I expect. I cannot set 
numerical, too specific goals because they can constrain the level of 
flexibility of my work [...] Regarding absent students, I suppose that 
some of them have good reasons. So, I cannot say that I aim for 100% 
attendance. (Ms. Minamisawa, East Senior High School) 
 
These teachers declared themselves against the rationale of the new teacher 
evaluation policy for the same reasons that they opposed the old efficiency 
rating plan (see Chapter 2) despite the policy claims that the new teacher 
evaluation system, with its professional development focus, was different. 
Mr. Aoyama also referred to the issue of performance related pay. For him, 
linking results to pay aggravates further the dysfunction of the new teacher 
evaluation system.  
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To be honest, we are making ourselves look better. Now that evaluation 
results are linked to pay, we cannot say, ―I am weak here. I have not done 
well enough there.‖ We cannot help each other when we need help. 
Anyway, being always aware of such a thing [being evaluated], we 
cannot do our work properly […] if you want to get good evaluation 
results, you will naturally delimit the scope of your work so that you can 
surely complete the work. If you take a risk, you may be seriously 
penalised for failure. As a result, there are parts of work that we must do 
as a school but no one is willing to do. (Mr. Aoyama, East Senior High 
School) 
 
With regard to performance-related pay, the national survey showed that about 
half (51.5%) of teachers agreed with the performance-based personnel system 
(seikashugi) in principle, but that many of them disagreed with its application 
due to the complex and collaborative nature of teachers‘ work (see Table 6.5). 
This also applies to Mr. Aoyama quoted above. He suggested that teachers were 
trying to make themselves look good and evading difficult but necessary work. 
Although almost all the teachers I interviewed had a distrust of the 
evaluation processes and results, one suggested that some teachers welcomed 
the new policy. 
 
I have an impression that young teachers see it [the new teacher 
evaluation system] much more favorably than I. They complain that they 
are doing more, working longer but that they are less paid than their 
elder colleagues. They want to be treated fairly, so they support the idea 
of teacher evaluation. (Ms. Minamisawa, East Senior High School) 
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As already suggested in Chapter 6, differences in duties and workloads can be 
linked to the endorsement of performance-related pay by those teachers who 
perceive the imbalances. However, it is also speculated that this support for 
linking pay to evaluation can plummet once the new pay system has been fully 
developed. Ms. Minamisawa understood her colleagues‘ complaints but thought 
of their endorsement as ―indiscreet‖ because given the way the teacher 
evaluation policies were being introduced, performance-related pay would not 
do justice to the imbalances. She came to think in this way partly because she 
was a union activist and learning about the relevant policies in detail.  
 
Unfulfilled promises of professional development 
Given the general level of distrust of teacher evaluation due to the practical 
and substantial difficulties mentioned above, it is not surprising that most 
teachers I interviewed categorically denied its beneficial impacts on their 
teaching. For example, Ms. Miyakawa commented on the ineffectiveness of 
teacher evaluation in terms of professional development, with reference to her 
own experiences of continuing professional development. A few years ago, she 
had an opportunity to take leave from school and study pedagogy at a graduate 
school of education. 
 
While I learned about ―lesson study‖ at the graduate school, I came to 
realise that I need to learn much from other teachers‘ lessons to improve 
my own teaching. I need to see other teachers teach and have them see 
me teaching, much more. For teachers to develop professionally, I 
believe, these practices need to be firmly rooted within school. Culture 
of mutual learning needs to be developed. Some may say that teacher 
evaluation should make this change. Yet, I totally disagree. As it stands, 
it has nothing to do with our professional development. We have not 
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come to see each other teach any more. We have not come to talk about 
teaching any more. Worse, the situation is the opposite. (Ms. Miyakawa, 
West Senior High School) 
 
As already mentioned in Chapter 7, Ms. Miyakawa was thinking about 
proposing new pedagogical appraoches to her colleagues after she returned to 
school from university. In the end, she gave up because she ―was nervous about 
being seen as trying to ‗get points‘ from them [colleagues].‖ She felt that 
collegial relations had become strained after the new teacher evaluation system 
started, which would hinder teachers‘ professional development. Ms. Miyakawa 
agreed with the idea of professional development, but felt that the new teacher 
evaluation system had failed her.  
Apparently, Ms. Yamamoto was an exception in that she admitted the 
beneficial effects of teacher evaluation on her work. She stated the following:  
 
I came to think about my goals more clearly. I had been thinking about 
my goals, but just thinking. A numerical goal such as the students‘ 
completion of assignments makes things clearer. For me, working 
mindful of the goals makes a difference. Actually, I got better results this 
year. (Ms. Yamamoto, East Senior High School) 
 
At the same time, it should be remembered that Ms. Yamamoto was not satisfied 
with the quality of feedback she had received from her head teacher. Even for 
this teacher, the beneficial effects of teacher evaluation were rather limited.  
The professional development model of teacher evaluation is intended to 
contribute to the professional development of teachers in two related ways (see 
Chapter 4). One is by encouraging teachers‘ reflection on work, aided by 
professional dialogue with the head teacher. The other is by clarifying individual 
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teachers‘ needs for professional development and thereby directing training and 
in-service education to meet these needs. However, I did not find any evidence 
of organisational (at the school level) or systemic (at the local board of 
education level) efforts to ensure that in-service education and training catered 
to the needs of professional development as part of the processes of teacher 
evaluation. For the teachers I interviewed, the promises of professional 
development had hardly been fulfilled. Consequently, they distrusted the teacher 
evaluation processes and results.  
 
8.2 How Did the New Teacher Evaluation Policies Affect Teachers’ Work 
and Professional Identities? 
 
In Section 8.1, I documented reasons for the failure of the new teacher 
evaluation policies. However, stating that the teacher evaluation systems failed 
to fulfill their claimed advantages is not the same as contending that they had no 
impact on teachers‘ work and selves. On the contrary, as mentioned in Chapter 7, 
the new teacher evaluation policies seemed to be significantly affecting some 
teachers‘ work and identities.  
In this regard, the most salient case was Ms. Hatakeyama of North Senior 
High School, who changed her way of teaching. Numerical goals regarding the 
attainment of her students forced her to adopt a ―teaching to the test‖ practice, 
which was contrary to the way she practiced previously. As a result, she faced a 
serious dilemma between her own pedagogical beliefs and performativity. This 
dilemma became too acute for her to endure, and eventually she suffered a 
breakdown. She felt strong pressure not only from her head teacher but from 
colleagues. She said, ―I was always feeling beholden to my colleagues, 
particularly to my year group colleagues.‖ At the same school, however, Ms. 
Minamisawa refused to set any numerical goals, claiming that such goals were 
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incompatible with her educational beliefs and practices. As this suggests, the 
ways individual teachers reacted to the new teacher evaluation policies varied 
even in the same school.  
At East Senior High School, Mr. Shimura suffered from a contradiction 
between his original aims of teaching and the numerical goals that he was 
required to set. He felt that the goals were ―distanced from the nature of 
education.‖ Mr. Kitano also talked about his sufferings. He was afflicted by the 
strained and accusatory relationships with his colleagues, as well as the 
numerical goals that he himself had set. For him, the teachers seemed to be more 
aware of each other‘s attainment than teaching practices per se. When his 
students did not perform well on tests, he felt ―as if everyone looked at me 
reproachfully.‖ On the other hand, Mr. Aoyama disagreed with the method of 
evaluation because it was supposed to make ―visible‖ (quantifiable) what is 
―invisible‖ (not quantifiable) in his work. He declared his deep distrust of the 
new teacher evaluation system, saying ―I do not see any point.‖ He completed 
the formal requirements but disregarded them from the beginning to end.  
 
I put bland goals in the evaluation sheet and handed it over to the head 
teacher. He had insisted on numerical goals, and we had a rather long 
talk at the meeting, but he conceded in the end. For me, teacher 
evaluation is simply a waste of time. I simply do not remember the goals 
I set. (Mr. Aoyama, East Senior High School) 
 
At the same school, Ms. Yamamoto appeared to have little difficulty adapting to 
the requirements of teacher evaluation. She confirmed the beneficial effect of 
numerical goals on her work motivation. 
Then, at West Senior High School, Ms. Kawabata did not like the emphasis 
on measurable aspects of student achievement and successfully declined to set 
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numerical goals. Ms. Miyakawa also disregarded the new teacher evaluation 
system. However, she took a practical approach to setting annual goals. 
Specifically, she set some numerical goals but regarded setting annual goals as a 
mere formality. 
 
I said to myself, ―OK. I will set goals that sound plausible, sound 
satisfying to the head teacher.‖ And then I forgot. (Ms. Miyakawa, West 
Senior High School) 
 
During the interviews, I found that Ms. Miyakawa was highly regarded not only 
by her colleagues but also by the head teacher for her expertise and enthusiasm 
for teaching. This advantage of social position may be why she was able to take 
this practical approach. At the same time, it should be noted that she mentioned 
considerable anxiety about being seen by her colleagues as trying to ―get 
points.‖  
At South Special School, the head teacher had recently decided on a new 
school goal of a ―100% success rate for employment.‖ Ms. Miyazaki disagreed 
with this goal because she believed ―not all of our students are both competent 
and suited for employment.‖ However, under pressure from the head teacher, 
she eventually did set her own annual goals, consistent with the new school goal. 
She recounted the painful experience as follows. 
 
In the end, my goal was ―I will make an effort to have all the students 
prepared for employment.‖ But I did not think that all of them were 
suited for employment. This experience greatly discouraged me. Of 
course, to those students who are suited for employment, I have been 
making every effort to provide proper preparation. (Ms. Miyazaki, South 
Special School) 
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Just like Mr. Shimura, she suffered from being forced to set goals against her 
professional beliefs. 
As mentioned several times, a number of teachers were persuaded by their 
head teachers to set numerical goals. Literature on shifting headship towards the 
―new manager‖ in the English context (e.g., Ball, 1994; Gewirtz, 2002; Grace, 
1995; Whitty, et al., 1998) also describes what Japan has witnessed — head 
teachers are more vulnerable to the pressures for new professional values and 
identities than teachers. For those head teachers who either advocate or cannot 
but advocate performativity, teacher evaluation is a helpful measure for winning 
teachers over to their side. However, it was not confined to the power accruing 
to the head teachers that helped performativity to gain full force. Both Ms. 
Hatakeyama and Mr. Kitano felt strong pressure from their colleagues. Ms. 
Hatakeyama mentioned that her year group leader ―stirred up rivalry‖ between 
colleagues in the same year group. Thus, performativity worked through 
horizontal (collegial) relationships as well as vertical (managerial) relationships.  
Furthermore, even in the same schools, individual teachers behaved 
differently in the face of the micro-politics of numerical goals or performativity. 
The teachers‘ reactions can be classified into four broad types: accommodating, 
suffering, separating, and resisting. A typical example of accommodation was 
provided by Ms. Yamamoto. She willingly accommodated to the requirements of 
new teacher evaluation and rewrote her original goals when the head teacher 
insisted that they be replaced by numerical ones. Ms. Hatakeyama, and to a 
lesser degree, Mr. Shimura, Ms. Miyazaki, and Mr. Kitano, represented the 
suffering reaction. Ms. Hatakeyama tried to accommodate to performativity but 
ended up having a breakdown. Mr. Shimura and Ms. Miyazaki also felt a 
dilemma between their original beliefs and the numerical goals they were 
required to set. Mr. Kitano suffered from strained and accusatory relations with 
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his co-workers. Ms. Miyakawa also represents this reaction type, as she felt 
uneasy about the declining collegial relationships caused by the introduction of 
the new teacher evaluation system. At the same time, however, her reaction can 
be classified as detachment, as she disregarded the processes and results of 
teacher evaluation. Separation is about keeping one‘s professional work and 
values intact by dealing with the requirements of teacher evaluation as ―a mere 
formality.‖ Certainly, Mr. Aoyama did this; he did not remember his own annual 
goals. Ms. Miyakawa could not remember hers either. Lastly, Ms. Kawabata and 
Ms. Minamisawa resisted the new teacher evaluation system by refusing to set 
any numerical goals. 
Of these types, it is obvious that teachers who suffered had their professional 
identities destabilised by performativity. As Mr. Kitano suggested, since they 
had been aware of test results, a dilemma between their beliefs and the 
requirements of the new teacher evaluation policies had been growing. On the 
face of things, the other types of reaction appear not to have particular impacts 
on teachers. For example, for Ms. Miyakawa, the processes of teacher 
evaluation were usually inconspicuous, surfacing only occasionally such as 
during meetings with the head teacher and lesson observations. However, things 
could be more complicated than they first appeared. She abandoned proposing a 
new pedagogical idea because she felt uneasy about being seen by her 
colleagues as trying ―to earn points.‖ When she conceded in this way, she must 
have experienced some sort of dilemma. 
This may also be the case with the reaction of resisting. Indeed, Ms. 
Kawabata, who declined to set any numerical goals, saying ―Excuse me [from 
the requirement of setting numerical goals]‖ to her head teacher, acknowledged 
her vulnerability to performativity. 
 
I feel increasingly powerless in the face of this new teacher evaluation 
Chapter Eight 
168 
system. I am tolerating it. But sometimes I feel as if my professional 
beliefs are completely outdated […] I did not set numerical goals, but my 
goals are still about test academic standards. Recently, I have become 
more conscious of test results. (Ms. Kawabata, West Senior High School) 
 
She successfully refused the requirement of the new teacher evaluation system 
to set numerical goals. Nonetheless, she felt that her professional values were 
being undermined by the pressure of performativity. Thus, the process of 
resistance did not guarantee that this teacher‘s values and professional identity 
were kept intact. 
In summary these examples suggest that even the teachers who apparently 
retained their values and original ways of working were at risk. To a greater or 
lesser degree, they have had their professional identities destabilised. While the 
new teacher evaluation system failed to fulfill its claimed advantages, it did have 
impacts on teachers‘ work — adopting ―teaching to the test,‖ becoming more 
aware of test results, internalising a sense of rivalry and comparison, and 
refraining from proposing a new idea. Furthermore, from the viewpoint of 
micro-politics, it appears that its apparent successes depended on a variety of 
factors, such as age, expertise, social position, and relationships in schools. Here, 
I can describe the precarious nature of successful resistance and detachment. In 
the concluding chapter, with reference to relevant literature, I will further 
explore how the new teacher evaluation system is affecting teacher identities. 
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Chapter Nine: Discussion and Conclusions 
 
In earlier chapters, I addressed the research questions introduced in Chapter 
1. In this concluding chapter, I summarise my findings and discuss further the 
significant themes for analysis. In particular, I have reserved detailed discussion 
of qualitative findings about the enactment of the new teacher evaluation 
policies (presented in Chapters 7 and 8) for this chapter. I also note the 
contributions and limitations of the present research and conclude with 
suggestions for further research.  
 
9.1 New Teacher Evaluation Policies Embedded within Wider Policy 
Formation 
 
Following the Tokyo Metropolitan Board of Education‘s (Tokyo-to Kyoiku 
Iinkai) introduction of a new teacher evaluation system in 2000, the concept has 
been gaining ground across the country with the support of the national 
government. Two rationales governed the development of the new teacher 
evaluation policies. The first was that teachers could attain required competence 
and performance by means of a professional development model of teacher 
evaluation. The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology 
(Monbukagakusho), local education boards, and some educationalists have 
endorsed this model, which involves goal setting, lesson observation and 
feedback, and self-review of competence and performance, in addition to formal 
evaluation by the head teacher. Advocates distinguish between this 
development-orientated model and the old efficiency-rating plan, which they 
regard as being solely for accountability. At the same time, however, new 
teacher evaluation schemes were sought so that performance-based personnel 
systems could be put in place. Thus, the second rationale is that the results of 
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teacher evaluation could be used as an objective basis for personnel 
disbursements, including providing performance-related pay.  
I critiqued these two rationales. The professional development model of 
teacher evaluation assumes that individual teachers‘ goals align with 
organisational and systemic goals. It ignores likely tensions between these goals, 
adopting instead a ―problem solving‖ approach (Thrupp & Willmott, 2003, pp. 54-
55). In reality, however, such conflicts may well occur. Therefore, practices based 
on this model, if enforced, could control teachers and their work just like the 
accountability model. The nature of teachers‘ work hampers the reliability of 
teacher evaluation when applied for the purpose of personnel disbursements. 
These lines of reasoning led me to adopt both macro- and micro-political points of 
view and to use an analytic concept of performativity. 
A macro-political examination has revealed that developments in new 
teacher evaluation policies have formed an integral part of the wider policy 
formation. The ―Structural Reform of Compulsory Education‖ aims for changes 
in the relations between the national government, local education boards, 
schools, and teachers. More specifically, the national government seeks to play a 
more strategic role in directing the education system to meet the imperatives of 
economy and global competition, while other actors assume greater 
responsibilities, but less autonomy, for carrying out national directives (i.e., the 
need to strengthen international competitiveness of human resources).  
Within this changed system of educational governance and accountability, a 
more effective quality assurance system is needed. Thus, a variety of measures, 
such as national and local examinations, school evaluation, and teacher 
evaluation, have been introduced. I have argued that the new teacher evaluation 
is supposed to develop teachers‘ competence and performance, but does so 
within the parameters set by governmental priorities. Indeed, the professional 
development model of teacher evaluation demands that teachers set their own 
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goals in line with school goals that are supposed to conform to local and 
national government objectives. Further, by linking pay to evaluation results, an 
individual teacher‘s success or failure in attaining his or her own goals will be 
rewarded or punished. Thus, the new teacher evaluation might be expected to 
work as a mechanism of political control. 
Having analysed the nature of new teacher evaluation policies embedded 
within wider policy developments, I considered a micro-political question: How 
are the new teacher evaluation policies being enacted? In the following sections, 
I discussed other significant themes arising from the qualitative findings 
presented in Chapters 7 and 8 against the background of the quantitative 
findings in Chapters 3 and 6. The discussion supports the thesis that new teacher 
evaluation will work as a performativity mechanism. However, it provides us 
with a particular view of how performativity works. At first glance, the new 
teacher evaluation policies seem to have failed. Few teachers took the new 
practices seriously, and most teachers were apparently immune from political 
control and performativity. Neither did the professional development model 
exhibit its acclaimed advantages. However, these findings suggest that the 
enactment of new teacher evaluation policies influenced teachers and their work 
indirectly by affecting modes of school management and teachers‘ relationships. 
Thus, my central argument is that performativity works not simply upon but also 
through teachers.  
 
9.2 Impact of the New Teacher Evaluation Policies  
 
In Chapter 7, I stated that the new teacher evaluation procedures provided 
head teachers with opportunities for individualised face-to-face communication 
with teachers. Head teachers can use this opportunity for listening, recognising, 
reassuring, proposing, persuading, and directing teachers. In other words, head 
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teachers now have a new means of control over what teachers think and do. The 
head teachers in my sample often asked teachers to replace their original, 
―ambiguous‖ objectives with ―specific and measurable‖ goals, typically 
regarding the academic performance of students. In addition, head teachers 
proposed to teachers individually that new teaching- and management-related 
initiatives should be undertaken; earlier, such proposals had been made 
collectively at staff meetings. As a result, it became more likely that teachers did 
not know what their colleagues were doing. Thus, teacher evaluation promoted 
individualised modes of decision-making and working in schools, while 
endangering collective modes.  
This change facilitated the top-down style of management within schools; 
even when individual teachers felt uncomfortable with head teachers‘ policies 
and specific initiatives, they had fewer opportunities to form a collective voice. 
Thus, teacher evaluation has eroded teachers‘ collective strength in Japan as 
witnessed in various other countries (Thrupp, 2002). Of course, the introduction 
of new teacher evaluation is not solely responsible for the top-down style of 
management in schools. In recent years, Japan‘s education has witnessed both 
coercive and managerial policies, such as sanctions against teachers defying the 
national anthem and flag, downgrading of democratic decision-making, and the 
creation of a more hierarchical management structure in schools. For the most 
part, teacher unions have been critical of these policies, which they fear will 
diminish democracy within schools. However, teacher unionism has drastically 
declined with teacher union membership standing at only 27.1% as of 2009 
(Monbukagakusho, 2010b). Informed objections to these policies have less 
appeal to non-union members than before. At East Senior High School, union 
members, joined by non-union members, publicly objected to performance-
related pay. However, this may not occur elsewhere very often. 
Work intensification for teachers is another factor. Some teachers appear to 
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have been reassured by the dubious judgements produced in the teacher 
evaluation. As Ms. Minamisawa of North Senior High School suggested, the 
more occupied teachers are with the evaluation procedure, in addition to their 
core job of teaching, the more difficult it is for them to develop ―extended 
professionality‖ — a concept originally coined by Hoyle (1974). It implies ―a 
[much] wide[r] vision of what education involves, values the theory 
underpinning pedagogy and generally adopts a much more intellectual approach 
to the job‖ (Evans, 1997, p. 61).  
Here, the work on policy enactment by Ball, Maguire, Braun, and Hoskins 
(2011) is relevant. The authors presented different types of ―policy actors or 
policy positions‖ (Ball, et al., 2011a, p. 625), based on their case studies in four 
schools in England. In an era of heightened accountability, reporting on the 
―implementation‖ of various policies demands ―increasing amount of time and 
effort away from that which is reported on‖ (Ball, et al., 2011a, p. 629). This is 
particularly, but not exclusively, true of senior teachers. Teacher evaluation, a 
focus of the present study, is a case in point, as it requires all teachers to self-
review their competence and performance and complete related paper work. 
However, for junior teachers, and perhaps some experienced teachers as well, 
day-to-day survival predominantly dominates and ―the bigger picture is mostly 
blurred and distant‖ (Ball, et al., 2011a, p. 632). Even when the policy 
―receivers‖ as Ball, Maguire, Braun, and Hoskins call them, consider policies 
enforced and oppressive, they normally choose to comply. Where these 
―transactors‖ and ―receivers‖ consist of the majority of staff in schools, the 
voice of policy ―critics,‖ such as active unionists, is likely to become muted. 
Thus, Ms. Minamisawa of North Senior High School warned that a ―resigning 
mood‖ was spreading and resistance was getting harder in Japanese schools. 
As the survey results clearly showed (see Chapters 3 and 6), Japanese head 
teachers were more in favour of the concept of the new teacher evaluation than 
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teachers, and more so than their English counterparts. Although no evidence can 
be provided at present, Japanese head teachers seem more likely to accept not 
just the teacher evaluation policies, but also the current raft of Japanese 
education reforms, despite their neo-liberal flavour. In Japan, the government 
has always been keen to win head teachers over to its side so that policies can be 
enacted smoothly. In particular, during the national confrontation over the old 
―efficiency rating plan of teachers,‖ the government moved to define head 
teachers as an ―authoritative boss‖ over teachers (Duke, 1973; Ojima, 2007, pp. 
20-25). Since then, it has been enforcing a series of policies aimed at driving a 
wedge between head teachers and teachers: for example, head teachers were 
formally prohibited from joining the same unions as teachers in 1968. In 
addition to this political maneuvering, perhaps the paternalistic culture of 
Japanese society discussed in Chapter 4 is responsible for teachers and head 
teachers embracing the top-down style of school management. This particular 
culture is assumed to underlie ―a hierarchical organisation of a group, with a 
paternalistic leader at the apex, who is the source of satisfying both affective and 
instrumental needs of subordinate members‖ (Befu, 1980, p. 170). The 
individualised methods of decision-making and working, induced by the new 
teacher evaluation policies, are the most recent factors resulting in this style of 
school management. In this regard, the enactment of the new teacher evaluation 
policies is playing a critical role in reinforcing the cultural base of Japanese 
leadership.  
However, it should be noted that head teachers are also subject to the 
requirements of goal setting and evaluation conducted by local education boards. 
Thus, while head teachers‘ power to persuade teachers to work in line with their 
management policies has been enhanced, their power in relation to local 
education boards is constrained.  
The goals and policies of local education boards are, in turn, supposed to be 
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set within the parameters defined by the state. All of these power relations, 
between teachers and head teachers and head teachers and local education 
boards, are aligned to enable the state‘s national educational goals to permeate to 
individual teachers. If the entire system functions properly, goals or objectives 
can be articulated not only at the school level but at all levels of the education 
system. My study suggests that this has already occurred in a proportion of 
schools. Japan‘s recent policies, scholarly discourses emphasising teacher 
evaluation as an integral part of school management, and Marsden and Belfield‘s 
formulation of joined-up goal setting or integrative bargaining approach to 
performance management, lack this broader, macro-political perspective.  
The new teacher evaluation affected not only vertical power relations 
between head teachers and teachers but also lateral relations among teachers. 
Some of the teachers I interviewed complained of strong pressure from their 
colleagues and rivalry among colleagues. Understanding that a teacher‘s failure 
to attain her/his goal would amount to the failure of the entire school, teachers 
became more aware of each other‘s performance. Consequently, even if teachers 
did not explicitly blame each other, their relationships became mutually 
accusatory and strained. Thus, teacher evaluation caused teachers to internalise a 
sense of comparison and rivalry. We saw that within these contexts, one teacher 
(Ms. Hatakeyama) became overly self-critical and needed to take extended leave.  
In the English context, the concept of ―panoptic performativity‖ was used to 
explore the experiences of teachers living in the stringent school inspection 
regime (Perryman, 2006). It was discussed that the sense of being under 
surveillance led to the teachers performing in ways dictated by rigid and pre-
determined criteria for their work. The metaphor of a panopticon (an institution 
in which everyone is easily seen from an observation point but nobody can see 
the observer) was useful for explaining how teachers internalised performativity.  
The following anecdote provided by one of my interviewees illustrates this 
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sense of being under surveillance. 
 
I pair up with a young teacher. She sometimes complains to me that she 
cannot be outspoken with the senior management. She feels that they are 
always watching with accusatory eyes rather than looking after her. They 
are ready to assess her rather than to lend her a helping hand. However, 
she is resigned to that as she is in her first year of teaching [during which 
her employment is conditional] anyway. (Mr. Kagawa, South Special 
School) 
 
Here the senior management represented the agency of surveillance. 
However, in other cases that I presented in Chapter 7, the salient observation 
point (the state, local education board, or head teacher) had receded into the 
background and was instead replaced by tacitly accusatory colleagues. The 
teachers were observed by each other rather than by an external authority such 
as the state or local education boards or an internal authority such as the head 
teacher. The authority may have initiated performativity, but it was being 
enacted through the strained and mutually accusatory relations of the teachers in 
the school — implicitly in some cases, but perhaps more explicitly in others. 
This seems to be echoed in Jeffrey‘s (2002) analysis of the replacement of 
the democratic relations of teachers with a ―team culture.‖ According to Jeffrey, 
―a performative discourse refocuses teachers‘ attention from the issues of how to 
interpret curriculum policy to ensuring that delivery of its basic tenets and 
reproduction of them illustrate the success of the school in the educational 
market place‖ (Jeffrey, 2002, p. 537). Thus, this changed priority functions as a 
disciplinary force for teachers. Furthermore, the performativity reconstitutes 
teachers‘ relations in terms of teams with the team, as Jeffrey quoted a teacher 
saying, ―being only as good as the weakest link and I keep thinking, ‗I‘m the 
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weak link here, I‘m going to let them down‘‖ (Jeffrey, 2002, p. 537). Mr. Kitano 
of East Senior High School, who felt ―as if everyone looked at me 
reproachfully‖ under the circumstances in which a teacher‘s failure to attain 
targets would equal the failure of the school, echoed the sentiments of the 
English teacher quoted by Jeffrey. 
―Panoptic performativity‖ (Perryman, 2006, 2009) is about self-policing, to 
which my interviewees, senior high school teachers, attested. Their colleagues 
were inquisitive about each other‘s attainment of goals, since it would affect the 
success of their school as a whole. They lived in fear of being looked upon as 
―standing in my colleagues‘ ways‖ (Mr. Kitano, East Senior High School) and 
grew self-critical. Not only vertical (with head teachers) but also lateral (with 
colleagues) relations became more tense, with increased pressure on teachers to 
perform better. My observation is that teachers did not simply police themselves 
but also each other.  
 
9.3 Exploring the Nature of Teachers’ Identity Work 
 
In Chapter 8, I hinted that the identity work teachers undertook in the 
process of teacher evaluation was more precarious than it first appeared. The 
results of surveys showed that the professional development model of teacher 
evaluation did not work and failed to gain teachers‘ confidence. A more in-depth 
analysis of the enactment of teacher evaluation policies confirmed this although 
suggesting that it still affected many teachers and their work.  
The teacher who suffered a breakdown was a case in point. She suffered 
from a serious dilemma between her own professional beliefs and performativity. 
Other teachers, whose identity work ranged from accommodating at one end by 
looking at the process ―as a mere formality,‖ to resisting at the other, appeared to 
succeed in keeping their professional identities intact. However, I observed that 
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less strain in their relationships at school was also responsible for their successes. 
In particular, the success of separating and resisting strategies depends on how 
many teachers, willingly or unwillingly, conform to the rationale and procedures 
of performativity policies, such as teacher evaluation. Performativity works 
through teachers as it is internalised by them. Performativity, as represented by 
numerical goals, causes emotional disturbance and conflicts through engendered 
relations. However, these conflicts can be pre-empted or solved again through 
these relations, which provides head teachers with the power to ―achieve and 
maintain particular definitions of school‖ (Ball, 1987, p. 278) — the power to 
dominate. 
It is not my intention to argue that all head teachers are advocates of 
numerical goals or performativity. However, as the English literature on shifting 
headship towards ―new managers‖ has shown, (Ball, 1994; Bottery, 2002; 
Gewirtz, 2002; Grace, 1995; Whitty, et al., 1998), head teachers are more 
vulnerable to the pressures of new professional values and identities than 
teachers. As Gewirtz stated, new managerialism ―provides a means by which 
school practices can be realigned to performance criteria set by the state‖ 
(Gewirtz, 2002, p. 47). For head teachers who either advocate or cannot help but 
advocate performativity, teacher evaluation is a helpful management tool for 
winning teachers over to their side.  
Drawing on Giddens‘ (1991) formulation of four major dilemmas that the 
self typically confronts in late modernity, Woods and Jeffrey (2002) elaborated 
on the situation of teachers in England in four areas: (1) the creation of a 
fragmented self, as it became difficult to retain old values; (2) an assault on 
teacher autonomy; (3) a heightened sense of uncertainty about one‘s abilities, 
aims, relationships, and commitment to teaching; and (4) commoditisation of 
personal relationships. While some teachers could simply embrace the dilemmas, 
others negotiated the inconsistencies between their self-concepts and the newly 
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assigned identities. 
Woods and Jeffrey (2002) found that the latter type of teachers responded in 
one of two ways: self-positioning (refusal and self-assertion) or separation of the 
self from what they were required to do and be. Self-positioning was concerned 
with ―a strong resolve to maintain the Plowden self-identity, rejecting the new 
assigned social identity‖ (p. 99). Here, the authors defined the Plowden identity 
as consisting of humanism and vocationalism (in other words, a missionary 
commitment to teaching), providing teachers with the basis for an integrated self. 
In the separation of self strategy, teachers developed a ―new personal identity to 
meet the ostensible requirements (although not the spirit) of the new social 
identity, while reserving and cultivating what were to them more important 
aspects of the self for their private life outside the teacher role‖ (Woods & 
Jeffrey, 2002, p. 100).  
These analyses seem applicable to the teachers I interviewed who responded 
differently to the new teacher evaluation. Specifically, Ms. Kawabata, Ms. 
Minamisawa, and Mr. Aoyama, who criticised the rationale of teacher evaluation, 
resisted the pressure of performativity. Some other teachers, for example Ms. 
Miyakawa, seemed to employ a separation of self-strategy or ―game playing‖ 
(putting on an act to meet expectations) which enabled ritualisation of teacher 
evaluation. Yet, these analyses are somewhat ambiguous with regard to the 
trajectories and consequences of the identity work. For one thing, it is not 
certain how long and under what conditions these strategies can be successful.  
Woods and Jeffrey (2002) noted that these strategies cannot always solve the 
dilemmas: ―Game-playing can leave teachers ambivalent about their self-identity. 
In the face of authority and loss of trust, uncertainty occurs and creates yet 
another dilemma for teachers‖ (pp. 102-103). Woods and Jeffrey (2002) 
suggested that these strategies could only be stop-gap measures. Although they 
did not expand on this idea, the strategies could intensify, rather than relieve, 
Chapter Nine 
180 
teachers‘ professional and existential anxieties. Indeed, as noted earlier, Ms. 
Kawabata acknowledged that her professional beliefs were being destabilised, 
although she refused to set numerical goals and apparently succeeded in 
sustaining her professional identity. 
In the present thesis, I introduced a work through, as opposed to work upon, 
perspective of performativity. My main objection to what I call a work upon 
perspective is that it makes us believe that teachers adapt to, comply with, 
appropriate, or resist performativity policies on their own (see Chapter 4 for a 
more detailed critique). Thus, analyses based on this perspective can fail to pay 
adequate attention to the impact of performativity on teachers, mediated by 
relations with their colleagues. I assume instead that performativity policies, in 
this particular case teacher evaluation, are being enacted through the social 
interactions of teachers. As I repeatedly noted, it is the strained and mutually 
accusatory relations among colleagues that seriously afflicted Ms. Hatakeyama 
and Mr. Kitano.  
This line of reasoning leads me to suggest that success in sustaining one‘s 
professional identity, at least partially depends on the degree to which relations 
with colleagues are strained. To put it in another rather blunt way, success was 
contingent on how many teachers, willingly or unwillingly, conformed to the 
rationale and procedures of performativity policies in each school. Apparently, 
the new teacher evaluation did not have a significant impact on Ms. Miyakawa‘s 
professional identity. Her own personal factors, such as disposition, professional 
and personal career, and strength of educational beliefs, contributed to the 
success of ―game-playing.‖ At the same time, however, it is possible that the less 
strained relations in West Senior High School allowed her to ritualise the 
processes of teacher evaluation. Thus, success is not guaranteed. 
Besides Ms. Miyakawa, some other teachers I interviewed set their own 
numerical goals as ―a mere formality,‖ believing that thereby they could 
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preserve their professional beliefs and identities. However, this may not be as 
easy as it first appears if evaluation is linked to pay. The penalty for failure to 
attain goals will put stronger pressure on teachers to be conscious of the goals. 
Furthermore, I would argue that ―game playing‖ involves a kind of 
instrumentalism that assumes it is possible, if not easy, to keep one‘s interior 
self intact by detaching it from one‘s exterior self. However, in reality, the 
exterior can affect, modify, and even decay the interior. Taylor (1994), an 
American philosopher, criticicsed instrumentalism when he warned that our 
inner nature is ―in danger of being lost, partly through the pressures toward 
outward conformity, but also because in taking an instrumental stance toward 
[ourselves, we] may have lost the capacity to listen to [our] inner voice‖ (p. 30). 
This is what performativity, the currently dominant policy technology, means. 
Performativity is one of the ―mechanisms for reforming teachers (scholars and 
researchers) and for changing what it means to be a teacher, the technologies of 
reform produce new kinds of teacher subjects‖ (Ball, 2003, p. 217, quoted in 
Youdell, 2010, p. 226). This may well happen to teachers, possibly including Mr. 
Aoyama who categorically criticised the rationale of new teacher evaluation. 
Describing the ―as a mere formality‖ strategy deployed by teachers as a 
method to successfully preserve their professional identities is also problematic. 
In this case, adequate attention is not paid to the consequences of the identity 
work and overall, this identity work can reinforce performativity, not the least 
because an increasing number of teachers will set numerical goals. Even if 
individual teachers feel they can preserve their professional identities for the 
present, other teachers could feel that circumstances are becoming more 
constrained. Here, again, performativity works through the working 
relationships — it does not simply impact upon teachers as an outside force. 
Thus, for individual teachers to disregard and set numerical goals ―as a mere 
formality‖ does not halt, but rather assists the enactment of performativity. 
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With regard to the consequences for individual teachers, undoubtedly, Ms. 
Hatakeyama was most severely affected. She faced a dilemma between her 
professional sense of dedication to students and her pedagogical beliefs on one 
hand and the changes in her teaching and strained relations with her colleagues 
on the other. This dilemma disturbed her professional and personal identities and 
eventually led to her breakdown. However, when the breakdown occurred, the 
dilemma had almost disappeared. She just blamed herself saying, ―I should 
never have become a teacher.‖ She came to consider herself ―incompetent and 
responsible for all the collapse.‖  
In this identity work, the mechanism of ―responsibilisation‖ (Kelly, 2001, pp. 
29-31) played its full part. Responsibilisation was successful because Ms. 
Hatakeyama could not but ―conduct themselves [herself] in accordance with the 
appropriate (or approved) model of actions‖ (Beck & Ritter, 1992, p. 29, quoted 
in Kelly, 2001, p. 30). For Ms. Hatakeyama, the appropriate or approved action 
was to commit herself to ―teaching to the test,‖ which meant to produce higher 
test scores. Yet, responsibilisation does not always demand commitment and can 
happen to other teachers. Teachers responding to the new teacher evaluation by 
deploying the ―as a mere formality‖ strategy will still behave in accordance with 
the appropriate and approved model of action, and they will in turn be asked to 
accept responsibility for the results of their behaviours. Responsibilisation 
works more imperceptibly and more widely than many previous studies have 
assumed, just as performativity does. 
 
9.4 Implications for Research, Policies, and Practices 
 
Advantages of work through perspective of performativity  
In the present study, I have deployed the work through perspective of 
performativity as a theoretical concept. Through this analytical lens, I have been 
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able to observe how the new teacher evaluation policies played a role in 
producing or reinforcing mutually policing relations and the destabilisation of 
teachers‘ identities in schools. This observation illustrates the usefulness of the 
work through perspective of performativity and enables theorizing of 
performativity and research into related policies to become better informed.  
The work through perspective is constructed on a core assumption: 
performativity is being advanced through the social interactions of teachers. Thus, 
this particular perspective is closely connected to the micro-political or relational 
viewpoint I have adopted in Chapters 7 and 8. In Chapter 4, I argued that previous 
literature on performativity tended to focus on the impact of performativity 
policies or discourse on teachers as if they were simply outside forces. I called 
this work upon, as opposed to the work through perspective of performativity. It is 
not my intention to deny the work upon perspective, but rather I would argue that 
while policies initiate performativity in schools, performativity is fully enacted 
through the social interactions of teachers.  
Using the work through rather than the work upon perspective of 
performativity allows us a more fine-grained understanding of the impact of new 
teacher evaluation and, perhaps, other policies. Specifically, it is possible to 
analyse the indirect impact of performativity policies on teachers, mediated by 
affected relationships, as I have documented in the present study. The 
perspective also made it possible to pay attention to the composite effects of 
policies. A number of teachers suffered due to the strained and mutually 
accusatory relationships produced not only by the new teacher evaluation but 
also due to other changes in the policies and structures of managing teachers and 
schools.  
In contrast, a problem with the work upon perspective would be the 
individualistic nature of the analysis. From this perspective, performativity 
comes from elsewhere as a mandate, and it is what teachers respond to in some 
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way. They adapt to, comply with, appropriate, or resist performativity 
requirements, but ultimately in an isolated manner. For example, Jeffrey and 
Woods (2002) explored the identity work of teachers confronting performativity 
policies. Faced with a dilemma between self-identity and social identity, the 
teachers employed varied strategies, including refusal, self-assertion, separation 
of the self from the new social identity, and game-playing. This analysis gives 
the impression that identity work is being done individualistically. In reality, 
however, the nature of teachers‘ relations could significantly influence how 
policies affect identity work, as the present analyses of the impact of teacher 
evaluation have suggested.  
In addition, although it sounds contradictory to analytical individualism, the 
work upon perspective of performativity is based on an assumption of 
ontological collectivism. It is a model of school organisation that would help 
performativity to be reified (in other words, considered to be an outside thing) 
rather than a micro-political analysis. The literature on performativity often 
assumes that teachers‘ social relations are monolithic in value and orientation. 
However, I believe such strong value sharing among teachers is not common 
enough to be generalised. My own analysis in the present study suggests that the 
new teacher evaluation helps performativity to work by capitalising on the 
―differences among teachers with regard to teaching philosophies, personal 
goals and values, and political interests divisions‖ (Blasé & Anderson, 1995, p. 
64), both already present and newly produced, within school organisations.  
Ball, et al. illustrates that studies on ―policy implementation,‖ as opposed to 
―policy enactment,‖ pay little attention to different positions taken by school 
actors in relation to policies. This obscures the differentiated nature of their 
responses to policy (Ball, et al., 2011a, p. 625). With the exceptions of school 
leaders, teachers are likely to be regarded as ―receivers,‖ just coping and 
defending. On the other hand, the present research provides a more nuanced 
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picture than such ―implementation studies‖ of how teachers responded to new 
teacher evaluation policies.  
 
A comparison of teacher evaluation policies 
Japan‘s new teacher evaluation policies are meant to work in almost the 
same way as in other countries, such as performance management for teachers in 
the UK. In other words, teacher evaluation may promote teachers‘ professional 
development but within the parameters of State policies. The ―Structural Reform 
of Compulsory Education‖ has given the State additional strategic and stronger 
powers, with local education boards, schools, and teachers being given some 
autonomy in how they should work while dealing with severe constraints on the 
scope of their work. On the other hand, the present research documents some 
variance in how policies are enacted. In Japan, strict accountability measures, 
such as linking evaluation to pay, have been only introduced in some prefectures. 
This may be partly because local education boards are reluctant to develop harsh, 
confrontational relationships with teachers. However, as the present research 
suggests, this does not necessarily mean that Japan‘s teacher evaluation is less 
effective as a measure of political control than its counterparts in other 
countries; teacher evaluation works in a more indirect, subtle way, by means of 
changed modes of school management and altered relations among colleagues. 
As noted in Chapter 4, in Japanese culture, conflicts tend to be avoided, but 
control and domination are completed through relationships (Nakane, 1967). 
The enactment of new teacher evaluation policies, as the present study has 
explored, seems a newly added illustration of such control and domination. 
In addition, compared with head teachers in the UK, head teachers in Japan 
are more in favour of new teacher evaluation policies and, possibly, of the 
current education reform as a whole. This difference also highlights the 
inadequacy of researching teacher evaluation policies as simply enforced upon 
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teachers, telling teachers how they should teach students, develop professionally, 
and manage themselves. A micro-political study, with a particular focus on how 
head teachers or what are called ―enthusiasts‖ and ―translators‖ (Ball, et al., 
2011a) interpret and translate teacher evaluation policies in schools, is highly 
relevant in Japan.  
 
Alternatives to teacher evaluation policies and practices 
The present study is also concerned with alternatives to teacher evaluation 
policies and practices. A number of teachers I interviewed were concerned about 
or even critical of performance-related pay. Linking pay to evaluation results is a 
powerful constraint on teachers‘ professionalism and professional collaboration. 
Many studies on teachers‘ professional learning have confirmed that a 
professional learning community has positive effects on student learning 
outcomes (McLaughlin & Talbert, 2001; Vescio, Ross, & Adams, 2008). They 
also indicate that managerialism and testing accountability, which aims to 
increase student learning outcomes, have detrimental effects on teachers‘ 
emotions, sense of efficacy, conditions of work, and relationships, which can be 
debilitating for the professional learning community. If teachers‘ professional 
development is a serious consideration in an era where teaching is increasingly 
complex and demanding, such a strong accountability or managerial element 
should be abolished.  
However, the present study clearly indicates that abolishing performance-
related pay is not sufficient; without the salient element of accountability and 
control, performativity impacts, repositions, and reconstructs teachers‘ work and 
identities. This implies the need for alternative policies and practices.  
First, at the level of policy-making, in addition to teacher evaluation polices, 
a range of accountability and managerial policies should be reconsidered. As 
stated earlier, the new teacher evaluation policies are part of the policy ensemble 
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intended to more effectively control what and how teachers perform and 
produce. Policymakers and scholars should be more critically engaged in the 
idea of professional development by means of teacher evaluation. They should 
consider carefully the practical conditions for and substantial difficulties 
involved in this model of teacher evaluation. They should also develop a broader, 
macro-political perspective.  
Second, at the level of practice, teachers need a more critical view of the 
professional development model and a broader, macro-political perspective on 
teacher evaluation and performance-related pay. A number of teachers have 
chosen to respond to the requirements of the policies ―as a mere formality.‖ 
However, this kind of response does not help them escape performativity. On the 
contrary, it reinforces performativity with increasing number of teachers still 
setting numerical goals, thus straining relations among peers. In addition, 
teachers and head teachers should be more conscious of issues of social injustice 
occurring during teacher evaluation. 
This also has implications for future directions for teacher professionalism. 
The present research stresses the need to develop ―extended professionalism‖ 
(Hoyle, 1974) so that teachers and head teachers can more fully understand 
education policies and can intellectually and morally respond to the 
performativity issues that the policies endorse. Given that education policies are 
influenced and shaped by a variety of intersecting globalising forces and are 
mediated nationally and locally, teachers and head teachers must enhance their 
awareness of these wider, complex forces. They need to develop what Bottery 
(2006, p. 108) calls ―ecological awareness.‖ 
As I stated in Chapter 4, the present study has a transformative orientation 
(Mertens, 2007). The domination and marginalisation that it has thus far 
discovered through a mixed method research approach and the theoretical lens 
of performativity, needs to be shared not only with other researchers but with the 
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researched. Better understanding of existing reality can empower the dominated 
and marginalised to seek improvements. 
 
9.5 Limitations of the Research 
 
As I stated in Chapter 5, I had planned to select a few focus schools from the 
146 schools where not only head teachers but also teachers participated in the 
national survey, but I had to abandon this plan. I adopted what is called a 
―convenience-sampling approach‖ (Cohen & Manion, 1989, p. 103), which 
resulted in limitations on the representativeness of the schools and the teachers 
involved in the research.  
Originally, I intended to choose schools such that head teachers‘ views on 
new teacher evaluation policies could represent the national sample, from 
favourable to skeptical. In the event, all the head teachers I interviewed were in 
favour of the policies. Given the importance of head teachers‘ interpretations 
and translations of policies, if I had conducted the research according to the 
original design, I might have found some differences in the way the policies 
were being enacted.  
It should also be noted that neither elementary nor junior high schools were 
included in the study. As repeatedly stated, senior high schools are under 
stronger pressure with regard to performativity than elementary and junior high 
schools. In addition, as the results of the national survey suggested, senior high 
school teachers may have different views on the new teacher evaluation policies 
and practices than teachers in other types of school (see Chapter 6). Specifically, 
they are more likely to report unfavourable impacts on their relationships, and 
they are more likely to feel that their evaluation results are arbitrary and 
subjective. On balance, senior high school teachers have less confidence in the 
new teacher evaluation. These variances in views may reflect variances in the 
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way the policies are being enacted in different types of school. Therefore, I 
cannot claim that the present findings can be generalised to other types of school. 
However, this delimitation is an advantage in a sense as I was able to observe 
explicitly how performativity functions. The theoretical themes arising from the 
analyses can be explored in other cases. 
Another limitation was that I could not match interview data with survey 
data by school. If I had been able to do this, a greater variety of approaches to 
analysis would have been possible. For example, better use could have been 
made of teachers‘ responses to survey items that queried the current state of their 
schools. On the other hand, I did have the advantage of being able to collect 
contextual information about the schools, such as the subtle feel of teachers‘ 
relations and neighbours‘ views on the schools.  
 
9.6 Future Directions for Research 
 
Studying the enactment of teacher evaluation policies is necessary for us to 
be able to develop more ―educative approaches‖ (Gitlin & Smyth, 1989, pp. 3-7). 
We need to have a more adequate understanding of how the present state of 
performativity has become established in schools.  
I conceive two future directions for research. One is to investigate further the 
manner in which the new teacher evaluation policies are enacted but in different 
contexts. As stated above, the present research has limitations in terms of 
generalisability. The theoretical themes arising from the present research need to 
be explored with a wider sample, which should include elementary schools and 
junior high schools. In addition, schools in geographical areas other than the two 
prefectures in which I have conducted my research should be included in 
research. Variances in the new teacher evaluation schemes introduced by local 
education boards can affect the different ways in which the schemes are enacted 
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in those schools. 
The other direction is to widen the scope of the policies to be studied. For 
example, target-setting, evaluation of a school‘s performance, league tables 
constructed from pupil test scores, and a variety of learning policies for students 
are all concerned with performativity. This research has found that a policy 
ensemble, of which the new teacher evaluation policies are part, is inducing 
performativity in schools. This suggests that studying the new teacher evaluation 
policies in isolation is not sufficient. At the moment, myriad polices are being 
enacted in schools and they interact with, and frequently contradict each other. 
While some policies are explicitly concerned with performativity, others are not. 
Therefore, to address the myriad of problems associated with performativity, we 
need to understand the complexity in policy processes. This understanding could 
help us grasp ―how it [performativity] might be unmade‖ (Youdell, 2006, p. 512). 
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Appendix 1 Questionnaire for head teachers (translated into English): 
Views on new teacher evaluation and performance-based personnel system:  
 
Thank you very much for your participation in this research. Your answers will 
be statistically analysed and thus both you and your school will not be 
identified. Your candid answers willl be very much appreciated. 
 
February 2008 
 
Associate Professor Masaaki Katsuno  
Graduate School of Education, The University of Tokyo 
 
 
First of all, I would like to ask you about your school and yourself. Please 
choose the alternative that you regard as the most appropriate. 
 
Question 1. What type of school is yours? 
1. Elementary school  2. Junior high school  3. Senior high school   
4 Special school 
 
Question 2. What is the number of students at your school? 
1. No more than 50  2. 51～100  3. 101～200  4. 201～300  5. 301～400   
6. 401～500  7. 50～600  8. 601～700  9. 701～800  10. 801～900   
11. 901～1000  12. no less than 1001 
 
Question 3. What is the number of staff at your school? 
1. no more than 10  2. 11～20  3. 21～30  4. 31～40  5. 41～50  6. 51～60   
7. 61～70  8. 71～80 9. 81～90  10. 91～100  11. No less than 101 
 
Question 4. How many years have you been working at the present school? 
1. 1 year  2. 2 years  3. 3years  4. 4years  5. 5years  6. Over 6years 
 
Question 5. What is your age? 
1. Under 46  2. 46～50  3. 51～55  4. 56～60  5. Over 60 
 
Question 6. Which is you sex? 
1. Female  2. Male 
 
 
Secondly, I would like to know about your views on teachers‘ pay and 
performance-based personnel system teacher.  
 
Question 7. For each item below, please choose the alternative that you regard 
the most appropriate. 
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1. Generally speaking, linking pay to performance 
and competence is a matter of course. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Teachers' pay should reflect the demands of posts 
such head of a department or ―lead teacher‖. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Teachers' pay should reflect differences in 
workloads, including, for instance, supervision of 
club activities. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 4. Linking teachers‘ pay to students‘ academic 
achievement is a good idea. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. In order to reward the hard work of teachers, 
salary levels for all, rather than only some, teachers 
should be raised. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Linking pay to performance and competence is 
intended to cut off teachers‘ pay budget. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Linking pay to performance and competence is a 
good way of rewarding hardworking or competent 
teachers. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. Most teachers could not work harder even if their 
pay was linked to performance and competence, 
because they are already working up to their full 
limit. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. It is better to reward schools‘ performance in 
terms of staffing and finance better than to reward 
individual teachers‘ performance. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. Linking pay to performance and competence 
should contribute to the improvement of quality or 
standards in education. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. Linking teachers‘ pay to performance and 
competence is a fair way of distributing financial 
resource. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. Linking pay to performance and competence 
would contradict evaluating teachers for their 
professional development. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. Teachers‘ pay should not be linked to 
performance and competence, because it is difficult 
to attribute students‘ attainment to individual 
teachers. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. Linking pay to performance and competence 
should prompt teachers to work harder to meet 
goals or develop professionally. 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. Teachers‘ pay should not be linked to 
performance and competence, because this will 
cause competition and jealousy among teachers. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Thirdly, I would like to know about your experience of and views on new 
teacher evaluation. 
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Question 8. For each item below, please choose the alternative that you regard 
as the most appropriate. If you have not been involved in the process of new 
teacher evaluation, please skip this question and go straight to Question 10. 
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On overall effects of new teacher evaluation  
1. Helped me to deal with particularly incompetent 
teachers. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Helped me to deal with teachers having 
particularly heavy work load or health issues. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Improved communication and mutual 
understanding between teachers and me.  1 2 3 4 5 
4. Helped me to have teachers understand my own 
school management policies.  1 2 3 4 5 
5. Improved the teachers‘ understanding of school 
goals.  1 2 3 4 5 
6. Helped me to deal with particularly poorly 
motivated teachers.  1 2 3 4 5 
7. Helped me to have teachers think about work 
priorities more effectively. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Helped me to better identify teachers‘ needs for 
professional development.  1 2 3 4 5 
9. Improved teachers‘ overall morale. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. Improved the quality or standards of teaching 
and learning in the school.      
11. Caused some kinds of attrition in the 
relationships with teachers. 1 2 3 4 5 
On goal setting, 
12. I instructed teachers to set ―concrete and 
objective‖ goals such as numerical goals. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. I instructed teachers to set goals in line with my 
own school management policies. 1 2 3 4 5 
14. I instructed teachers to set goals in line with 
school goals, and goals of year or subject groups. 1 2 3 4 5 
15. I repeatedly required teachers to rewrite goals. 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. I instructed teachers to be aware of their annual 
goals over the course of a year. 1 2 3 4 5 
On meetings with teachers 
17. At the meeting with teachers, I listened to their 
concerns about teaching and guidance. 1 2 3 4 5 
18. At the meeting with teachers, I listened to their 
concerns about relations with parents or guardians 
of their students. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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19 At the meeting with teachers, I listened to their 
concerns about their work load or health issues. 1 2 3 4 5 
20. At the meeting with teachers, I listened to their 
concerns about relations with their colleagues. 1 2 3 4 5 
21. At the meeting with teachers, I listened to their 
opinions regarding my school management 
policies. 
1 2 3 4 5 
On lesson observation and feedback 
22. I had enough pre-observation discussion with 
teachers. 1 2 3 4 5 
23. I gave enough feedback to teachers after lesson 
observations. 1 2 3 4 5 
24. I felt the difficulties of objectively judging teachers‘  
performance, competence, and motivation. 1 2 3 4 5 
On self review and evaluation results 
25. I often felt that teachers‘ self-reviews were 
subjective or arbitrary. 1 2 3 4 5 
26. I gave enough feedback to teachers regarding 
my judgment of their performance and 
competence. 
1 2 3 4 5 
27. Teachers were mostly satisfied with my 
judgment of their performance and competence. 1 2 3 4 5 
28.My judgment of teachers‘ performance and 
competence  
mostly accorded with their self-review. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Fourthly, I would like to know about your views on differences in performance 
of different teachers. 
 
Question 9. On the whole, do you agree with the proposition that differences in 
performance of different teachers can be attributable to the teachers themselves? 
Please, choose the alternative that you regard as the most appropriate. 
 
1. Strongly agree  2. Agree  3. Disagree  4. Strongly disagree  5. Do not know 
 
    If you chose 1 or 2, please go to Question 10.  
    If you chose 3 or 4, please go to Question 11. 
    If you chose 5, please skip both Question 10 and 11 and go straight to 
Question 12.   
 
Question 10. What do you think differences in performance of different teachers 
are specifically attributable to? Please choose up to three alternatives that you 
regard as the most appropriate.  
1. Knowledge about subject matters  2. Teaching skills   
3. Knowledge about students  4. Age  5. Prior experiences  6. Motivation   
7. Others (Please specify                                                                                )   
 
Question 11. Except for teachers‘ personal matters, what do you think 
differences in performance of different teachers are specifically attributable to? 
Please choose up to three alternatives that you regard as the most appropriate.  
1. relationships with students  2. Relationships with colleagues  
 3. Relationships with school managers  4. Load and intensification of work   
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5. School management policies  6. The current education reform   
7. Others (Please specify                                                                               ) 
 
Question 12. When evaluating teachers‘ performance and competence, whose 
views do you think should be most seriously considered? Please choose up to 
three alternatives that you regard as the most appropriate.  
1. Head teacher  2. Deputy head  3. Chief teacher or Head of sub-groups   
4. Colleague teachers  5. Colleagues of the same subject  
 6. School councilors or governors  7. Students   
8. Parents or guardians of students  9 Local board of education   
10. The third party   
11 Others (Please specify                                                                               ) 
 
 
Lastly, I would like to ask you about the current state of your school. 
 
Question 13. For each item below, please choose the alternative that you regard 
as the most appropriate.  
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1. Our staff shares the same goals regarding 
teaching and guidance of students. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Even when a certain teacher has serious 
difficulties in her/his teaching or class 
management, other teachers are not willing to give 
a helping hand to her/him. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Our staff always talks about the way we should 
attain the current school goals. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. At the subject or year group meetings, little time 
remains for talking about classes and learning and 
of development of students, because agendas are 
occupied with administrative matters. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Most of our staff does not know how other 
teacher are teaching or they does not know each 
other‘s goals. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Despite difficulties in day-to-day running of 
school, our staff is always forward-looking. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Our staff feels free to talk about teaching and 
guidance of students. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Our staff gives the top priority to students‘ 
learning and development. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. Our staff is always aware of school managers‘ 
policies. 1 2 3 4 5 
10. Our staff gives the top priority to raising 
―visible‖ achievement of students, whether 
academic or physical. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. Not a few of staff are critical of giving the top 
priority to raising ―visible‖ achievement of 1 2 3 4 5 
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students, whether academic or physical 
12. Not a few of staff complains about the heavy 
workload. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. Not a few of staff complains about school 
manager‘s policies. 1 2 3 4 5 
14. Our staff often talks about how students are 
doing and developing. 1 2 3 4 5 
15. Even if individual teachers disagree with 
whole-school or  sub-group policies, they are 
consistently put in force. 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. Our staff is proud of being a member of this 
school. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Question 14. If permitted, I would also like to know the views held by teachers 
in your school. If you cooperate further and grant this permission to me, please 
specify the name of your school below. I will send a package of questionnaire 
for teachers to you (For your reference, a sample of questionnaire for teachers is 
enclosed.) 
 
The name of your school  
             (                                                                                                               ) 
 
  
You have answered all the questions. Thank you again for your participation in 
this research. 
 
If you have any concerns or questions about the research, please do not hesitate 
to make enquiries to the following address, phone/fax, or email. 
 
Address: Graduate School of Education, The University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, 
Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, 113-0033 Japan    Phone/Fax: 03-5841-3967    Email: 
mkatsuno@p.u-tokyo.ac.jp   
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Appendix 2 Questionnaire for teachers (translated into English): Views on 
new teacher evaluation and performance-based personnel system  
 
Thank you very much for your participation in this research. Your answers will 
be statistically analysed and thus both you and your school will not be 
identified. Your candid answers shall be very much appreciated. 
 
February 2008 
 
Associate Professor Masaaki Katsuno  
Graduate School of Education, The University of Tokyo 
 
 
First of all, I would like to ask you about your school and yourself. Please 
choose the alternative that you regard as the most appropriate. 
 
Question 1. What type of school is yours? 
1. Elementary school  2. Junior high school  3. Senior high school   
4 Special school 
 
Question 2. What is the number of students at your school? 
1. no more than 50  2. 51～100  3. 101～200  4. 201～300  5. 301～400   
6. 401～500  7. 50～600  8. 601～700  9. 701～800  10. 801～900   
11. 901～1000  12. no less than 1001 
 
Question 3. What is the number of staff at your school? 
1. No more than 10  2. 11～20  3. 21～30  4. 31～40  5. 41～50  6. 51～60   
7. 61～70  8. 71～80 9. 81～90  10. 91～100  11. No less than 101～ 
 
Question 4. How many years have you been working at the present school? 
1. 1 year  2. 2 years  3. 3years  4. 4years  5. 5years  6. 6years  7. 7 years   
8. 8 years  9. 9 year  10. 10years  11.Over 11 years 
 
Question 5. What is your current post or responsibility? 
1. Deputy head  2. Chief teacher  
3. Head of sub-groups such as instruction division, guidance division, and year group  
4. Lead teacher  5. Regular teacher 
 
Question 6. What is your age? 
1. Under 26  2. 26～30  3. 31～35  4. 36～40  5. 41～45  6. 46～50  7. 51～55   
8. 56～60  9. Over 60 
 
Question 7. Which is you sex? 
1. Female  2. Male 
 
 
Secondly, I would like to know about your views on teachers‘ pay and 
performance-based personnel system teacher.  
 
Question 8. For each item below, please choose the alternative that you regard 
as the most appropriate. 
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1. Generally speaking, linking pay to performance 
and competence is a matter of course. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Teachers' pay should reflect the demands of posts 
such head of a department or ―lead teacher‖. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Teachers' pay should reflect differences in 
workloads, including, for instance, supervision of 
club activities. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 4. Linking teachers‘ pay to students‘ academic 
achievement is a good idea. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. In order to reward the hard work of teachers, 
salary levels for all, rather than only some, teachers 
should be raised. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Linking pay to performance and competence is 
intended to cut off teachers‘ pay budget. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Linking pay to performance and competence is a 
good way of rewarding hardworking or competent 
teachers. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. Most teachers could not work harder even if their 
pay was linked to performance and competence, 
because they are already working up to their full 
limit. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. It is better to reward schools‘ performance in 
terms of staffing and finance better than to reward 
individual teachers‘ performance. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. Linking pay to performance and competence 
should contribute to the improvement of quality or 
standards in education. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. Linking teachers‘ pay to performance and 
competence is a fair way of distributing financial 
resource. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. Linking pay to performance and competence 
would contradict evaluating teachers for their 
professional development. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. Teachers‘ pay should not be linked to 
performance and competence, because it is difficult 
to attribute students‘ attainment to individual 
teachers. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. Linking pay to performance and competence 
should prompt teachers to work harder to meet 
goals or develop professionally. 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. Teachers‘ pay should not be linked to 
performance and competence, because this will 
cause competition and jealousy among teachers. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Thirdly, I would like to know about your experience of and views on new 
teacher evaluation. 
Question 9. For each item below, please choose the alternative that you regard 
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as the most appropriate. If you have not been involved in the process of new 
teacher evaluation, please skip this question and go straight to Question 10. 
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On overall effects of new teacher evaluation  
1. Improved communication and mutual 
understanding between my head teacher and me. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Improved my understanding of head teacher‘s 
school management policies. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Improved my understanding of school goals. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Improved my overall morale. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Helped me to think about work priorities more 
effectively. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Helped me to better identify my needs for 
professional development. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Improved quality and standards of teaching and 
learning in my classes. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Caused some kinds of attrition in the 
relationships with my head teacher. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. Caused some kinds of attrition in the 
relationships with my colleagues. 1 2 3 4 5 
On goal setting, 
10. My head teacher instructed me to set ―concrete 
and objective‖ goals such as numerical goals. 1 2 3 4 5 
11. My head teacher instructed me to set goals in 
line with her/his school management policies. 1 2 3 4 5 
12. My head teacher instructed me to set goals in 
line with school goals, and goals of year or subject 
groups. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. I consulted my colleagues when setting my 
own goals. 1 2 3 4 5 
14. My head teacher repeatedly required me to 
rewrite goals. 1 2 3 4 5 
15. Most of my colleagues know my goals. 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. I have been always aware of my annual goals 
over the course of a year. 1 2 3 4 5 
On meetings with the evaluation 
17. At the meeting with the evaluator, I voiced 
concerns about teaching and guidance. 1 2 3 4 5 
18. At the meeting with the evaluator, I voiced 
concerns about relations with parents or guardians 
of my students. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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19 At the meeting with the evaluator, I voiced 
concerns about my work load or health issues. 1 2 3 4 5 
20. At the meeting with the evaluator, I voiced 
concerns about relations with my colleagues. 1 2 3 4 5 
21. I expressed opinions regarding my head 
teacher‘s management policies. 1 2 3 4 5 
On lesson observation and feedback 
22. I had enough pre-observation discussion with 
the evaluator. 1 2 3 4 5 
23. I received enough feedback from the evaluator after 
lesson observations. 1 2 3 4 5 
On self review and evaluation results 
24. I consulted my colleagues when self-reviewing 
performance and competence. 1 2 3 4 5 
25. I felt that my evaluation results were subjective 
or arbitrary. 1 2 3 4 5 
26. I received enough feedback from my head 
teacher regarding my evaluation results. 1 2 3 4 5 
27. I was mostly satisfied with my evaluation 
results. 1 2 3 4 5 
28. My self-review of performance and competence 
mostly accorded with my evaluation results. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Fourthly, I would like to know about your views on differences in performance 
of different teachers. 
 
Question 10. On the whole, do you agree with the proposition that differences 
in performance of different teachers can be attributable to the teachers 
themselves? Please, choose the alternative that you regard the most appropriate. 
 
1. Strongly agree  2. Agree  3. Disagree  4. Strongly disagree  5. Do not know 
 
    If you chose 1 or 2, please go to Question 11.  
    If you chose 3 or 4, please go to Question 12. 
    If you chose 5, please skip both Question 11 and 12 and go straight to 
Question 13.   
 
Question 11. What do you think differences in performance of different teachers 
are specifically attributable to? Please choose up to three alternatives that you 
regard as the most appropriate.  
1. Knowledge about subject matters  2. Teaching skills   
3. Knowledge about students  4. Age  5. Prior experiences  6. Motivation   
7. Others (Please specify                                                                                 ) 
 
Question 12. Except for teachers‘ personal matters, what do you think 
differences in performance of different teachers are specifically attributable to? 
Please choose up to three alternatives that you regard as the most appropriate.  
1. Relationships with students  2. Relationships with colleagues   
3. Relationships with school managers  4. Load and intensification of work   
5. School management policies  6. The current education reform   
7. Others (Please specify                                                                                  ) 
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Question 13. When evaluating teachers‘ performance and competence, whose 
views do you think should be most seriously considered? Please choose up to 
three alternatives that you regard as the most appropriate.  
1. Head teacher  2. Deputy head  3. Chief teacher or Head of sub-groups   
4. Colleague teachers  5. Colleagues of the same subject   
6. School councilors or governors  7. Students   
8. Parents or guardians of students  9 Local board of education   
10. The third party  
11. Others (Please specify                                             ) 
 
 
Lastly, I would like to ask you about the current state of your school. 
 
Question 14. For each item below, please choose the alternative that you regard 
as the most appropriate.  
 
 
S
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1. Our staff shares the same goals regarding 
teaching and guidance of students. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Even when a certain teacher has serious 
difficulties in her/his teaching or class 
management, other teachers are not willing to give 
a helping hand to her/him. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Our staff always talks about the way we should 
attain the current school goals. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. At the subject or year group meetings, little time 
remains for talking about classes and learning and 
of development of students, because agendas are 
occupied with administrative matters. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Most of our staff does not know how other 
teachers are teaching or they do not know each 
other‘s goals. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Despite difficulties in day-to-day running of 
school, our staff is always forward-looking. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Our staff feels free to talk about teaching and 
guidance of students. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Our staff gives the top priority to students‘ 
learning and development. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. Our staff is always conscious of school 
managers‘ policies. 1 2 3 4 5 
10. Our staff gives the top priority to raising 
―visible‖ achievement of students, whether 
academic or physical. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. Not a few of staff are critical of giving the top 
priority to raising ―visible‖ achievement of 
students, whether academic or physical 
1 2 3 4 5 
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12. Not a few of staff complains about the heavy 
workload. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. Not a few of staff complains about school 
manager‘s policies. 1 2 3 4 5 
14. Our staff often talks about how students are 
doing and developing. 1 2 3 4 5 
15. Even if individual teachers disagree with 
whole-school or sub-group policies, they are 
consistently put in force. 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. Our staff is proud of being a member of this 
school. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
You have answered all the questions. Thank you again for your participation in 
this research. 
 
If you have any concerns or questions about the research, please do not hesitate 
to make enquiries to the following address, phone/fax, or email. 
 
Address: Graduate School of Education, The University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, 
Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, 113-0033 Japan    Phone/Fax: 03-5841-3967    Email: 
mkatsuno@p.u-tokyo.ac.jp   
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Appendix 3 Letter of invitation to head teachers for interview (translated 
into English) 
Dear    
 
As you know, over the last few years almost all of the local boards of 
education across Japan have put re-designed schemes of teacher evaluation into 
operation. In this letter, I would like to request for your kind cooperation with 
my research into the way the new teacher evaluation policies are enacted in 
schools, and how head teachers and teachers experience and make sense of the 
practices.  
I would like you, as head teacher, to consider your own participation in this 
research and also conveying this invitation to teachers at your school. 
Participation in this research is totally voluntary. If you decline to cooperate 
altogether, you don‘t have to distribute invitation letters for teacher on my behalf. 
Participation in this research will involve an interview of approximately one 
hour in length. The interview will take place when and where you feel most 
convenient and comfortable. You may decline to answer any of the interview 
questions if you wish. You may decide to withdraw from this research at any 
time before completion of data collection (July/2009). With your permission, the 
interview will be audio recorded for the accuracy of information, and later 
transcribed for analysis. All information you provide will be kept completely 
confidential. You have rights to see the transcripts of interview and any other 
information you have provided and withdraw any part of the information before 
completion of data collection (July/2009). Whenever I use the information in my 
PhD thesis or any other papers resulting from this study, your school and 
identity will be kept strictly anonymous.  
For your reference, I have attached a list of likely interview questions to this 
letter. If you would like additional information to assist you in reaching a 
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decision about participation or you have any questions regarding this study, 
please contact me by means of postal address, phone/ fax, or email that appears 
below.  
I look forward to hearing from you and thank you in advance for your co-
operation with this research. 
 
With best wishes. 
 
 
 
Masaaki KATSUNO 
Graduate School of Education,  
The University of Tokyo,  
7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo, Tokyo, 
113-0033 Japan 
Phone & Fax 03-5841-3967 
Email mkatsuno@p.u-tokyo.ac.jp 
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Interview questions for head teachers 
 
These are the key interview questions, however you may wish to make other 
comments where you think they are relevant 
 
1. What do you think are the beneficial or harmful effects of teacher evaluation? 
For example how about its effects on  
 communication between you and teachers? 
 communication among teachers? 
 teachers‘ understanding of school goals or your management 
policies? 
 teachers‘ morale? 
 teachers‘ professional development? 
 quality or standards of teaching and learning in you school? 
2. What is your view of evaluation meetings with teachers? More specifically, 
 What instruction did you give with regard to goal setting? 
 Were you happy with teachers‘ self-review of performance and 
competences? 
3. Do you think your management approach has somehow changed as a result of 
teacher evaluation?  
4. Are there elements in the process of teacher evaluation that particularly 
impressed/dismayed you? Why? 
5. Do you think if there is any better way to evaluate teachers? 
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Appendix 4 Letter of invitation to teachers for interview (translated into 
English) 
 
Dear    
 
As you know, over the last few years almost all of the local boards of 
education across Japan have put re-designed schemes of teacher evaluation into 
operation. In this letter, I would like to request for your kind cooperation with 
my research into the way the new teacher evaluation policies are enacted in 
schools, and how head teachers and teachers experience and make sense of the 
practices.  
With you head teacher‘s permission; I distribute this invitation letters to you. 
Participation in this research is totally voluntary. Participation in this research 
will involve an interview of approximately one hour in length. The interview 
will take place when and where you feel most convenient and comfortable. You 
may decline to answer any of the interview questions if you wish. You may 
decide to withdraw from this research at any time before completion of data 
collection (July/2009). With your permission, the interview will be audio 
recorded for the accuracy of information, and later transcribed for analysis. All 
information you provide will be kept completely confidential. You have rights to 
see the transcripts of interview and any other information you have provided and 
withdraw any part of the information before completion of data collection 
(July/2009). Whenever I use the information in my PhD thesis or any other 
papers resulting from this study, your school and identity will be kept strictly 
anonymous.  
For your reference, I have attached a list of likely interview questions to this 
letter. If you would like additional information to assist you in reaching a 
decision about participation or you have any questions regarding this study, 
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please contact me by means of either postal address, phone/ fax, or email that 
appears below.  
I look forward to hearing from you and thank you in advance for your co-
operation with this research. 
 
With best wishes. 
 
 
 
Masaaki KATSUNO 
Graduate School of Education,  
The University of Tokyo,  
7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo, Tokyo, 
113-0033 Japan 
Phone & Fax 03-5841-3967 
Email mkatsuno@p.u-tokyo.ac.jp 
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Interview questions for teachers 
 
These are the key interview questions, however you may wish to make other 
comments where you think they are relevant 
 
1. What do you think are the beneficial or harmful effects of teacher evaluation? 
For example how about its effects on  
 communication with head teacher? 
 communication among teachers? 
 your understanding of school goals or head teacher‘s 
management policies? 
 your morale? 
 your professional development? 
 quality or standards of teaching and learning in you class? 
 
2. What is your view of evaluation meetings with head teacher? More 
specifically, 
 what instruction were you given with regard to goal setting? 
 what were your goals like? 
 were you happy with head teacher‘s evaluation of your 
performance and competences? 
3. Do you think your teaching approach has somehow changed as a result of 
teacher evaluation?  
4. Are there elements in the process of teacher evaluation that particularly 
impressed/dismayed you? Why? 
5. Do you think if there is any better way to evaluate teachers? 
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Appendix 5 Consent Form 
 
Having read the letter of invitation and list of key interview questions, I 
understand the purpose of the research and the nature of my participation in it. I 
was informed that I have rights to; 
1) decline to participate in the research, 
2) decline to answer particular questions, 
3) withdraw completely from the research at any time and  
4) see the transcripts of interview and any other information I have 
provided and withdraw any part of the information before completion of data 
collection (July/2009). 
 
I am aware that I have the option of allowing my interview to be audio recorded 
to ensure the accuracy of information and the information will be kept 
confidential, with the understanding that any quotations in the thesis or paper 
will be anonymous.  
With full knowledge of all of the above, I agree, of my own free will, to 
participate in this research. 
 
 
Signature: ______________________________ 
 
  
Date: ____________________________ 
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Appendix 6 List of teacher interviewees 
 
Pseudonym Subject Age Brief description 
East Senior High School 
Ms Yamamoto mathematics  30s Apparently had little difficulty 
in adapting herself to the 
requirements of teacher 
evaluation. 
Mr. Aoyama physical education 50s Categorically criticised the 
rationale of new teacher 
evaluation 
Mr Kitano chemistry 30s Suffered from the strained 
relationships with his 
colleagues 
Mr Shimura English 50s Thought of numerical goals as 
contradictory to his original 
aims of teaching. 
West Senior High School 
Ms Miyakawa English 40s Disregarded the new teacher 
evaluation system, believing 
in its ineffectiveness. 
Ms Kawabata physics 40s Declined to set any numerical 
goals 
Mr. Ota History 50s Was doubtful about the 
effectiveness of new teacher 
evaluation. 
South Special School 
Mr. Kagawa autonomic training  50s Raised issues concerning 
harassment and 
discrimination.  
Mr. Miyazaki special education needs 50s Suffered from the experience 
of exhorted to set her goals in 
line with school goals that she 
disagreed. 
North Senior High School 
Ms Hatakaeyama English  20s Suffered from performativity 
and developed a mental 
illness. 
Ms Minimisawa chemistry  50s An active union member and 
declined to set numerical 
goals. 
Mr.Tada Japanese 50s His lessons had never been 
observed by the head teacher. 
 
